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Research shows that Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) is related to excessive worry. 
Individuals high in IU appear to have information processing biases, which may explain 
how IU leads to worry. Specifically, high IU individuals appear to have an attentional 
bias for threat and uncertainty, and interpret uncertain information in a threatening way. 
While there is some evidence of a memory bias for uncertainty in high IU, findings are 
limited. The purpose of this study was therefore to explore the relationship between IU 
and memory biases for threat and uncertainty. Stimuli for use in the research were pilot 
tested in Study 1; this produced a set of word stimuli that included neutral, uncertain, 
social threat, physical threat, and positive words. Study 2 evaluated the relationship 
between IU and explicit memory for threat and uncertainty; the influence of worry, 
cognitive avoidance, and depression were also explored. Participants performed an 
incidental learning task and then completed recognition and free recall tests of memory. 
Results showed no relationship between IU and explicit memory for uncertain and threat 
words. However, three forms of cognitive avoidance—distraction, avoidance of 
threatening stimuli, and thought suppression—were related to recall of physical threat 
words. Study 3 examined the role of IU in implicit memory for threat and uncertainty, 
and the contribution of cognitive avoidance and stimulus relevance. Participants 
performed an implicit encoding task, and measures of explicit (recall) and implicit 
(tachistoscopic identification) memory. The results showed no relationship between IU 
and memory for threat or uncertainty. However, stimulus relevance was related to 
implicit memory for physical threat words. Interesting results again emerged for 
cognitive avoidance: thought substitution, avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought 
suppression were related to implicit memory for physical threat words. Findings from the 
three studies were discussed in relation to the Williams et al. (1997) model, which 
predicts an implicit but not an explicit memory bias for threat among anxious individuals. 
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Worry is a widespread experience. Most of us have worried about an event whose 
outcome is unknown, and whose consequences could range anywhere from disagreeable 
to disastrous. Research suggests that as much as 38% of the general population worry at 
least once a day (Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). In the literature, worry is often 
described as an internal monologue concerning some anxiety-provoking future event. For 
the purposes of research, worry has more specifically been defined as ―a cognitive 
phenomenon… concerned with future events where there is uncertainty about the 
outcome, the future being thought about is a negative one, and this is accompanied by 
feelings of anxiety‖ (MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 1991, p. 478). While worry is 
usually accompanied by the experience of anxiety, there is evidence that worry and 
anxiety are distinct constructs, with different relationships to indices of affect, 
performance, coping, and problem solving (i.e., Davey, 1993; Davey, Hampton, Farrell, 
& Davidson, 1992; Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, 1978; Steptoe & Kearsley, 1990; 
Zebb & Beck, 1998). At mild levels, worry is not only a common experience, but may 
even be a constructive one. For example, Borkovec (1985) described worry as a form of 
attempted mental problem solving, whose goal is to generate ways of coping with 
potential negative outcomes. Studies show that many people believe worrying is helpful. 
For example, beliefs that worry is motivating, helps problem solving, analytical thinking, 
and prepares one for negative outcomes, have been widely reported (i.e., Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995; Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994; Tallis et al., 1994). There is some research support for the idea that 




is controlled, worrying can be related to constructive forms of coping such as 
information-seeking, monitoring, and problem solving. However, this type of result has 
emerged primarily when measures of non-clinical worry are used (e.g., Davey et al., 
1992; Davey, 1993, 1994a), suggesting that worry may be related to positive coping 
strategies primarily among low worriers.  
In accordance with this idea, research shows that higher levels of worry are often 
experienced as aversive, intrusive, and uncontrollable (Borkovec & Newman, 1999; 
Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Davey, 1993). Subjective reports 
suggest that people also believe that worry makes them less effective, creates emotional 
distress, and makes problems seem worse (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Davey et al., 
1996; Tallis et al., 1994). Research does in fact indicate that worry can interfere with 
functioning in a variety of ways. For example, studies show that worry results in slowed 
performance on certain tasks, particularly when the correct response is unclear (Dugas, 
Freeston, Blais, & Ladouceur, 1993; Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990; 
Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991). In addition, research suggests that worry, rather than 
anxious affect, has a negative impact on test performance (Deffenbacher, 1978; Morris & 
Liebert, 1970; Seipp, 1991). In addition, high worriers appear to require excessive levels 
of information in order to make decisions (Tallis et al., 1991). Still other research shows 
greater degrees of procrastination and perfectionism among high worriers, which seems 
due to their elevated concern about taking action and making mistakes (Frost, Marten, 
Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Stöber & Joormann, 2001). As previously noted, while 
worry resembles certain aspects of problem solving (i.e., the identification of problems), 




worriers do not appear to be deficient in problem solving skills (Davey, 1994b; Dugas, 
Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995), they do appear to have a negative 
problem orientation – in other words, worriers report a negative view of problems, and a 
lack of confidence in their own problem solving abilities (Belzer, D‘Zurilla, & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2002; Davey, 1994b; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). Research has 
shown that both problem solving skills and a positive problem orientation are necessary 
for the successful resolution of problems (D‘Zurilla & Nezu, 1999). Worriers may 
therefore be less successful problem solvers because their negative problem orientation 
prevents them from acting on any of the ideas generated during the worry process 
(Davey, 1994b; Davey et al., 1992; Dugas, Letarte, et al., 1995). It has further been 
proposed that the vigilant, information-seeking cognitive style of worriers may lead them 
to view innocuous events as threats, and to detect an ever-increasing number of problems, 
thereby perpetuating the cycle of worry (Davey et al., 1992). Overall, therefore, it appears 
that worry, particularly at higher levels, is an intrusive, unwanted process that maintains 
anxiety and awareness of threat, without leading to successful resolution of the triggering 
situation. 
The type of maladaptive worry described above is particularly prominent in 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD); in fact, excessive and uncontrollable worry is the 
central feature of this disorder. In GAD, excessive worry must be present most days for at 
least six months, and accompanied by physical symptoms such as agitation, muscle 
tension, irritability, fatigue, and sleep disturbance (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). As already noted, worry is also present in non-clinical populations. However, the 




Beaudoin, Rhéaume, Ladouceur, & Dugas, 2001; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001) as well 
as more uncontrollable and less realistic (Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989). 
Individuals with GAD are also more likely to view their worry as dangerous (Ruscio & 
Borkovec, 2004) and difficult to regulate compared to controls (Craske et al., 1989; 
Hoyer et al., 2001). GAD is one of the most common anxiety disorders, with a lifetime 
prevalence of between 4 - 6% (Blazer, Hughes, George, Swartz & Boyer, 1991; Kessler 
et al., 1994). Research indicates that GAD is among the most disabling of the anxiety 
disorders, and is comparable to physical illness and depression in terms of interference 
and distress (Maier et al., 2000; Wittchen, 2002). Studies show that individuals with 
GAD have higher consultation and comorbidity rates than individuals with other anxiety 
disorders (Dugas, Freeston, et al., 1998). GAD is also associated with an elevated use of 
health care services, and higher costs due to occupational disability, compared to the 
general population (Koerner et al., 2004; Wittchen, 2002). The inclusion of excessive 
worry as the cardinal feature of GAD in the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987) led to numerous studies investigating the properties of worry and its 
underlying mechanisms. This research generated several theoretical models of excessive 
worry and GAD (e.g., Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998; Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & 
Freeston, 1998; Wells & Carter, 1999), which in turn have led to empirically supported 
treatments (e.g., Borkovec & Costello 1993; Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; 
Dugas et al., 2010; Dugas et al., 2003; Ladouceur, Dugas, et al., 2000). Among clinical 
disorders, high levels of worry appear to be most characteristic of GAD (Andrews et al., 




anxiety disorders, and to some extent in mood disorders as well (Barlow, 1988; Riskind 
et al., 1991; Starcevic et al., 2007). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Given that excessive worry is the core feature of GAD, and is moreover present in 
other anxiety disorders, worry itself has been the focus of several studies. The goal of 
some recent research has been to understand the cognitive processes that may drive and 
perpetuate excessive worry. A cognitive process that has received considerable research 
attention, and that has been specifically linked to excessive worry, is Intolerance of 
Uncertainty (IU). IU can be defined as a dispositional characteristic that results from a 
set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, 
p. 24). More specifically, individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty believe that 
uncertainty is stressful, unfair, interferes with their ability to function, and should be 
avoided (Sexton & Dugas, 2009a). Negative reactions to uncertainty, and difficulty 
coping with uncertainty, can be seen as a type of dispositional bias which gives rise to 
excessive worry. It can be imagined that someone highly intolerant of uncertainty would 
encounter numerous instances of uncertainty in everyday life; negative beliefs about 
uncertainty (i.e., ―Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed‖; ―It‘s unfair having 
no guarantees in life‖) would increase their tendency to worry, even about minor events. 
IU is the key process in the theoretical model of worry proposed by Dugas, Gagnon, et al. 
(1998). In addition to IU, this model includes other components thought to be related to 
worry (e.g., negative problem orientation, cognitive avoidance, and positive beliefs about 




appears to be the central mechanism that underlies the other processes, and is most 
specifically related to worry.  
Research supports the proposal that IU is both highly and specifically related to 
worry. For example, research has shown that IU maintains a strong and significant 
relationship with worry, even when associated factors such as anxiety (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002), symptoms of depression (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 
2004), dysfunctional attitudes (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004), perceived sense of 
control, and perfectionism are statistically controlled (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). In addition, 
IU has been found to accurately differentiate individuals with GAD from non-clinical 
controls, and from those with other anxiety disorders (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 
2005; Ladouceur et al., 1999; note however that findings are less definitive with regards 
to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, i.e., Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006). In clinical 
populations, IU successfully distinguishes mild GAD from moderate to severe GAD 
(Dugas et al., 2007). Moreover, experimental manipulations have shown that increasing 
IU leads to more worry, whereas decreasing IU leads to less worry (Ladouceur, Gosselin, 
& Dugas, 2000). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Information Processing 
While the above research demonstrates a strong relationship between IU and 
worry, it does not explain the mechanism underlying this relationship. In other words, we 
know that IU contributes to worry, but we do not yet know how. Cognitive theory, with 
the aid of an information processing framework, allows us to explore just this type of 
question. Essentially, cognitive theory proposes that our basic beliefs or schemas affect 




2010). The information processing approach examines processing in terms of different 
stages, such as attention, interpretation, and memory (see Bower, 2000, for an overview). 
Combined, these theories produce questions concerning how a belief such as IU might 
affect what worriers attend to, understand, and remember about the world around them. 
More specific questions might be: Do individuals high in IU pay more attention to certain 
types of information in their environment? How do they interpret and remember this 
information? How might IU influence different aspects of information processing, and 
how might this lead to increased levels of worry? Answers to these questions could 
enhance not only current cognitive models of excessive worry, but could also inform 
psychological treatments for disorders such as GAD. 
Contemporary research does in fact suggest that IU can influence and direct 
information processing. For example, a recent study assessed whether individuals high in 
IU have an attentional bias toward words denoting uncertainty (Heinecke, Koerner, 
Dugas, & Mogg, 2006). This study used a probe classification task, in which a probe (the 
letter E or F) replaced different types of stimulus words. Words were presented in pairs, 
comprised of one neutral and one other word, that was either physically threatening, 
socially threatening, uncertain, or positive. When a probe appeared, participants were 
asked to classify it as ‗E‘ or ‗F‘ by pressing a key; faster reaction times denoted an 
attentional bias toward the word that the probe replaced. The results showed that 
individuals high in IU were faster at classifying probes that replaced either uncertain or 
physically threatening words, indicating an attentional bias toward threatening and 
uncertain information. Unfortunately, no other studies to date have specifically examined 




Other research suggests that IU influences the interpretation, or appraisal, of 
ambiguous information. For example, Dugas, Hedayati, et al. (2005) assessed the 
relationship between IU and the appraisal of scenarios using the 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et al., 1992). The AUSD is 
made up of a set of scenarios that describe everyday events. The scenarios of interest for 
this study were ambiguous in nature, for example, ―Today, my supervisor called me to 
their office to discuss the change in the quality of my work over the last few weeks‖. 
Participants were asked to read these scenarios, imagine that the events had happened to 
them, and then rate their level of concern about the scenario. Higher levels of concern 
indicated that a scenario had been interpreted in a more negative way. The results showed 
that individuals high in IU reported significantly more concern about ambiguous 
scenarios compared to those low in IU. In addition, regression analyses showed that IU 
made a significant and unique contribution to the prediction of these negative appraisals, 
beyond demographics, mood, anxiety, and worry (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005).  
Expanding on this methodology, Koerner and Dugas (2008) examined appraisals 
in high and low IU participants, using a larger set of positive, negative, and ambiguous 
scenarios. They found that IU was the strongest predictor of concern about ambiguous 
scenarios when demographics, mood, and physical anxiety symptoms were controlled. In 
addition, a mediational analysis showed that appraisals of ambiguous scenarios partially 
mediated the relationship between IU and worry. Similar findings have emerged from 
studies using pictorial stimuli. For example, Koerner and Dugas (2007) recently 
conducted a study using neutral, ambiguous, negative, and positive pictures selected from 




Participants were asked to rate the pictures on pleasantness (this was used as an index of 
appraisals, such that ‗very unpleasant‘ = negative, and ‗very pleasant‘ = positive; see 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, Johnson, 2000). As with the written scenario studies, the 
results showed that individuals high in IU rated negative and ambiguous pictures as 
significantly less pleasant compared to those low in IU. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that an information processing bias (i.e., a negative appraisal of ambiguity) 
may be one of the mechanisms by which a cognitive process such as IU ultimately leads 
to worry. These studies together support the proposal that IU is associated with negative 
interpretations of ambiguity. The tendency to negatively interpret ambiguity may lead 
high IU individuals to perceive more situations as threats, and consequently worry more. 
Finally, some research suggests that there is a memory bias for uncertain 
information among individuals high in IU. In the same paper described above, Dugas, 
Hedayati, et al. (2005) carried out a second study examining the relationship between IU 
and memory for uncertain words. For this study, an incidental learning task was used; in 
other words, participants were not told that their memory will be tested, nor were they 
asked to memorize material. Instead, they performed a task that involved the stimuli, and 
were later tested on their memory for the stimuli. The value of incidental learning is that 
it not only resembles the type of learning that occurs in everyday life, but also has the 
capacity to reveal information processing biases. For example, if a certain type of 
information is better remembered following incidental learning, we can infer that there 
was preferential or biased processing of that information (i.e., Dalgleish, 1994). In the 
Dugas, Hedayati, et al. (2005) study, participants viewed a series of neutral and uncertain 




task). Following the ratings, participants were given a free recall task. While all 
participants recalled more uncertain than neutral words, results showed that high IU 
participants recalled a significantly higher proportion of uncertain words (uncertain 
words/neutral words) than did the low IU participants. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that individuals high in IU may have an 
attentional bias toward uncertain and threat words; a tendency to appraise uncertain and 
negative scenarios as more threatening; and an enhanced memory for uncertain words. 
The findings of a bias toward threat and negative information are not unexpected, given 
that these biases are characteristic of anxiety more generally, as will be discussed below. 
However, findings of a bias for uncertainty among high IU individuals may represent an 
information processing bias that is specific to worry. Overall, these findings are 
consistent with a view of IU as a cognitive process that influences all phases of 
information processing: attention, appraisal, and memory. If the results of these studies 
are upheld, they may well explain how IU leads to excessive worry. An individual high in 
IU, with enhanced attention and recall for uncertainty, and who interprets uncertainty in a 
negative way, might experience more cues to worry, and consequently worry more. 
However, given the very few studies to date that have directly examined this question, 
conclusions concerning IU and information processing must await further exploration.  
Although information processing studies of IU are scarce, there is a relatively 
large body of research concerning information processing biases in GAD, and some 
research concerning worry. Given the well-established relationship between IU, worry, 
and GAD, a review of this literature will provide additional clues concerning the potential 




several caveats in mind. First, most of the research comparing information processing in 
controls, high worriers, and GAD patients does not specifically measure IU. Therefore, 
any biases found in the GAD and high worry groups may be due to IU; conversely, biases 
may also be due to some other cognitive process, personality trait, or symptom that is 
common to these groups. Second, much of the research that will be reviewed concerns a 
bias for threat rather than for uncertainty. This focus on the processing of threat is based 
on Beck‘s (Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & Beck, 2010) cognitive model of anxiety, which 
proposes that anxiety and the anxiety disorders are characterized by selective processing 
of threatening stimuli, at all stages of information processing. This framework has been 
influential and has shaped much information processing research on anxiety. Many 
studies have consequently employed threat stimuli that are broadly conceptualized (e.g., 
stimuli that represent threat in terms of physical harm) or undifferentiated (i.e., a mix of 
physically threatening, socially threatening, and depressogenic stimuli). While some 
studies have used stimuli intended to represent themes specific to GAD (e.g., Eysenck, 
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; also see review by Mogg & Bradley, 2005), 
these distinctions are often omitted. The implications of using stimuli that have limited 
specificity for particular forms of anxiety, and for particular anxiety disorders, is an issue 
to which we will later return. For the time being, however, it should be noted that the 
definition of threat varies widely from study to study in the GAD/worry literature.  
A third qualification concerns the distinction between GAD and non-GAD worry. 
While elevated worry characterizes both GAD patients and non-clinical high worriers, 
there are differences between these populations. For example, compared to non-clinical 




Molina, & Borkovec, 1997) for longer durations (Craske et al.,1989), and report more 
distress and physical symptoms associated with worry (Hoyer et al., 2001; Ruscio & 
Borkovec, 2004). Even when matched on level of trait worry, one study found that GAD 
worriers reported a greater subjective loss of control over worry, more negative intrusions 
following worry, and more negative beliefs about worrying, than did high-worry controls 
(Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). Despite these differences, there are many similarities 
between high worriers and individuals with GAD. For example, worry topics appear to be 
comparable across GAD and non-GAD groups (Craske et al., 1989; Dugas, Freeston, et 
al., 1995; Shadick, Roemer, Hopkins, & Borkovec, 1991). Moreover, the actual 
experience of GAD and non-GAD worry may be quite similar in terms of unpleasantness, 
anxiety, and the attentional interference it produces (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). Ruscio, 
Borkovec, and Ruscio (2001) further observe that the majority of findings from studies of 
non-clinical worry have been later replicated in clinical samples. Finally, two taxometric 
studies have examined the latent structure of worry, and both have found evidence that 
worry is dimensional in nature; in other words, non-clinical and clinical worry appear to 
exist on a continuum, rather than belonging to discrete categories (Olatunji, Broman-
Fulks, Bergman, Green, & Zlomke, 2010; Ruscio et al., 2001). Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to consider research on both non-clinical high worry and GAD, while 
acknowledging that certain differences limit the between-groups generalizability of 
findings. 
Information Processing in GAD and Worry 
Attentional biases. With the above qualifications in mind, a considerable body of 




less present in non-anxious individuals. Various methodologies have been used to explore 
this question. One of the most prevalent is the emotional or modified Stroop task, in 
which participants are asked to name the colour a word is printed in, rather than reading 
the word. Slower colour naming of threat compared to neutral words shows attentional 
bias toward the threatening meaning of the word, which slows colour naming (Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Numerous studies using the emotional Stroop task have 
confirmed the presence of an attentional bias for threat in GAD patients, as compared to 
controls (Becker, Rinck, Margrath, & Roth, 2001; Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 
1995; Golombok et al., 1991; Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991; Mathews & Klug, 1993; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, 
Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). In one 
study, while colour-naming latency was not biased, speed and direction of eye 
movements indicated an attentional bias for threat among GAD participants (Mogg, 
Millar, & Bradley, 2000). In addition, attentional bias for threat can be found with the 
emotional Stroop even when awareness of the stimuli are restricted by a backward mask 
(e.g., a random letter or number string following a brief presentation of the word; 
Bradley, Mogg, Millar, et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1993).  
Other widely-used attentional tasks include the dot-probe and probe classification 
tasks. In these tasks, probes replace neutral and threat stimuli in different locations on a 
visual display; an attentional bias for threat is indicated by faster identification of probes 
that replace threat stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Several dot-
probe/classification studies using words as stimuli have found evidence of attentional 




& Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 
1992; Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999). Studies using backward 
masking have produced similar results (Mogg et al., 1995), as have studies using 
threatening faces (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999).  
Evidence of an attentional bias in GAD has also emerged from visual search 
paradigms. In a visual search task, participants are asked to identify a threat stimulus 
presented within a field of neutral stimuli; faster reaction time denotes an attentional bias 
for threat. Conversely, slower identification of a neutral stimulus within a field of threat 
stimuli is a measure of difficulty disengaging from threat—another manifestation of 
attentional bias. Visual search tasks have provided some support for both an attentional 
bias, and difficulty disengaging from threat words in GAD (Rinck, Becker, Kellerman, & 
Roth, 2003). A modified version of this paradigm showed that GAD participants were 
significantly slower to identify targets in the presence of threatening as compared to 
neutral distractors (Mathews, May, Mogg, & Eysenck, 1990).  
Taken together, the studies reviewed above provide considerable evidence of an 
attentional bias for threat in GAD, which converges across tasks, and suggests that this is 
a robust effect. In support of this conclusion, a recent meta-analysis found a moderately 
large effect size across studies of attentional bias in GAD (Cohen‘s d = .56; Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). 
Interpretation biases. Research also suggests that there is a relationship between 
GAD, worry, and negative interpretations of ambiguity. A widely-used test of 
interpretation bias involves homophones. In this type of task, a series of words are 




presented are homophones: words with one pronunciation but two different meanings, 
such as pane/pain or dye/die. One study using this task found that participants with GAD 
reported a significantly higher number of threatening meanings; in other words, GAD 
patients made more threatening interpretations of ambiguous words (Mathews, Richards, 
& Eysenck, 1989). 
Another method used to assess interpretation bias in GAD involves the 
presentation of ambiguous text. In this type of procedure, a series of sentences are 
presented, some of which are ambiguous (i.e., ―The two men discussed the best way to 
blow up the boat‖). Participants are later shown a series of new sentences and are asked 
to decide whether they have the same meaning as any previously viewed sentence. The 
possible responses included an equal number of disambiguations that are either 
threatening (i.e., ―The men talked about how they should destroy the boat‖) or non-
threatening (―The men talked about how they should inflate the boat‖). Two related 
studies by Eysenck and colleagues (1991) showed that compared to controls, GAD 
patients more often chose threatening disambiguations of sentences (Eysenck et al., 
1991).  
Further support for an interpretative bias in GAD comes from studies that have 
experimentally manipulated these biases. Innovative research has shown that participants 
can be trained to make non-threatening interpretations of ambiguity. In two such studies, 
interpretation training had two phases. In the first phase, participants were visually 
presented with homophones (e.g., patient), followed by a semantically-related word 
fragment to complete. Participants were assigned to groups that were given either benign 




and threatening fragments (e.g., sick; kind). In the second training phase, participants 
heard a scenario that remained ambiguous until it was completed by a final benign or 
threatening word; (e.g., ―…you think that your boss will put it down to you being 
busy/lazy‖). Participants in the benign condition received only benign completions, 
whereas those in the control condition received an equal number of benign and 
threatening completions. Using these methods, one study showed that following benign 
interpretation training, high worriers experienced fewer negative thought intrusions and 
anxiety, compared to high worriers in the control condition (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 
2009). These findings were then replicated in a group of patients with GAD, which 
further confirmed that after the benign training, patients made fewer threatening 
completions of ambiguous sentences (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010). These 
and the studies reviewed above suggest a significant relationship between interpretive 
biases, worry, and GAD. 
Memory biases. Among GAD patients and high worriers, biases in attention and 
interpretation have now been fairly well established (see reviews by MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 2004; and Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In contrast, research on memory bias 
is inconclusive. This is a puzzling discrepancy: if GAD patients and high worriers have 
enhanced attention for threat, and a tendency to make threatening interpretations, this 
should be reflected in the increased availability of threat-related information in memory. 
However, studies of memory bias in GAD and worry have produced a series of 
contradictory findings.  
Adding to the complexity of this research is that both explicit and implicit 




to retrieve information from memory; for example, the attempt to remember one‘s 
grocery list. In contrast, implicit memory does not involve effortful retrieval, but instead 
is shown through enhanced performance on a task due to prior experience with certain 
information; for example, faster completion of food-related words in a crossword puzzle, 
although one‘s grocery list is forgotten (see Roediger & Amir, 2005, for an overview). 
While certain tasks have traditionally been used to measure each type of memory, tasks 
are not intrinsically measures of either explicit or implicit memory: this rather depends on 
the instructions given to participants. Completion of word stems, for example, has 
frequently been used to test implicit memory. In a typical word stem procedure, 
participants perform an incidental task with a set of word stimuli. Subsequently, they are 
instructed to complete a series of word stems with the first word that comes to mind. The 
word stems are derived from both new (unprimed) and previously viewed (primed) 
words. The measure of implicit memory is the degree of superior performance on primed 
compared to unprimed word stems; as this does not involve effortful retrieval of 
information from memory, it can be considered a test of implicit memory. Conversely, 
using the same procedure, participants can be asked to complete word stems using the 
stimuli they previously viewed. As this involves effortful retrieval of information, it can 
be considered an explicit test of memory. These distinctions between explicit and implicit 
memory will be applied to the review of research that follows. Finally, unless otherwise 
specified, all the studies reviewed below use an incidental learning approach. 
Studies of explicit memory. Much of the early information processing research on 
worry and GAD focussed on explicit memory. In addition, many studies used a self-




some way during the learning phase (e.g., rate the extent to which each word describes 
you). It seems apparent that self-referenced material should be more salient to 
participants, and therefore better remembered. In fact, the superiority of the self-reference 
effect on memory has been well-established in non-clinical populations (see Symons & 
Johnson, 1997, for a review). Consequently, this approach was often used in studies of 
GAD and worry. 
In one early study, Mogg, Mathews, and Weinman (1987) explored explicit 
memory in controls and generally anxious patients; the patients were diagnosed with 
anxiety state according to the International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision (ICD-
9-R: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980). In this study, participants 
heard a mixed set of adjectives, half of which were positive (e.g., amused, secure). The 
remaining adjectives were either negative and socially or physically threatening 
(humiliated, trapped), or negative and non-threatening (bored, gloomy). In a procedure 
often used in this type of research, candidate stimuli were generated by the researchers, 
and a group of expert judges then reached consensus on stimuli that optimally 
represented each of the categories of interest. As is also typical, word norms were 
consulted (e.g., Thorndike & Lorge, 1944) to ensure that words were equivalent in their 
frequency of use; words were also matched as closely as possible in length. Before each 
word was presented, participants were instructed to refer the word to themselves (does 
this word describe you?) or to a well-known British television personality (does this word 
describe Angela Rippon?); these represented self- and other-referent conditions, 
respectively. Following a 20 s distractor task to reduce recency effects, participants were 




explicit memory). Subsequently, they were given a sheet containing the words they had 
heard, and a matched set of new words; they were asked to identify the words they had 
heard (a recognition test of explicit memory). Finally, participants completed self-report 
questionnaires measuring trait anxiety, state anxiety, depression, and vocabulary. The 
results showed that positive words and self-referenced words were better remembered 
overall. However, there was no difference in the number of threatening words recalled in 
the anxious and control groups. In fact, there was a trend for anxious participants to recall 
fewer threat words than controls. Measures of recognition memory (hit rate, sensitivity, 
and response bias) produced similar results. Interestingly, the researchers found that 
several anxious patients reported elevated levels of depression, although none had a co-
morbid diagnosis of depression. While this is not surprising given the high co-occurrence 
of anxiety and depression (i.e., Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001), it 
does raise the question of how depressed mood may affect this type of task. Based on 
their findings, the authors proposed that anxiety may be characterized by an attentional 
bias for threat, but not a memory bias. The authors also noted previous research 
suggesting that a memory bias may be characteristic of depression; they proposed that 
the same pattern may not hold for anxiety.  
Using a similar methodology, Mogg and Mathews (1990) instructed controls and 
generally anxious patients (diagnosis of anxiety state; ICD-9-R, 1980) to refer half of a 
set of words to themselves (does this word describe you? ) and the rest to other people 
(does this word describe the average person on the street?). Words with self-and other-
referent instructions were randomly mixed together. In this study, however, words 




carefree); these were selected by judges and matched on frequency. Participants were 
warned that their memory for the words would later be tested. Results of a free recall test 
showed the expected advantage for self-referenced words. In addition, anxious patients 
recalled significantly more anxious than non-anxious words compared to controls; 
however, this was not specific to self-referenced words. When the researchers analyzed 
intrusions on the recall test (―recalled‖ words that had not actually been presented) they 
found that anxious participants had significantly more anxiety-related intrusions than 
controls. They therefore concluded that their results were more likely due to a response 
bias for anxious stimuli, than to a memory bias. A further caveat is that participants were 
warned that their memory would be tested. The results may therefore demonstrate that 
anxious patients are better at memorizing anxious words, or that asking them to 
memorize words creates a response bias toward anxious information. In either case, the 
results of this study are difficult to integrate with those that use an incidental learning 
approach. 
Becker, Roth, Andrich, and Margraf (1999) also employed a self-referent task, 
comparing controls to patients diagnosed with GAD or Social Phobia according to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., revised; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987). The words used in this study were either GAD-related 
(e.g., injury, nervous), speech-related (talk, blush), positive (dreaming, flower), or neutral 
(chair, umbrella). The stimuli used in this study were drawn from a larger pool of words 
generated by a group of anxiety experts; selected words were then matched on frequency. 
Stimuli were presented in random order on a computer screen, and participants were 




completed a free recall test and self-report questionnaires. The results showed that 
positive words were better recalled by all groups. However, there were no differences in 
the number of GAD or speech-related words recalled by any group. Of further interest is 
that participants were also asked to rate the word stimuli following testing. Analyses 
showed that while GAD patients rated the GAD words as more relevant and unpleasant 
than did controls, patients with Social Phobia also rated GAD words as highly relevant 
and unpleasant, suggesting that the stimuli may have had limited specificity to GAD. 
Other researchers eschewed the self-referent approach, in part due to the non-
significant findings of some previous studies. Mathews and MacLeod (1986), for 
example, administered a dichotic listening task to controls and GAD patients (DSM-III, 
1980). In this study, participants wore headphones and listened to a story narrated in one 
ear. In the other ear, a series of words were periodically heard, which they were told to 
ignore. Simultaneously, participants visually monitored a computer screen, and pressed a 
key in response to the appearance of a probe. The words heard in the unattended ear were 
an equal mix of threat words (e.g., timid, emergency, worried) and non-threat words 
(playful, prize, friend). Word stimuli were created for this study by the researchers, and 
matched using frequency norms. As attentional biases have been found when stimuli are 
outside of awareness (i.e., with quickly presented or backward-masked stimuli), Mathews 
and MacLeod used a very brief ―pre-attentive‖ exposure for words in the unattended 
channel. Before the dichotic listening task, participants completed a set of self-report 
questionnaires. As expected, the researchers found that when threat words were in the 
unattended channel, GAD patients were significantly slower to identify probes. However, 




words in controls or GAD patients, and no memory bias for threat words in the GAD 
group. While self-reported depression was higher in the GAD group, no significant 
correlation was found between task reaction times and depression, leading the authors to 
conclude that their findings were probably due to anxiety and not depression. Based on 
their results, the researchers suggested that biases in anxiety may concern the preferential 
allocation of processing resources toward threat at an early stage of processing (i.e., a 
pre-attentive bias), rather than a memory bias for threat. 
Using the emotional Stroop paradigm, Mogg and colleagues (1989) explored 
memory bias in controls and a group of generally anxious patients (diagnosis of anxiety 
state; ICD-9-R, 1980). In this study, an equal number of words were physically 
threatening (e.g., disease, mutilated), socially threatening (failure, inadequate), and non-
threatening (holiday, contented). Most of these stimuli were obtained from those used in 
previous research ( i.e., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). In standard Stroop fashion, 
participants viewed the words in random order and named the ink colour of each word. 
Subsequently, they completed a test of recognition memory, and then reported whether 
their most typical worries were physical or social in nature. They also completed a 
package of self-report questionnaires. The results showed the expected emotional Stroop 
effect, with significantly slower colour naming of threat words by GAD patients. In 
addition, patients with predominantly physical worries were significantly slower at colour 
naming physical threat as compared to non-threat words, suggesting specificity of the 
physical threat stimuli. However, a similar pattern with regards to social worries and 
social threat words did not reach significance. Most notably, however, there was no 




Analyses of the self-report measures showed a significant relationship between threat 
word interference and levels of both trait anxiety and depression. The researchers 
observed that the lack of memory bias in this study is only puzzling if we assume that 
biases must operate in the same way across all stages of processing. As an alternative, 
they proposed a model in which there is a bias for threat in attentive processing, but not 
in subsequent elaboration; this type of model would be consistent with biased attention 
for threat, but not biased memory.  
In one of the few studies that found an explicit memory bias in GAD, Friedman, 
Thayer, and Borkovec (2000) employed a classical conditioning paradigm. In their study, 
control and GAD participants (DSM-III-R, 1987) viewed a series of words paired with 
neutral stimuli (coloured dots, used to evaluate higher-order conditioning, and not related 
to this study). The words that participants viewed included mixed physical threat words, 
social threat words, and non-threat words, derived from previous research (i.e., Mathews 
& MacLeod, 1986). Participants were asked to read each word silently to themselves as it 
appeared on the screen. They were then given a free recall test and completed self-report 
measures. This procedure was repeated in two studies, each with a different sample of 
GAD patients and controls. The results showed that in both studies, GAD patients 
recalled significantly more threatening words than did controls; moreover, within the 
GAD groups, more threat than neutral words were recalled. The researchers suggested 
that the 8 s exposure to the stimuli (longer than most studies) may have contributed to 
conscious processing and hence memory for threat. They also speculated that self-
referent tasks may have led to non-significant findings in other studies. Specifically, they 




patients, who may ultimately avoid thoughts about the threat (i.e., they may engage in 
cognitive avoidance); this would reduce the processing of threat and subsequent memory.  
Studies of implicit memory. In the dearth of explicit memory findings, 
researchers began to focus on the question of biases in implicit memory. As with studies 
of explicit memory, self-referent tasks were often used, with varying results. In most of 
the studies that follow, explicit memory was also measured. Interestingly, an implicit 
memory bias, but not an explicit memory bias, was sometimes found within the same 
study.  
Bradley, Mogg, and Williams (1995) used a lexical decision task to assess 
implicit memory, and a self-referent task with free recall for explicit memory. Their 
participants included controls and patients with either GAD or Major Depression (DSM-
III-R, 1987). In the first phase of the lexical decision procedure, participants rated a set of 
stimulus words on the frequency with which they used them. There were mixed equal 
numbers of words that were anxious (e.g., embarrassed, cancer), depressed (pessimistic, 
despair), positive (bliss, adorable), and neutral (doorbell, carpet). The words were based 
on a pool of words used in previous research (i.e., Mathews, Mogg, May, & Eysenck, 
1989, and others), and were selected based on the consensus of three judges. After the 
word ratings, the lexical decision task was administered, in which a series of individual 
stimuli appeared on the computer screen. Some of the words were those participants had 
previously rated (primed stimulus words), some were new words (unprimed stimulus 
words), and others were pronounceable non-words (e.g., traib, enpine). Participants were 
asked to decide whether or not the letters on the screen formed a word. The measure of 




decisions were expected for primed words, and particularly for primed words that had 
been preferentially processed (i.e., anxious or depressed words). In order to explore any 
effects that might occur outside of awareness, some of the lexical decision trials were 
sub-threshold presentations (i.e., presented for only 14 ms and followed by a string of 
mixed letters to visually mask the word). In the explicit memory portion of the 
experiment, participants viewed the set of unprimed words from the lexical decision task, 
and were asked to rate each word on how relevant it was to their personal concerns. They 
then completed a free recall test and self-report measures. For the lexical decision task, 
priming scores were calculated (unprimed word latencies minus primed word latencies), 
in order to control for baseline performance. Results showed that while there was a 
significant priming effect overall (faster decisions for primed words), there was no 
difference between the GAD and control groups on decisions for different types of words, 
on normal or sub-threshold trials. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a GAD group 
bias toward any type of word on the free recall task. There was therefore no evidence of 
either an implicit or explicit memory bias in GAD patients. However, there was a 
significant bias for priming of depressed words in the depressed group, in both normal 
and sub-threshold trials; a similar bias for depressed words was found on the free recall 
task. While the absence of an explicit memory bias in the GAD group is consistent with 
previous studies, the authors observed that a finding of implicit memory bias in 
depression is unusual. However, they noted that this study underscores the differences 
between anxiety and depression, as depression may be characterized by both implicit and 




Otto and colleagues used a dichotic listening task to assess the role of hemispheric 
laterality in explicit and implicit memory (Otto, McNally, Pollack, Chen, & Rosenbaum, 
1994). To assess hemispheric laterality, controls and patients with GAD or Panic 
Disorder (DSM-III-R, 1987) completed a dichotic listening task in which a series of 
similar neutral word pairs were heard, one word in each ear (e.g., bar, car). Participants 
were asked to write down the word they heard (in this procedure only one word is usually 
perceived). An incidental learning task followed, in which participants viewed a new set 
of stimulus words and were asked to rate each word on its personal emotional 
significance. The stimuli were mixed and included an equal number of panic (e.g., 
suffocate), general threat (cancer), positive (creative), or neutral (carpet) words. These 
stimuli were primarily derived from previous research (i.e., Mathews, Mogg, et al., 1989, 
and others), and were matched in terms of frequency. Participants then completed two 
memory tests using word stems: for half of the stimuli, an implicit test (i.e., complete the 
stems with any word that comes to mind), and for the other half, an explicit test (i.e., 
complete the stems with the words you rated earlier). The results showed no differences 
between the groups in implicit memory for different types of words. On the explicit test, 
neutral words were most poorly recalled, but there were also no differences between the 
groups. Dichotic listening responses were then analyzed to identify the ear in which more 
words were correctly identified; this was used as an index of perceptual asymmetry. 
Perceptual asymmetry (PA) was used as a measure of relative hemispheric activation, 
with left-ear PA being an indication of right hemisphere lateralization, and right-ear PA 
of left hemisphere lateralization. This was of interest as previous research has found a 




behavioural withdrawal (see Otto et al., 1994, for a review). In this study, however, the 
results showed no PA difference between the anxious and control groups. However, 
regression analyses suggested that a right-ear PA (left-hemisphere lateralization) in GAD 
and Panic patients was predictive of a greater explicit memory bias for general threat and 
panic words. The researchers suggested that anxious participants with left-hemisphere 
lateralization may better process verbal information, and therefore show a clearer explicit 
memory bias for threatening word stimuli. 
Mathews, Mogg, and colleagues (1989) found an implicit but not an explicit 
memory bias for threat in a group of GAD patients. In this study, controls and GAD 
patients (DSM-III-R, 1987) were presented with a series of words, and were asked to 
imagine a scene involving themselves and the word, and then rate its pleasantness. The 
words participants viewed were comprised of mixed equal numbers of threat and non-
threat words. Threat words included social threat (e.g., lonely, insult) and physical threat 
words (cancer, collapse); non-threat words included positive (confident, bliss) and 
neutral words (emblem, fountain). The word stimuli were based on previous research 
(MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985) and were matched on both 
frequency and length. During the imagery task, participants viewed a proportion of the 
total stimuli, with the rest retained as unprimed stimuli for memory testing. After the 
imagery task, participants were asked to complete two sets of word stems. Specifically, 
for the explicit memory test, participants were asked to complete one set of word stems 
using the words they had viewed. For the implicit test, participants were asked to 
complete the remaining set of word stems with the first word that came to mind. For both 




primed words, and half for new unprimed words. All participants completed both tests, in 
counterbalanced order, and then filled out self-report questionnaires. Results did not 
show any explicit memory differences between the groups. For the implicit task, priming 
scores were calculated (primed minus unprimed stem completions) and showed a 
significant overall priming effect. In addition, control participants demonstrated a 
significant bias toward non-threat words. More importantly, however, the GAD patients 
showed a significant bias for threat words compared to controls, indicating an implicit 
memory bias for threat. Correlations did not show any significant relationships between 
word completion scores and self-reported anxiety or depression. Given these findings, the 
authors noted that a lack of explicit memory bias for threat would be consistent with the 
avoidance of conscious processing of threat by anxious patients. They proposed that the 
implicit bias found in this study may reflect a different kind of processing that may only 
emerge on implicit tests of memory.  
Mathews and colleagues (1995) evaluated processing biases in a group of controls 
and GAD patients (DSM-III-R, 1987). The stimulus words used in this study were largely 
taken from the study described above; they included threat words (social and physical), 
and non-threat words (positive and neutral; see Mathews, Mogg, et al., 1989). The stimuli 
were divided into matched sets, with mixed equal numbers of threat and non-threat 
words. All participants in this study performed three tasks, each using a different word 
set; a fourth word set was not used, and was retained for memory testing. The first task 
was an emotional Stroop, in which participants named the colours of stimulus words. The 
second task was an attentional search, in which participants responded to a visual probe 




that were stimulus words). In the third task, participants viewed a set of word stimuli and 
counted the number of es in each word. After the letter counting, participants were asked 
to complete an implicit word stem task, for primed and unprimed words. Participants 
completed all tasks in counterbalanced order, and then filled out a set of questionnaires. 
The results showed the expected emotional Stroop effect, with slower colour-naming of 
threat words by GAD patients. In addition, GAD patients, compared to controls, showed 
significantly slower responses to targets that were accompanied by threatening 
distractors. While a significant overall priming effect was found on the word-stem task, 
there was no difference between GAD patients and controls in their completion of 
threatening words. Therefore, while attentional biases were present, no corresponding 
implicit memory bias for threat emerged in the GAD group. As these findings contrasted 
with those of Mathews, Mogg, et al. (1989), the authors highlighted a key difference 
between these studies: Mathews, Mogg et al. used a self-referent imagery task, while this 
study used letter counting. They noted that a self-referent imagery task is both elaborative 
and conceptual in nature, which, according to prevalent theories, should result in 
enhanced explicit memory (i.e., Roediger, 1990). In contrast, a letter-counting task 
should encourage encoding of perceptual features, and thereby enhance implicit memory. 
In light of their non-significant implicit memory findings, however, they speculated that 
the test they used —word-stems— may rely on more explicit, elaborative processes than 
is traditionally supposed; this could explain their lack of implicit memory findings. 
Another group of researchers attempted to replicate the findings of Mathews, 
Mogg, and colleagues (1989), but with different tasks. In their study, MacLeod and 




violence, disaster, humiliated) and non-threat words (symphony, superior, celebrates). 
Words were generated by the researchers, who then asked five clinical psychologists to 
rate the words on scale ranging from 1 = non-threatening to 5 = threatening. Stimuli 
were selected on the basis of these ratings, with subsequent t-tests confirming that threat 
and non-threat words differed significantly. Stimuli were matched for length and 
frequency, and placed in randomized order. The stimuli were divided into sets so that 
participants viewed some of the words during encoding (a Stroop task), and the 
remainder in two memory tests. The researchers asked controls and GAD patients (DSM-
III-R, 1987) to complete a series of tasks, beginning with a calibration procedure 
(described below). Participants then completed an emotional Stroop task , in which they 
were asked to name the ink colour, but also read each word aloud. An explicit recognition 
memory test followed, using previously viewed and new stimuli. Due to concerns about 
the validity of word stems as an implicit memory task, the researchers instead employed a 
tachistoscopic identification procedure. In a tachistoscopic identification task, words are 
very briefly flashed on a computer screen. Implicit memory can be demonstrated if rates 
of correct identification are higher for primed than unprimed words. For this to be 
effective, however, there must be an appropriate display duration: if words are presented 
too quickly, none will be identified; too slowly, and a ceiling effect will obscure any 
priming effects. To this end, calibration was performed for each participant, in which 
neutral test words were presented at increasingly short durations. The duration at which 
each participant could accurately identify 50% of the words was then used for testing that 
participant. The third task in this study was the tachistoscopic identification, in which 




any other task). Participants were asked to read each word aloud as it appeared on the 
screen. All participants completed both memory tasks, in counter-balanced order, and 
then self-report questionnaires. The results showed that while all participants had better 
explicit memory for the words they viewed during the Stroop, there was no difference 
between the groups. Responses to the implicit tachistoscopic task showed a significant 
overall priming effect. Moreover, compared to controls, GAD patients had a significantly 
higher priming score for threat compared to non-threat words. The results of this study 
are therefore consistent with those of Mathews, Mogg, et al. (1989) in that no explicit 
memory bias, but an implicit memory bias, was found among GAD patients. 
Coles, Turk, and Heimberg (2007) took an individualized approach to the 
assessment of memory bias in GAD. Specifically, prior to testing, they presented a group 
of GAD patients (DSM-IV, 1994) with a large pool of potential stimulus words, and 
asked them to rate each word on its personal relevance (using a scale ranging from 
extremely negative for me to extremely positive for me). The words that each participant 
rated as most relevant were then used as stimuli for that person. The pool of potential 
words was specific to GAD: threat words representing common worry domains (e.g., 
emergency, bills, deadline), and positive words that were the opposite of the threat words 
(raise, relaxed, vacation). Neutral words were generated from several categories in order 
to match the different types of words in the other sets. Based on the ratings, a unique 
matched set of threat, positive, and neutral words was selected for each participant. One 
week after stimulus word selection, participants returned to the laboratory. Each GAD 
patient was experimentally yoked with a control participant, who was also tested with 




imagine a scene incorporating themselves and each word; they then rated the ease of 
generating each image. After completing a filler task, they were asked to complete an 
implicit word stem task for primed and unprimed stimulus words. Participants were then 
given a free recall task and questionnaires to complete. Results showed no significant 
differences between the groups on the explicit memory task. However, the implicit word 
stem completions showed that GAD patients completed significantly more threat words 
than did controls. Interestingly, there was no difference in the ease of imagery between 
the GAD and control groups. As a memory bias emerged when GAD patients were given 
stimuli that were relevant to their worries, the authors proposed that poor stimulus 
relevance may account for the lack of findings in other studies. Of further interest is that 
this study was the only one reviewed to include a self-report measure of worry; 
regressions showed that worry continued to make a significant contribution to implicit 
memory for threat words, above and beyond depression.  
In summary, eleven of the twelve studies reviewed above included a measure of 
explicit memory. Only two of these eleven studies found an explicit memory bias, and in 
one case the findings are difficult to interpret, as participants were warned their memory 
would be tested (i.e., Mogg & Mathews, 1990). In the other study that found an explicit 
memory bias, however, the effect was replicated in two separate samples (i.e., Friedman 
et al., 2000). Nevertheless, current research support for an explicit memory bias in GAD 
appears weak. In contrast, six of the reviewed studies measured implicit memory, and of 
these three produced significant findings. Support for an implicit memory bias for threat 
in GAD therefore appears to be equally divided. Interestingly, in all three studies that 




MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; Mathews, Mogg, et al., 1989). Of further note is that 
self-referenced tasks do not appear to be consistently related to a memory advantage in 
these studies. Specifically, six of the reviewed studies used some form of self-referenced 
task; of these, two found an implicit memory bias, and one an explicit memory bias. As a 
whole, therefore, research findings in this area appear too equivocal for definite 
conclusions to be drawn.  
Information Processing in High Trait Anxiety 
Given the mixed state of findings on memory bias in worry and GAD, it may be 
useful to consult a related body of research: that concerning trait anxiety. Trait anxiety 
can be defined as the relatively stable tendency to experience anxiety, and to respond 
fearfully to aversive stimuli (Spielberger, 1985). Research shows that there is a strong 
relationship between trait anxiety and worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Brown, Chorpita, & 
Barlow, 1998), and between trait anxiety and GAD (Rapee, 1991). Some researchers 
have proposed that high trait anxiety is a risk factor for the development of GAD 
(Eysenck, 1992; MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004). Therefore, research on high trait anxiety 
may provide some insights about findings in worry and GAD.  
In fact, information processing research on high trait anxiety closely mirrors 
research on worry and GAD. For example, numerous studies have found that high trait 
anxious individuals show an attentional bias for threat; as with GAD, this has been 
demonstrated with tasks such as the dot-probe, the emotional Stroop, and selective 
attention for threatening faces. Similarly, an interpretive bias for threat among trait 
anxious individuals has emerged from studies using homophones, lexical decisions, and 




MacLeod, 2005). Furthermore, high trait anxious individuals have undergone interpretive 
training, and results suggest that benign training can reduce both anxiety and the 
tendency to make negative interpretations (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mathews, 
Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007). 
As with GAD and worry, however, findings begin to diverge when we consider 
memory. In parallel with research on GAD, both explicit and implicit memory have been 
explored; similarly, self referent tasks and word stimuli (threat versus non-threat) 
predominate. For example, a number of studies have used a variation of the self-reference 
procedure, in which participants refer half of the stimuli to themselves, and the remainder 
to other people. Martin, Ward, and Clark (1983) asked participants to rate how well a 
series of words described themselves, and the rest on how well they described the 
average undergraduate. They found that high trait anxious participants recalled 
significantly more negative self-referent adjectives than did those low in trait anxiety; 
moreover, the relationship between explicit memory for negative words and trait anxiety 
remained significant when depression was statistically controlled. Using a similar 
approach, Reidy and Richards (1997a) asked participants to refer words either to 
themselves or to a television personality; they found a free recall bias for threat words 
among participants highest in trait anxiety. In addition, they found that all participants 
remembered more positive words and more self-referenced words. In a replication study 
controlling for recency effects, similar findings emerged (Reidy & Richards, 1997b). In 
another variation, Green and McKenna (1996) asked participants to judge whether word 




or other-referent. They found no differences between high and low trait anxious groups in 
free recall of negative words. 
 Other studies have contrasted some form of self-reference with a read-only 
condition. For example, Richards and French (1991) created two experimental 
conditions: self-referenced imagery (i.e., imagine a scene concerning yourself and the 
word), and read-only (simply read and study the word). They then administered either an 
implicit word stem task or a free recall task. While there were no differences on the recall 
task, they found an implicit bias for threat words among high trait anxious participants, 
but only in the self-referent condition. In a similar study, Harrison and Turpin (2003) 
found an implicit memory bias for non-threat words across all participants on a word-
stem completion task; however, no bias for threat emerged in the high trait anxious 
group. Russo, Fox, and Bowles (1999) also used self-referent imagery and read-only 
tasks at encoding, but tested implicit memory with either word stems or tachistoscopic 
word identification. In three studies that varied aspects of the procedure, they found no 
evidence of an implicit bias for threat words. In a simplified version of this method, 
Oldenburg, Lundh, and Kivisto (2002) used self-referent imagery alone at encoding, and 
then asked participants to complete a set of explicit word stems for half of the stimuli, 
and implicit word stems for the other half. Neither measure indicated a memory bias for 
threat among high trait anxious participants.  
Another approach has been to create a task that requires participants to actually 
generate the stimuli during encoding. In one such study, Eysenck and Byrne (1994) gave 
participants letters or short phrases to complete; in each case, there was only one correct 




stimulus set during the task; the other half were presented in read-only format. 
Participants then completed implicit word stems, cued recall, and free recall tests. Results 
showed that high trait anxious participants had an explicit (cued recall) bias for threat in 
the generate condition, and an implicit bias for threat in the read only condition. In 
another variation, Dalgleish (1994) used a generate procedure in which participants were 
asked to solve anagrams of the stimulus words; this was followed by an explicit 
recognition test. In his second study, Dalgleish used a homophone task, followed by a 
free recall test. In neither study did high trait anxious participants show an explicit 
memory bias for threat. 
Other research on trait anxiety has used the emotional Stroop task for incidental 
learning. For example, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) followed a Stroop task with a 
recognition test of explicit memory, and found no bias for threat words among high trait 
anxious participants. Richards and colleagues (1999) also used a Stroop task, followed by 
tachistoscopic word identification; in three different Stroop variations (colour naming; 
word naming; word and colour naming) results showed no differences between high and 
low trait anxious participants, although there was better implicit memory for threat words 
overall (Richards, French, Adams, Eldridge, & Papadopolou, 1999). Using a different 
approach, Reidy (2004) used a list of non-worry and worry topics as stimuli, asking high 
and low trait anxious participants to rate how often they thought about each. He 
subsequently found no free recall bias for worry topics among high trait anxious 
participants. Among low anxious participants, however, non-worry topics were better 
recalled. In two other studies, Nugent and Mineka (1994) asked participants to rate their 




recognition, and free recall tests. In one study, trait anxious participants recalled more 
threat words; however, this was not replicated in their second study. In addition, no 
recognition or implicit memory biases for threat emerged in either study.  
In summary, while research supports attention and interpretation biases for threat 
in high trait anxious participants, memory findings are mixed. As many of the papers 
reviewed above included more than one test of memory, the findings will be summarized 
in terms of memory outcomes. In the papers reviewed, 30 separate indices of memory 
were calculated. Of these, 19 assessed explicit memory, and 6 (32%) revealed a 
significant memory bias. The remaining 11 were implicit measures of memory, and 2 of 
these (18%) showed significant biases. In total, therefore, six instances of explicit and 
two instances of implicit memory bias emerged from this research. In contrast to research 
on GAD, research on trait anxiety therefore appears to offer more support for an explicit 
memory bias. However, the number of studies examining explicit memory is nearly 
double those examining implicit memory, making it difficult to draw conclusions about 
implicit memory. Of further interest is that many of the significant findings emerged from 
self-referent paradigms, which also contrasts with findings on GAD and worry. What is 
consistent across research on trait anxiety, worry, and GAD, however, is the mixed state 
of evidence for a memory bias, compared to clear support for biases in attention and 
interpretation. 
Information Processing in Other Anxiety Disorders 
 As previously noted, Beck‘s (Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & Beck, 2010) model 
predicts that a bias for threat should be present in all stages of information processing, 




for each of the anxiety disorders is beyond the scope of the current research. However, in 
order to provide context for the research already reviewed, a few key points from this 
research will be highlighted. Information processing research has in fact provided 
evidence of selective processing for threat in each of the anxiety disorders. However, the 
type of biases vary from disorder to disorder, as do the consistency of results. For 
example, evidence of attention bias for threat appears to be clearest for GAD, followed 
by Post-traumatic Stress Disorder(PTSD) and Panic Disorder (PD); findings in Social 
Phobia (SP) and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) are mixed. Conversely, support 
for biased interpretations appear strongest in GAD, SP and PD, with less conclusive 
evidence for the other anxiety disorders (see reviews by Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 
2000; Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 2004; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; 
McNally, 1994; Muller & Roberts, 2005). Coles and Heimberg (2002) observed that with 
the exception of PD, there is little definitive evidence of an explicit memory bias for 
threat in any anxiety disorder. However, they note that while there are fewer studies of 
implicit memory, these do offer some indication of an implicit bias for threat. 
Broadly speaking, the most evident resemblance between this and the previously 
reviewed research is a lack of consensus concerning memory (with the possible exception 
of PD). However, much information processing research in both clinical and non-clinical 
anxiety is affected by methodological problems that limit the validity of findings. One 
key concern is the appropriateness of the stimuli to the particular disorder under study. 
Coles and Heimberg (2002) observe that the most consistent evidence of memory bias 
has emerged from studies with stimuli that have high validity for the population in 




ideally have high construct validity (i.e., the stimuli should clearly represent the 
constructs of interest, whether that is threat, positiveness, or neutrality). In addition, 
stimuli should have high specificity (i.e., should represent the particular type of threat 
that is salient to a particular type of anxiety). For example, findings of a significant 
memory bias have emerged from research on PD using words that represent panic-
specific threat such as malls, crowds, palpitations, and dizziness (Becker et al., 1999). 
Similarly, memory biases in OCD have been found in research using real objects 
―contaminated‖ by a dirty tissue, thereby providing stimuli specific to OCD 
contamination fears (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999). In these cases, memory biases were 
found when tasks involved stimuli with high validity and specificity for each disorder. In 
fact, Becker et al. (1999) suggested that the consistency of memory findings in PD may 
be due to the relative ease of providing stimuli that represent PD-specific threat (i.e., 
physical anxiety symptoms and unsafe places). It may be, therefore, that inconsistent 
findings in previous memory research are partly due to issues with the stimuli employed. 
GAD, which is characterized by worry about a wide range of topics, presents a particular 
challenge in terms of generating stimuli that are both valid and specific to the disorder. 
Summary of Information Processing Research 
 The information processing research reviewed in the preceding pages can be 
summarized as follows. Research suggests that Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) is 
associated with the selective processing of uncertain and threatening information. 
Specifically, high IU individuals show an attentional bias for threat and uncertainty; a 
tendency to make threatening interpretations of uncertain and negative information; and 




Given the few studies to date that have examined the role of IU in information 
processing, research with worriers and GAD patients was reviewed. Research suggests 
that GAD patients and high worriers have an attentional bias for threat, and make 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous information. However, evidence of a memory 
bias is mixed. More specifically, there is little evidence of an explicit memory bias in 
worry and GAD, but some evidence of an implicit memory bias. 
As high trait anxiety is closely to related to worry and GAD, this research was 
also considered. High trait anxious individuals tend to show the same biases in attention 
and interpretation as high worriers and GAD patients; as in worry and GAD, memory 
findings were mixed. In high trait anxiety, however, there was slightly more support for 
explicit than implicit memory biases.  
Finally, key findings from information processing research in other anxiety 
disorders were noted. Biases for disorder-specific threat have been found in each of the 
anxiety disorders. However, the strength of evidence for attention and interpretation 
biases varies considerably across disorders. With the exception of PD, there is little 
consistent evidence for explicit memory bias in the anxiety disorders, but some evidence 
of implicit biases. 
Critique of Research on Memory Bias in GAD and Worry 
The findings reviewed above have led some researchers to propose that anxiety is 
characterized by an attentional bias for threat, but not an explicit memory bias (Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; discussed below). However, other researchers 
suggest that inconsistent findings with regards to memory may be explained by the 




number of methodological shortcomings in the existing research, which may well account 
for mixed results.  
Validity and specificity of stimuli. Most studies of memory in GAD and worry 
have employed word stimuli. This is likely due to the effectiveness of words as stimuli in 
attention research, and their adaptability to information-processing tasks. However, the 
validity of the stimuli used in previous studies can be questioned on several grounds. For 
example, some studies have employed anxiety specialists (researchers or practitioners) to 
generate or select word stimuli (i.e., Becker et al., 1999; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; 
Mogg & Mathews, 1990; Mogg et al., 1987). However, many researchers have selected 
stimuli solely on the basis of face validity. Even in the case of expert-selected stimuli, the 
content validity of the words to participants has rarely been evaluated. Consequently, it is 
difficult to know whether ―threat‖, ―neutral‖, and ―positive‖ words adequately 
represented their intended constructs. Without this information, the comparison of 
responses to words from different categories is less meaningful. A related concern is that 
the concept of threat has been differently defined across studies. For example, threat has 
been defined in terms of physical threat, social threat, or even depression; in several 
studies, different concepts have been combined to form a single threat category (e.g., 
Friedman et al., 2000; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; Mathews et al., 1995; Otto et al., 
1994). Similar mixtures have been made in categories of neutral and positive words. 
Acquiring participant ratings of the meaning of word stimuli could resolve many of these 
issues; however, this approach has rarely been used. Some researchers have obtained 
participant ratings of stimuli following the study, which allows for post-hoc verification 




however, stimuli would be pre-selected for research based on participant ratings. Only 
one study has used this approach, by selecting threatening, positive, and neutral words on 
the basis of participant ratings; the results showed an implicit memory bias for threat 
words (Coles et al., 2007). A limitation of this study, however, was that while each GAD 
patient was tested on their own idiosyncratic set of threat words, each yoked control 
participant was also tested on that patient‘s set of words. A greater bias might therefore 
be expected for the group tested on their own themes of concern (i.e., the GAD group). 
Nevertheless, using stimuli that have been rated and selected by participants has the 
potential to establish the validity of the stimuli for the population being studied.  
Some studies have found a memory bias when stimuli were specifically tailored to 
the type of anxiety being studied. For example, memory biases have been found when 
disorder-specific words have been used to test individuals with Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Kaspi, McNally, & Amir, 1995; Vrana, Roodman, & Beckham, 1995) and 
Panic Disorder (Becker et al., 1999; Otto et al, 1994). As previously noted, Becker et al. 
(1999) commented that findings of an explicit memory bias in Panic Disorder may be due 
to the ease of generating words specific to panic. Still other studies have used stimuli that 
may have better ecological validity than words. For example, memory bias has been 
found in studies using threatening facial expressions in Social Phobia (Lundh & Öst, 
1996), and contaminated objects in OCD (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999). In all these 
cases, it appears that the specificity of the stimuli to the type of anxiety being studied aids 
in the detection of a memory bias.  
Given the diversity of threat themes in GAD, and the idiosyncratic nature of 




researchers suggest that word stimuli lack ecological validity (i.e., McNally, 1995), 
words have nevertheless been successfully used to elicit attention and interpretation 
biases in GAD and worry. In other anxiety disorders, when words are sufficiently 
specific, they also appear to be effective. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize a more 
ecologically valid set of stimuli for GAD. Whether words, pictures, or objects are 
considered, generating stimuli that would adequately represent threat and worry themes 
across high worriers would be extremely difficult. In fact, a word or passage of text may 
be more easily applied to personal concerns than an image. For example, words such as 
heart attack or loser, presented without any specific context, may naturally be processed 
in terms of personal associations to those words. Conversely, an image is likely to contain 
highly specific context and features (i.e., setting, gender and ethnicity of individuals 
depicted, etc.), which may prevent participants from relating the stimuli to their own 
experience. Furthermore, research suggests that threatening images are particularly 
aversive to worriers and GAD patients. If images are highly aversive to worriers, they 
may avoid focusing on threatening images, thereby interrupting any processing that might 
lead to enhanced memory (Friedman et al., 2000; see The role of cognitive avoidance, 
below, for further discussion). While not without limitations, therefore, word stimuli may 
at this time be a reasonable choice for testing memory biases in GAD and worry.  
In order to address the diversity of threat and worry themes, many studies have 
included different types of threat words in their stimuli. This creates the risk that many 
words will not be relevant for a given participant. Given the small number of stimuli that 
typically make up a category of words, this could make biases extremely difficult to 




(i.e., embarrassed, lonely), while others are not; similarly, words like heart attack may be 
relevant for some GAD patients, but are more likely to be relevant to individuals with 
Panic Disorder. Therefore, presenting GAD patients and high worriers with mixed types 
of threat stimuli may be an imperfect solution. Other researchers have used words 
representing worry themes that are typical for GAD patients (Becker et al., 1999; Coles et 
al., 2007). This approach has had mixed success, possibly due to the same issue of 
individual variability in threat and worry themes. One study to date has used a different 
approach, by using words that denote uncertainty, rather than threat; in this study, an 
explicit memory bias for uncertain words was found (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005). As 
previously noted, IU is particularly high among worriers and GAD patients. In addition, 
although IU has been noted in other anxiety disorders, the weight of current evidence 
suggests that it is most strongly related to worry. Given the close relationship between 
IU, worry, and GAD, it may be that uncertainty is the quality most aversive to high 
worriers and GAD patients. While a bias for threat may also be found in GAD because it 
is an anxiety disorder, biases may be clearer for stimuli related to its key cognitive 
vulnerability: intolerance of uncertainty. The use of stimuli that represent an underlying 
cognitive process, rather than specific worry themes, may overcome issues of variability 
in worry themes. While further research has yet to replicate the finding of a memory bias 
for uncertainty, the use of uncertain words as stimuli is an intriguing possibility. 
Finally, if we intend to compare memory for different types of words, the words 
should be matched, or equivalent, on everything but the dimension of interest (i.e., threat 
value, uncertainty). For example, if one word in a set is distinctive compared to another 




because it represents a certain construct. For example, depending on the type of test and 
the familiarity of a given set of words, high or low frequency words may be better 
remembered (see Roediger & McDermott, 1993, for a review). For this reason, most 
studies to date have matched word stimuli on familiarity, by controlling for the frequency 
of their occurrence in English (e.g., Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971; Francis & 
Kucera, 1982). As differences in length and part of speech can also make words more 
memorable, these features are also usually controlled. However, research shows that 
other properties can have a significant impact on processing and memory for words. 
Imageability, for example, refers to the ease with which a mental image can be formed of 
a word; concreteness refers to the degree to which a word relates to objects, persons, 
places, or things that can be experienced by the senses. Research shows that highly 
imageable and highly concrete words are more memorable than abstract words (Altarriba, 
Bauer, & Benvenuto, 1999; Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968). However, no study to date 
has controlled for the imageability or concreteness of stimuli. In fact, many studies have 
contrasted threat words with neutral words; most sets of neutral words have been both 
concrete and imageable (i.e., doorbell, chair). If the words used as a control condition are 
more concrete and imageable than other words, any bias for threat may well fail to be 
detected. In addition to imageability and concreteness, the emotionality of stimuli should 
be controlled. On one level, this implies that the emotional valence of words should be 
assessed, to ensure that positive words are significantly more positive, negative words 
more negative, and neutral words at a mid-point, on a continuum of emotionality. On 
another level, emotionality itself may be preferentially processed. Some researchers have 




than threat per se (Becker et al., 1999; Martin et al., 1991). Several studies of attention 
have actually found biases toward both positive and threatening stimuli in GAD patients 
(see Mogg & Bradley, 2005, for a review). The inclusion of positive stimuli permits an 
exploration of whether biases concern threat (i.e., a bias toward threat words alone) or 
emotionality in general (a bias for both threat and positive words). While some studies to 
date have measured the valence of words, and included positive stimuli, many have not 
controlled for emotionality in this manner.  
Encoding tasks and memory tests. In addition to stimulus variations, studies on 
memory bias in worry and GAD have differed widely in terms of procedure; this adds to 
the difficulty of drawing clear conclusions. The most evident divergence concerns the 
type of encoding tasks studies have used, including colour-naming, imagery, lexical 
decision making, and dichotic listening. One similarity, however, may be the prevalence 
of self-referent encoding tasks; fully half of the reviewed studies have used some form of 
self-referenced encoding. As previously noted, self-referenced tasks produce superior 
memory effects in non-clinical populations (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Self-referenced 
tasks are thought to result in enhanced memory because they encourage deep, elaborative 
processing. According to the levels of processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), 
encoding of information can occur on several levels: shallow processing, concerning 
sensory and physical information; deeper processing involving pattern recognition and 
matching; and deep processing, which involves semantic elaboration of the meaning of 
an item. According to this view, retention of information depends on how deeply an item 
is processed, with deeper processing resulting in better memory retention. In accordance 




organization and the elaboration of material—in other words, deep processing—which 
results in enhanced memory (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Self-
referenced encoding tasks have therefore seemed an obvious choice for studies of 
memory bias. As previously noted, however, self-referenced tasks do not consistently 
produce an advantage for threatening information among GAD patients and worriers, an 
apparently anomalous finding to which we will return. For the moment, however, it 
should be noted that half of the studies in this area employed highly elaborative, self-
referent encoding, while the remainder used tasks that varied considerably in the type and 
level of processing they required. 
A review of this area of research should consider not only levels of processing, 
but the type of processing that tasks require. Research suggests that instructions given 
during encoding will determine the type of processing that will take place. For example, 
instructions to generate a word based on semantic cues (i.e., find the antonym for hot) 
will lead to conceptual processing, which involves the elaboration of semantic meaning. 
Conversely, instructions to focus on visual features (i.e., count the number of letters in 
hot) will lead to perceptual processing, which concerns surface information, such as 
visual or auditory features, without reference to meaning (Jacoby, 1983; Roediger, 1990). 
In accordance with these ideas, several studies have shown that under conditions of 
conceptual processing, memory for conceptual but not perceptual aspects of stimuli are 
found. Similarly, perceptual processing appears to enhance memory for perceptual but 
not conceptual aspects of a stimulus (Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Smith & 
Branscombe, 1988). In fact, some research suggests that requiring participants to focus 




reverse may also be true, with conceptual encoding reducing memory for perceptual 
features (Jacoby, 1983). These studies imply that task requirements determine what type 
of information will be encoded with regards to a stimulus; this then determines what is 
later available for retrieval. This view, termed the transfer-appropriate procedures 
approach, contrasts somewhat with levels of processing theory. Jacoby notes that deep 
(i.e., conceptual) processing does not necessarily create better memory for the stimulus, 
but rather determines what aspects of the stimulus will be remembered. In other words, 
conceptual processing enhances memory for conceptual aspects of a stimulus; similarly, 
perceptual processing does not necessarily imply shallow processing and poorer memory, 
but rather memory for perceptual features of a stimulus (Jacoby, 1983; see also Roediger, 
1990). Of further note is that standard tests of explicit and implicit memory tend to 
measure different types of processing. For example, most explicit tests of memory 
involve the retrieval of semantic, elaborated information (i.e., free recall). In contrast, 
implicit tests often require retrieval based on partial perceptual information (i.e., 
degraded pictures, word stems). Therefore, tests of explicit memory might be better 
termed conceptually driven tests, and implicit tests perceptually driven; this is the source 
of some debate in the literature (see Roediger, 1990; Schacter, Chiu, & Oschner, 1993, 
for overviews). For the purposes of the current discussion, however, it is sufficient to 
observe that a failure to match tasks and tests on processing requirements will increase 
the likelihood of non-significant findings. In fact, the concept of transfer appropriate 
procedures is based on the broader idea of transfer appropriate processing, the well-
established finding that memory effects are greatest when the conditions at testing 




These principles together underscore the importance of matching study conditions— 
including type of processing—between encoding and testing.  
In this light, memory research on GAD and high worry displays a dearth of 
transfer appropriateness. Of the twelve studies reviewed, only two were clearly transfer 
appropriate, with perceptual encoding tasks followed by perceptual implicit tests of 
memory; while one of these studies found a memory bias for threat, the other did not 
(MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; Mathews et al., 1995). Two other studies are difficult to 
classify: one followed ‗read only‘ encoding with an explicit free recall test (a bias was 
found: Friedman et al., 2000); in another, dichotic listening was followed by an explicit 
test of recognition (no bias was found: Mathews & Macleod, 1986). Another study used a 
perceptual encoding task, with an explicit recognition test, which would be transfer 
―inappropriate‖; in this study, no bias for threat was found (Mogg et al., 1989). All of the 
remaining seven studies used conceptual, primarily self-referenced encoding, which as 
previously noted involves a high degree of semantic elaboration. Further, all of these 
studies assessed explicit forms of memory, which would be considered transfer 
appropriate. However, four of these studies also assessed implicit memory; a significant 
bias for threat only emerged from two. Given that implicit tests were transfer 
inappropriate for these studies, the two non-significant findings are not surprising. What 
is surprising, however, is that any significant implicit memory bias could emerge from 
transfer inappropriate studies. However, a closer examination of the type of implicit test 
used—word stem completion—may explain this finding.  
While word stems have been widely used as a test of implicit memory, research 




example, a participant who is asked to complete a set of word stems ―with the first word 
that comes to mind‖, and in so doing notices that the stems correspond to words 
encountered during an earlier encoding task. In this case, the word stem completion 
becomes a form of explicit, cued recall. Studies suggest that participants do tend to 
become aware of the purpose of word stem tasks (i.e., Light & Singh, 1987; Schacter, 
1987). Moreover, research shows that word stem completions are significantly related to 
measures of explicit memory such as recall and recognition (Perruchet & Baveux, 1989). 
In contrast, a task such as tachistoscopic word identification has been found to be 
unrelated to explicit memory, causing some researchers to deem it a purer measure of 
perceptual implicit memory (i.e. , Perruchet & Baveux, 1989; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 
1995; Tarsia, Power, & Sanavio, 2003). It is notable that although both of the transfer 
appropriate studies mentioned above used perceptual encoding (an emotional Stroop 
task), only the study using a tachistoscopic word identification test found a significant 
memory bias for threat (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). The other study (Mathews et 
al., 1995) used a word stem completion test, which, given the above account, may explain 
the failure to find an implicit memory bias.  
To summarize, there are a number of methodological problems with memory 
research on worry and GAD. For example, the stimuli employed in these studies have 
rarely been rated or selected by participants. This raises questions about the validity of 
stimuli, and whether they adequately represent their intended constructs for the 
population being studied. Furthermore, the construct of threat has been broadly or 
differently defined across studies, bringing the specificity of the stimuli for GAD and 




represent a cognitive vulnerability specific to worry and GAD—may be a potential 
solution. Additional areas for improvement concern measuring and matching stimuli on 
aspects of emotionality, imageability, and concreteness, all of which affect processing 
and memory for words. Finally, studies in this area have varied widely in the encoding 
tasks they have employed. One trend has been the use of self-referent encoding, which 
produces superior memory effects in non-clinical populations, but does not appear to 
have this effect in GAD patients and worriers. Part of the reason for this may be the lack 
of distinction between conceptual and perceptual processing, and a failure to match tasks 
and tests on this dimension (i.e., a lack of transfer appropriate procedures). A related 
issue is that the word-stem completion test, which has often been used to measure 
implicit memory, appears to be influenced by explicit memory. Conversely, perceptual 
tests such as tachistoscopic word identification seem to more purely measure implicit 
memory. In fact, one of the few transfer appropriate studies that found a memory bias 
employed a tachistoscopic test. Together, these observations suggest that problems with 
stimuli, tasks and tests, and a lack of transfer appropriate processing, may explain many 
non-significant research outcomes.  
Theoretical Accounts of Existing Findings 
The Williams et al. (1997) model. The limitations described above may explain a 
lack of consistency across studies, and many mixed or non-significant research findings. 
However, they do not as easily explain why biases appear to be fairly consistent with 
regards to attention and interpretation, but rarely consistent on tests of memory. Some 
researchers have proposed that this pattern of findings actually represents the 




(1997) have suggested that different emotional states such as anxiety and depression are 
characterized by different patterns of cognitive processing, which do not operate in the 
same way across all stages of processing. They specifically propose that anxiety is 
primarily characterized by biases in attention and interpretation, but not in explicit 
memory. As the biological and social function of anxiety is to allow the individual to 
quickly cope with threat, attention and interpretation biases in anxiety would be adaptive. 
However, extensive elaboration of a threatening stimulus would not necessarily be 
adaptive, and might actually interfere with environmental vigilance for threat. For 
example, it may be useful for an individual to quickly recognize threat in the environment 
(there may be a bear in the trees!) but it might be less useful to elaborate on that stimulus 
(What species of bear is it? Is this their usual habitat? Are they vegetarian?). Williams et 
al. propose that it is this latter type of elaboration that would create a memory bias for 
threat stimuli. In their model, attention for threat is assumed, but without the type of 
elaboration that would lead to enhanced explicit memory.  
More specifically, the Williams et al. (1997) model proposes that information 
from the environment is quickly evaluated on its threat value (high or low), through a 
perceptual, pre-attentive Affective Decision Mechanism. If the stimulus is assigned a 
high threat value, an automatic Resource Allocation Mechanism directs further 
processing toward threat. Subsequent cycles of information uptake are also informed by 
previous experiences with threatening stimuli (i.e., threat schemata). Through this 
allocation of attention to perceptual aspects of the threat, the stimulus becomes 
perceptually primed; that is to say, when partial perceptual cues are later presented, the 




occurs through integrative processing, the automatic strengthening of the components of 
a mental representation. Integration is thought to make the stimulus more accessible 
when any aspect of it is later encountered (see also Graf & Mandler, 1984). A 
presentation of partial visual cues is typical of perceptual implicit tests of memory (e.g., 
degraded pictures, tachistoscopic identification). The Williams et al. theory therefore 
predicts an implicit perceptual memory bias for threat stimuli.  
However, the same stimulus will not necessarily be more retrievable in terms of 
explicit memory. Williams et al. (1997) contrast integration with elaboration, which is a 
form of strategic processing associating the stimulus to other mental representations. 
Elaboration is analogous to conceptual processing, and is thought to make stimuli more 
retrievable. Increased retrievability would be shown on tests of explicit memory such as 
recall or recognition. In the Williams et al. model, although attention is allocated toward 
threat, processing resources are not subsequently devoted to further elaboration of the 
threat stimuli. Therefore, in this model, an explicit conceptual memory bias for threat is 
not predicted.  
Based on their model, Williams and colleagues (1997) propose that high trait 
anxious and anxiety-disordered individuals more readily identify stimuli as threatening, 
and more often direct attentional processing resources toward threat, without showing an 
explicit memory bias. Non-anxious individuals, in contrast, tend to direct attentional 
resources away from threat, unless stimuli are high in threat value. It should be 
emphasized that the assignment of threat value (through the Affective Decision 
Mechanism) is thought to occur automatically, at a pre-attentive level. Similarly, the 




Williams et al. propose a different allocation of processing resources in depression as 
compared to anxiety. They contend that depression is characterized by increased 
elaborative processing of negative stimuli, but not increased integration. Therefore, the 
model predicts enhanced conceptual, explicit memory for negative information in 
depression, without an attention bias. Furthermore, the researchers note that different 
anxiety disorders may be characterized by differing degrees of elaborative processing, 
such that in some anxiety disorders (i.e., phobias) there may be a stronger tendency to 
direct resources away from further elaboration. Finally, Williams et al. acknowledge that 
both automatic and strategic processes are likely to contribute to information processing; 
they only propose that certain modes will predominate in anxiety, and others in 
depression.  
The Williams et al. model might account for many current research findings in 
trait anxiety and GAD. They note that, in accord with their predictions, attentional biases 
are consistently found among anxious individuals, while explicit memory biases are rare; 
furthermore, there is some evidence of implicit memory biases. Recall that in the 
literature review, six of the GAD studies used conceptual self-referenced encoding, and 
all of these assessed explicit memory, in accord with transfer-appropriate procedures. 
However, only one of these studies found an explicit memory bias, and this study warned 
participants their memory would be tested (Mogg & Mathews, 1990). Therefore, there 
does appear to be some research support for the idea that an explicit memory bias does 
not characterize GAD. In addition, research supports the proposal that attentional biases 
can be observed at the pre-attentive level (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Millar, et al., 1995; Mogg 




depression, an explicit memory bias for negative information is often found (see 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, for a review). 
Nevertheless, Williams and colleagues (1997) acknowledge that not all findings 
fit their model. They note several failures to find an implicit memory bias, and attribute 
these in part to some of the methodological issues already reviewed, including a lack of 
transfer-appropriate procedures. In some studies, however, conceptual tasks actually 
produced evidence of an implicit memory bias. In most of these studies, however, word 
stems were used to test implicit memory, and, as already discussed, word stems possibly 
provide a largely explicit measure of memory. Williams and colleagues also recognize 
that while few in number, studies that have found an explicit memory bias are 
problematic for their model. First, they note that if participants are actually required by 
the task to engage in elaborative processing of the stimuli, an explicit bias may result 
(e.g., Mogg & Mathews, 1990). Alternatively, they propose that depression, which often 
co-occurs with anxiety, may account for some instances of explicit memory bias. While 
few studies have measured or controlled for depression, in some studies depression has 
indeed been found to contribute to explicit memory for threatening or negative 
information (e.g., Becker et al., 1999; Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 1995; Mogg et al., 
1989).  
In summary, the Williams et al. (1997) model predicts that anxious individuals 
will show both attention and interpretation biases for threat. This leads to enhanced 
accessibility of threat stimuli: in other words, an implicit perceptual memory bias for 
threat. However, because elaborative processing of threat does not occur, there should be 




of bias for threat in attention and interpretation, but not in explicit memory; however, an 
implicit memory bias for perceptual aspects of threat are predicted. While this model is 
consistent with much of the existing data, there are discrepancies, some of which may be 
attributable to methodological shortcomings or to the influence of depression on memory.  
Cognitive avoidance. While much research has focused on a bias toward threat, 
anxiety and the anxiety disorders are also characterized by avoidance of threat. For 
example, anxiety disorders are associated with avoidance of threatening objects or 
situations (e.g., spiders in Spider Phobia; social interactions in Social Phobia). Anxiety 
disorders are also associated with avoidance of threatening cognitions (e.g., intrusive 
thoughts in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; traumatic images in Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder), in other words, cognitive avoidance. It can be imagined that the tendency to 
avoid upsetting cognitive material would affect memory for threatening information. For 
example, an anxious individual may quickly notice and attend to a threatening stimulus, 
but then engage in cognitive avoidance to reduce their unpleasant emotional response. In 
this scenario, less processing of the threatening information would occur, resulting in 
weaker memory. The finding that GAD patients do not consistently show enhanced 
memory for self-referenced material may be related to cognitive avoidance. Friedman and 
colleagues (2000) suggest that a task relating threatening information to the self may be 
too anxiety-provoking for GAD patients, who may engage in cognitive avoidance to 
reduce their anxiety; they note that this may be particularly true for self-referent imagery. 
In this case, a memory bias would be less likely to result.  
In fact, research indicates that cognitive avoidance is closely related to both GAD 




high trait anxious individuals and GAD patients. However, some studies show that when 
longer response latencies are examined, attention shifts away from threat (see reviews by 
Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010). This suggests initial attention 
toward threat, followed by a shift of attention away from threat, a pattern that would be 
consistent with cognitive avoidance. In addition, research has shown elevated levels of 
cognitive avoidance in both GAD patients (Ladouceur et al., 1999) and high worriers 
(Dugas, Marchand, et al., 2005). While different types of cognitive avoidance may be due 
to automatic or effortful processes (i.e., Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), the measurement of 
automatic cognitive avoidance presents obvious difficulties. Therefore, much existing 
research on cognitive avoidance concerns relatively conscious and effortful processes. 
For example, research shows that worry and GAD are associated with several forms of 
cognitive avoidance, such as substituting worries with positive thoughts; distraction from 
worry; avoiding cues that may trigger worry; and suppression of worrisome thoughts 
(Dugas, Marchand, et al., 2005; Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Consequently, several 
models of GAD include cognitive avoidance as a process that contributes to and 
maintains worry (e.g., Borkovec et al., 1998; Dugas, Marchand, et al., 2005 ).  
Some researchers have suggested that worry is itself a form of cognitive 
avoidance. For example, research shows that threatening mental images are more 
emotionally arousing than the abstract, verbal-linguistic thought characteristic of worry 
(Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). Furthermore, research suggests that worrying can 
actually reduce both mental imagery and physiological reactions to threat (Borkovec, 
Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993). In their cognitive avoidance theory of worry, 




unpleasant anxious arousal associated with threatening mental images (Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). This is consistent with the finding that high worriers report that 
worrying allows them to avoid thinking about even more upsetting topics (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995). According to this view, although worry is associated with tension and 
anxiety, it may prevent the more intense anxiety and arousal associated with frightening 
images (i.e., the image of one‘s child in a car accident). Borkovec and colleagues also 
propose that worry prevents full emotional processing of fear. According to Foa and 
Kozak‘s (1986) theory, activation of all aspects of fear (cognitive, behavioural, affective, 
physiological) is necessary for corrective emotional processing to occur. Without full 
emotional activation, fears are not fully emotionally processed, and are thereby 
maintained. Consequently, the cognitive avoidance theory of worry suggests that worry 
actually maintains fears (Borkovec et al., 2004). Furthermore, every time that worry 
reduces unpleasant emotional and physiological arousal, it may be negatively reinforced. 
This negative reinforcement would perpetuate and maintain the tendency to worry. In 
fact, some research indicates that worrying about a stressful situation reduces short-term 
anxiety, but generates more intrusive thoughts in the long term (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 
1995; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). Taken together, this 
research suggests that worry may be a form of cognitive avoidance that interferes with 
the processing of threatening information by anxious individuals. As with other forms of 
cognitive avoidance, worry would be expected to direct processing—particularly 
elaborative processing—away from threat, thereby reducing memory for it. 
Some parallels can be drawn between the Williams et al. (1997) model and 




threat, but an intervening process directs further processing away from threat, thereby 
inhibiting the type of elaboration that would result in a memory bias. Williams and 
colleagues, however, do not conceptualize this re-direction of processing resources as 
effortful, and they disagree with some of the assumptions made by Borkovec‘s cognitive 
avoidance theory of worry. In addition, the Williams model is the only one to specifically 
predict an implicit perceptual memory bias for threat. However, some degree of implicit 
memory bias might be expected in the cognitive avoidance theory, due to the initial 
attention allocated toward threat. Despite their differences, therefore, the theories 
reviewed above converge in their prediction of initial attentional biases toward threat, 
without a subsequent explicit memory bias.  
General goals of the current research 
As is evident from the preceding review, many studies of GAD patients have 
failed to find a memory bias for threat. However, an explicit memory bias for threat has 
emerged from a few studies of GAD and high trait anxious individuals. In addition, some 
other anxiety disorders such as Panic Disorder have demonstrated explicit memory biases 
for threat. Therefore, one goal of the current study is to re-examine the question of 
explicit memory bias for threat. A review of the literature also shows that while findings 
are mixed, several studies indicate that worriers and GAD patients have an implicit 
memory bias for threat. The Williams et al. (1997) theory, which predicts an implicit but 
not an explicit bias for threat in anxiety, will be used to guide an investigation of implicit 
memory. Accordingly, the second goal of this study is to explore implicit perceptual 




A central goal of the current research is to evaluate the contribution of IU to 
memory biases. Most previous research has focused on the presence or absence of 
memory bias in GAD or trait anxiety; the impact of a cognitive vulnerability such as IU 
has yet to be examined. Given that IU is not only highly related to worry and GAD, but is 
a dispositional vulnerability for worry and GAD, levels of IU may affect memory biases 
for threat. It could be hypothesized that worriers higher in IU may show a stronger 
memory bias for threat than those lower in IU. Given the close relationship between IU 
and worry, worry is also expected to be related to memory biases for threat. However, 
IU—a cognitive disposition—is expected to be a better predictor of memory bias than 
worry—a symptom or manifestation of IU. While one study to date suggests a connection 
between IU and memory bias, this is a new area of exploration. A key objective of this 
research is therefore to assess the contribution of IU to memory biases for threat.  
Intolerance of uncertainty will also be examined on another level in this study: 
that of the stimuli. As already noted, IU as a dispositional characteristic is expected to 
make a contribution to memory biases for threat. However, because uncertainty is a 
source of distress for individuals high in IU, we might expect that stimuli denoting 
uncertainty will be preferentially processed. This does seem to be the case in the few 
studies that have used uncertain stimuli to date. It can be supposed that threatening 
stimuli would be threatening to most individuals, and more threatening to anxious 
individuals. Uncertain stimuli, however, would be most threatening to individuals who 
are highly intolerant of uncertainty. The use of uncertain stimuli may therefore provide a 
highly specific means of examining memory biases in worry. Accordingly, another goal 




Contemporary research and theory suggest that other processes may contribute to 
memory outcomes in worry and GAD. Cognitive avoidance, for example, may lead to a 
lack of elaborative processing, and hence a lack of memory bias. Consequently, different 
forms of cognitive avoidance will be measured in this study. Another potential influence 
that will be considered is depression. The few findings of an explicit memory bias in 
anxiety may in fact be due to co-occurring depression, given that depression is 
characterized by an explicit memory bias. For this reason, moderate to high levels of 
depression will be an exclusionary criterion in this research, and symptoms of depression 
will be measured and analyzed. Other factors known to affect performance on 
information processing tasks will also be assessed, including state anxiety, irritability, 
fatigue, attentional control, and social desirability. 
An over-arching goal of this research is to address the methodological problems 
found in previous studies. In order to establish the validity of the stimuli, for example, 
stimulus words will be pilot tested before hypotheses concerning memory bias are 
explored. Specifically, participants will be asked to rate the properties of candidate 
words, and only those that correspond to the constructs of interest, and can be matched on 
other dimensions such as familiarity, will be used in the memory studies. In the studies 
concerning explicit and implicit memory, transfer-appropriate procedures will be strictly 
observed. Specifically, explicit conceptual processing will be matched with explicit 
memory tests, and implicit perceptual processing will be matched with implicit tests. To 
this end, tachistoscopic word identification will be used to assess perceptual implicit 




In summary, the goal of the current research is to explore the relationship between 
IU, and explicit and implicit memory biases for threat and uncertainty. The potential 
influence of factors such as worry, cognitive avoidance, and depression will also be 
considered. To achieve these ends, a participant-piloted set of stimuli will be created, 
including stimuli denoting uncertainty. Throughout these investigations, procedural 
issues will be addressed, with a particular focus on the maintenance of transfer-
appropriate procedures.  
Study goals and hypotheses 
In Study 1, pilot testing and selection of word stimuli for the research will take 
place. Candidate stimuli will first be rated by a group of participants on five dimensions: 
familiarity, uncertainty, imageability, concreteness, and valence. Word ratings be 
analyzed, and stimuli will be selected based on their distinctness with regards to 
constructs of uncertainty, positive valence, threat valence (social or physical), and neutral 
valence. Stimuli will then be matched on the remaining dimensions of familiarity, 
imageability, and concreteness, as well as length and part of speech. The result will be a 
matched set of stimulus words categorized as neutral, uncertain, socially threatening, 
physically threatening, and positive. Words representing uncertainty will be included in 
order to provide stimuli specific to worry and GAD. Both physical and social threat 
words will be used in order to explore any differences in processing for these different 
types of threat. Furthermore, positive words will be included so that any biases related to 
the emotionality of the stimuli can be evaluated. This method of piloting, statistical 




and specificity. This procedure should rectify some of the problems with previously used 
stimuli, which may have prevented memory biases from being identified.  
Study 2 will explore the relationship between IU and explicit memory bias for 
threat and uncertainty. While existing research does not offer strong support for an 
explicit memory bias for threat among worriers, this may be due to the limited validity 
and specificity of the stimuli that have been used. Therefore, using the stimuli created in 
Study 1, an explicit encoding task will be used to promote incidental learning, and 
explicit memory for the stimuli will be tested. Given the good validity and specificity of 
the stimuli that will be used in this study, it is hypothesized that IU will be a significant 
predictor of explicit memory bias for threatening and uncertain words. Exploratory 
analyses will be assess the influence of factors such as worry, cognitive avoidance, and 
depression.  
Study 3 will examine the relationship between IU and perceptual, implicit 
memory bias for threat and uncertainty. Specifically, participants will engage in an 
incidental learning task that promotes perceptual processing. They will then complete a 
perceptual test (tachistoscopic word identification) in order to assess their implicit 
perceptual memory for the stimuli. Transfer-appropriate procedures will be strictly 
observed, with both task and test requiring perceptual processing. Based on the 
predictions of Williams et al. (1997), and the findings of previous studies, IU is expected 
to be significantly related to an implicit perceptual memory bias for threatening and 
uncertain words. A free recall test will be administered to explore any inadvertent effects 
of explicit memory; however, as outlined in the Williams et al. model, no explicit 




and depression will be assessed. In Study 3, the impact of vocabulary, personal relevance 







Participants for this study were recruited through Concordia University‘s 
Psychology Department Participant Pool, and received one bonus course credit for 
participating (one credit = a bonus 1% of their final grade). This method of recruitment 
and compensation was approved by Concordia University‘s Human Research Ethics 
Committee. Participants were eligible for the study if they were fluent in English, and 
between 18-65 years of age. 
Fifty participants completed the study and received one course credit for their 
participation. The sample included 40 women and 10 men, aged 18 to 40, with a mean 
age of 23 (SD = 4.22). Seventy-two percent of the sample were White, 12% were Asian, 
8% Multi-racial, 4% Black, 2% First Nations, and 2% Middle Eastern. All participants in 
this sample were students, of whom 74% were Psychology majors. Seventy percent of the 
sample reported that English was their first language; 20% reported their first language as 
―Other‖, and 10% cited French as their first language. All participants reported being 
fluent in English. 
Materials  
Generation of words for pilot testing. Initially, the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) Psycholinguistic Database 
(http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm) was consulted in order to obtain 
stimulus words for this study. While extensive, this database included few words 




dimensions of uncertainty and valence, which are key for this study. For these reasons, it 
was decided that a new set of words would be selected and pilot tested for this study. 
In order to generate a large pool of words for pilot testing, the anxiety information 
processing literature was searched for previously used sets of stimulus words (i.e., Dugas, 
Hedayati, et al., 2005; Matthews & Macleod, 1985; Macleod et al., 1986; Manguno-Mire, 
Constans, & Geer, 2005). Words that could be categorized as either positive, uncertain, or 
threatening were selected; for threat words, a distinction was made between words that 
were socially versus physically threatening. A small pilot test (N = 5) was conducted, 
with participants rating a pool of threat words on the following scale: purely socially 
threatening; mostly socially threatening; equally socially and physically threatening; 
mostly physically threatening; purely physically threatening. Words that were rated as 
equally socially and physically threatening were excluded, and words rated as either 
primarily social or primarily physical were retained. 
Multiple synonyms for the literature-derived words were then obtained using 
various sources (i.e., Microsoft Word® (Microsoft Corporation) Thesaurus; Roget's 
College Thesaurus, Revised, 2000; Thesaurus.com synonym generator: 
http://thesaurus.com). The first author and another graduate student then reviewed the 
pool of words, and each independently selected pilot words that they felt best represented 
each of the categories. The raters then compared their lists of pilot words: words both had 
rejected were excluded; words both had selected were retained; and a consensus was 
reached about the remaining words. This process resulted in 40 positive, 40 social threat, 




Neutral words were generated last in order to match them to the other pilot words 
on length, part of speech, and familiarity. Each of the 160 pilot words was entered into 
the MRC Psycholinguistic Database, which was used to generate words that matched 
each pilot word on length and part of speech, and had a moderate familiarity rating 
(according to the MRC rating system, between 400-700). A research assistant then 
selected the three words she judged most neutral for each pilot word. The graduate raters 
then independently chose two neutral words for each pilot word. As with the other pilot 
words, the word lists were then compared and consensus was reached; this resulted in a 
set of 86 neutral words for pilot testing (a larger number of neutral words was required 
for use in practice trials). 
The procedure described above resulted in a total of 246 words for pilot testing: 
40 positive, 40 social threat, 40 physical threat, 40 uncertain, and 86 neutral words. Given 
that each of these 246 words would be rated five times (i.e., on five dimensions), it was 
predicted that accuracy of word ratings would suffer if participants were asked to rate the 
entire set of words. Therefore, the pilot words were randomly divided into two sets. Set 1 
was made up of 123 words: 20 positive, 20 social threat, 20 physical threat, 20 uncertain, 
and 43 neutral words. Set 2 likewise included 123 words, with the same proportion of 
each word type. No word appeared in both sets (see Appendix A for Set 1 words). 
Set 1 words were then mixed in randomized order, and inserted into a 
questionnaire asking participants to rate each word on its concreteness (questionnaires are 
described in detail below). Set 1 words were then inserted into four other questionnaires 
asking participants to rate the familiarity, imageability, uncertainty, and valence of each 




The five questionnaires containing Set 1 pilot words were placed in random order, 
with the constraint that familiarity was always the first questionnaire, as re-rating words 
could influence familiarity ratings. The same procedure was then followed for 
questionnaires containing the Set 2 pilot words. As explained below, Set 1 and Set 2 
packages were later completed by separate groups of participants. 
Measures 
Concreteness questionnaire. This questionnaire was based on definitions of 
concreteness used in previous research (i.e., the MRC Psycholinguistic Database, 
http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm, and Spreen & Schulz, 1966). 
Instructions to participants were: ―Words differ in the extent to which they refer to 
concrete objects, persons, places or things that can be seen, heard, felt, smelled, or tasted, 
as contrasted with abstract concepts that cannot be experienced by our senses. In this 
questionnaire you will be asked to rate a list of words with respect to their ―concreteness‖ 
in terms of sensory experience. Any word that refers to objects, materials, or persons, 
should be given a high concreteness rating (….) Any word that refers to an abstract 
concept that cannot be experienced by the senses should be given a low concreteness 
rating (….).‖ In previous research, concreteness ratings were made on a 7-point Likert 
scale; this format was therefore retained, with each word rated from 1 = least concrete, to 
7 = most concrete (see Appendix C).  
Familiarity questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed to assess how often 
participants had come into contact with the words. They were asked to rate each pilot 
word on how often they had seen, heard, or used the word in speech or writing, on a 5-




word in your life, to 5 = very often: you have seen or heard or used the word nearly every 
day of your life. As this questionnaire concerned familiarity and not vocabulary, 
participants were asked to make a rating even if they were unsure of the word's meaning 
(see Appendix D). 
Imageability questionnaire. The purpose of this questionnaire was to assess the 
ease with which a mental image can be formed of a word. The instructions are based on 
previous research ( i.e., MRC Psycholinguistic Database; Gilhooly & Logie, 1980): 
―Words differ in their capacity to arouse mental images of things or events. Some words 
arouse a sensory experience, such as a mental picture or sound, very quickly and easily, 
whereas other words may do so only with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or not at all. 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to rate a list of words on the ease or difficulty with 
which they arouse mental images. Any word that in your opinion arouses a mental image 
(i.e., a mental picture, or sound, or other sensory experience) very quickly and easily 
should be given a high imagery rating (….) Any word that arouses a mental image with 
difficulty or not at all should be given a low imagery rating (….).‖ The original 7-point 
Likert rating was retained, with words rated from 1 = difficult to form a mental image, to 
7 = easy to form a mental image (see Appendix E). 
Uncertainty questionnaire. This measure was created in order to assess the 
extent to which words represented uncertainty. Preliminary piloting of this questionnaire 
and feedback from participants indicated that simple instructions were easier to follow 
when rating uncertainty. Therefore, participants were asked How much do each of the 




ranging from 1 = does not refer to uncertainty, to 5 = refers perfectly to uncertainty.(see 
Appendix F). 
Valence questionnaire. The purpose of this questionnaire was to obtain ratings of 
the positive or negative qualities of each word, i.e., the word‘s valence. Participants were 
asked, How much of a negative or positive connotation do the following words have? 
Each of the words was rated on a 5-point Likert scale with the following anchors: 1= very 
negative; 2 = a little negative; 3 = neutral (neither negative nor positive); 4 = a little 
positive; 5 = very positive (see Appendix G). 
A General Information Sheet was created to obtain demographic information 
about participants, specifically: age, sex, education, student status, field of study, first 
language, English language fluency, race/ethnicity (see Appendix H). 
Procedure 
Rating of words. Participants were tested in groups, in a classroom setting. 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was rate words on dimensions of 
concreteness, imageability, familiarity, uncertainty, and positive/negative characteristics 
(valence). Participants read and signed consent forms describing the study and conditions 
of informed consent (see Appendix I). Participants were randomly given either a Set 1 
package, or a Set 2 package; these took approximately one hour to complete. 
Debriefing. When word ratings were completed, participants were given a written 
Debriefing sheet (see Appendix J) concerning the purpose of the study, and how their 
ratings would be used to select stimulus words for use in future research. Finally, they 





Data Screening  
Ratings of the pilot words were independently entered by two individuals (i.e., 
double-entered). The two entries were then compared, and discrepancies were corrected 
in order to ensure accuracy. 
Participant Characteristics 
A series of Chi-square analyses showed no significant differences between Set 1 
and Set 2 participants in sex χ²(1) = .50, p = .48; race/ethnicity χ²(5) = 6.44, p = .27; 
education level χ²(3) = .75, p = .86; or first language χ²(2) = .63, p = .73 (note that all 
participants reported being fluent in English). In addition, an independent samples t-test 
showed no significant age differences between Set 1 (M = 22.40, SE = .60) and Set 2 
participants (M = 23.38, SE = 1.07), t(47) = -.81, p = .13  
Stimulus Word Selection 
The goal of stimulus word selection was to obtain sets of words that would be 
conceptually specific to their own category, while being equivalent to words in other 
categories on concreteness, familiarity, and imageability. To this end, a mean score was 
calculated for each of the 246 pilot words on each of the dimensions of concreteness, 
familiarity, imageability, uncertainty, and valence. 
The set of uncertain words was selected first, as the goal was to match other word 
sets to the uncertain words. Uncertain words were placed in ranked order, from least to 
most concrete. Four more ranked lists of the uncertain words were then made based on 
familiarity, imageability, uncertainty, and valence. Uncertain words with extreme values 




select the uncertain stimulus words: 1) high uncertainty; 2) moderate to high familiarity; 
3) neutral valence; 4) high concreteness and high imageability (because uncertain words 
are low on these dimensions, the highest possible were chosen). As with pilot word 
generation, the first author was aided by lab colleagues in this task.  
The other stimulus word sets were selected in a similar way. First, ranked lists of 
words in each category were generated, and words with extreme scores eliminated. Each 
set of words was then selected with reference to the primary characteristic of its category; 
as far as possible, words were then chosen that matched the uncertain words on 
familiarity, concreteness, and imageability. For example, the positive words selected 
were the highest on valence, moderate on familiarity, and low on uncertainty, 
concreteness, and imageability. Threat words were lowest on valence, moderate on 
familiarity, and low in uncertainty, concreteness, and imageability. Neutral words fell in 
the mid-range on valence, moderate in familiarity, and low on all other dimensions. In 
addition to these criteria, each of the words from the other categories was matched in 
length (+ 1 letter) and part of speech to one of the uncertain words. 
This procedure resulted in a set of 64 matched stimulus words, comprised of 16 
neutral words, 16 uncertain words, 16 threat words (8 social, 8 physical), and 16 positive 
words (see Table 1). Equal numbers of social and physical threat words were subsumed 
in the category of threat words to simplify the research design, while providing the option 
of later analyzing these types of words separately. As previously noted, additional neutral 




Properties of Stimulus Words 
The final set of stimulus words was analyzed to compare the concreteness, 
familiarity, imageability, uncertainty, and valence of each category of words. As the 
words had been administered in 2 packages (Set 1 and Set 2), and these made up two 
different sets of words, rated by different groups of participants, analyses were conducted 
separately for Set 1 and Set 2 (note: Set 1 and Set 2 words were combined to produce the 
final stimulus sets; the division of words into Set 1 and 2 was solely for the purpose of 
statistical analysis). For these analyses, each word was treated as a case, having a mean 
rating on each of the 5 dimensions (concreteness, familiarity, imageability, uncertainty, 
and valence). Because the five dimensions are qualitatively different, and moreover rated 
on different scales (i.e., 7-point scales for concreteness and imageability; 5-point scales 
for the other dimensions), each dimension was used as the outcome in a separate analysis. 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted, with word category (neutral, uncertain, 
social threat, physical threat, positive) as the grouping variable, and ratings on one of the 
dimensions as the outcome. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were then used to compare 
the word categories on the outcome dimension. Due to heterogeneity of variance, Welch's 





Study 1: Matched Stimulus Set of Neutral, Uncertain, Social Threat, Physical Threat, and 
Positive Words 
 
Uncertaina Threatb Positive Neutral 
vague hated great rural 
maybe rude good every 
chance virus worthy entire 
tricky mocked adored modern 
random lethal caring actual 
varying ignored admired literal 
puzzling mutilated talented exterior 
doubtful feverish generous apparent 
debatable inferior pleasant customary 
irregular ridiculed optimistic methodical 
imprecise epidemic wonderful reciprocal 
uncertain unsanitary unselfish unlisted 
ambiguous sickness confident universal 
hesitation disapproval integrity ingredient 
mysterious incompetent delightful theoretical 
questionable contaminated enthusiastic geographical 
 
a
Each uncertain word is matched to the other words in that row (i.e., vague is matched to 
hated, great, and rural).  
b




While the goal was to achieve equivalent concreteness across categories, 
differences on this dimension emerged in Set 1, Welch's F(4, 12.81) = 54.27, p < .05. 
Specifically, comparisons showed that in Set 1, uncertain words were significantly less 
concrete than social threat, physical threat, and positive words; furthermore, physical 
threat words were significantly more concrete than all other word types. Differences in 
concreteness were also found in Set 2, Welch's F(4, 5.69) = 10.11, p < .05; in this case, 
however, uncertain words were only significantly less concrete than social threat and 
positive words (see Figures 1 &2). 
As expected, familiarity was equivalent across all word types. The results showed 
no significant differences in familiarity for any of the word categories in Set 1, Welch's 
F(4, 14.38) = 1.95, p = .16, or in Set 2, Welch's F(4, 3.86) = .79, p = .59 (see Figures 1 
&2). 
Results also indicated some disparity in imageability in Set 1, Welch's F(4, 14.88) 
= 23.53, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons showed that uncertain words were significantly 
less imageable than social threat, physical threat, and positive words. In addition, 
physical threat words were significantly more imageable than all other word types, except 
neutral. Differences were also found in Set 2, Welch's F(4, 5.68) = 12.62, p < .05; in this 
set, however, positive words alone were more imageable than social threat words (see 
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In Set 1, ratings of uncertainty were significantly different across word categories, 
Welch's F(4, 13.00) = 39.31, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons showed that uncertain words 
were significantly higher on uncertainty than all the other categories of words. In 
addition, social threat and physical threat words were higher on uncertainty than positive 
words. A similar pattern of results for uncertain words was seen in Set 2 F(4, 24) = 
148.11, p < .05, as uncertain words were significantly higher on uncertainty than all other 
types of words (note: Welch's F could not be computed due to zero variance in social 
threat word ratings). As with Set 1, social threat words were higher on uncertainty than 
positive words; however, physical threat words were only higher on uncertainty than 
neutral words (see Figures 1 &2). 
In Set 1, analyses with valence as the outcome showed significant differences 
between word types, Welch's F(4, 13.28) = 300.53, p < .05. Specifically, positive words 
were significantly more positive compared to all other word types. Furthermore, social 
and physical threat words were significantly more negative compared to other word 
types. There were no significant differences in the valence of social threat and physical 
threat words. Neutral and uncertain words fell in the middle of the valence continuum. 
The same pattern of results emerged for Set 2, Welch's F(4, 4.28) = 268.99, p < .05, with 
the addition that neutral words were significantly more positive in valence than uncertain 





In this study, a large pool of words was generated and pilot tested to obtain ratings 
on five dimensions of interest. Based on these ratings, a final stimulus set of 64 words 
was selected, including categories of neutral, uncertain, threat (social and physical), and 
positive words. Analyses showed that the stimulus words had good construct validity; 
i.e., they showed a significant relationship with the key characteristic of their respective 
categories. Specifically, uncertain words were highest as a group on uncertainty; positive 
words were highest (most positive) on valence; and threat words—both social and 
physical—lowest (most negative) on valence. Neutral and uncertain words were neutral 
in valence. In addition, none of the word categories differed significantly with regards to 
familiarity. While the goal was to achieve similar equivalence in the remaining 
dimensions, results showed that uncertain words were less imageable, and physical threat 
words more imageable, than other word types. Similarly, uncertain words were 
significantly less concrete, and physical threat words more concrete, than all other word 
types. Given that findings concerning concreteness and imageability were not consistent 
across word sets, however, these last findings may not be robust. In contrast, ratings of 
familiarity, uncertainty, and valence were consistent across word sets. 
Despite the inconsistency in the concreteness and imageability findings, it is 
possible that differences between uncertain and physical threat words do exist. While it 
was hoped that stimuli could be matched on concreteness and imageability, this may not 
have been realistic given the types of word categories in this study. For example, 
matching the low imageability and concreteness of abstract, uncertain words (i.e., 




matching on these characteristics may compromise the construct validity of uncertain and 
threat words. For the purposes of this study, therefore, equivalence on concreteness and 
imageability across categories can be considered as secondary, compared to the primary 
goal of high construct validity of words within each category.  
A second caveat to this study is the sample used, which was small and largely 
comprised of female Psychology students. Generalizability of the findings to other 
populations may therefore be limited. In addition, because the words were divided into 
two sets, only 25 participants rated any given word. It is worth noting, however, that this 
resulted in 125 ratings of each word, when the five dimensions are taken into account. 
This can be contrasted with many previous studies, in which stimulus properties received 
little or no examination.  
In conclusion, the current study successfully produced a set of stimulus words 
with good construct validity and equivalent word familiarity, for use in future research. 
Differences with regards to the concreteness and imageability of uncertain and physical 






Using the stimulus sets created in Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to explore the 
relationship between IU and explicit memory for threatening and uncertain stimuli. As 
already noted, existing research does not provide strong support for an explicit memory 
bias for threat among worriers. Nevertheless, a few studies of GAD patients have found 
an explicit memory bias for threat. Furthermore, studies with high trait anxious 
participants suggest that this type of bias may in fact characterize anxious individuals. It 
is also possible that some previous non-significant findings have been due to problems 
with the validity and specificity of the stimuli employed in those studies. Therefore, the 
goal of Study 2 was to re-examine the question of explicit memory bias for threat, and 
more specifically the contribution of IU, while using the stimuli created in Study 1. In 
this study, a non self-referent explicit encoding task was used to promote incidental 
learning. A self-referent task was not used because previous research suggests that it does 
not enhance explicit memory for threat among worriers (i.e., GAD patients: Becker et al., 
1999; Bradley et al., 1995; Coles et al., 2007; Mathews, Mogg, et al., 1989; Mogg et al., 
1987). Following the incidental task, participants were given two explicit memory tests: 
free recall and recognition. Free recall is a widely used test of explicit memory. A 
subsequent recognition memory test was also administered. Because participants are 
provided with the stimuli on a recognition test, it can be considered a less difficult test of 
memory than recall, in which participants must independently retrieve information from 
memory. As a less difficult test, recognition may reveal memory biases that are not 




sensitivity, which is essentially a measure of a participant's ability to accurately 
discriminate previously viewed stimuli from distractors; this was calculated in Study 2 
(see Results: Calculation of memory outcomes). Given the good construct validity and 
matching of the stimuli used in this study, it was hypothesized that IU would be a 
significant predictor of memory bias for threatening and uncertain words. Further 
exploratory analyses were conducted to assess the impact of worry, cognitive avoidance, 
and depression on explicit memory.  
Method 
Participants 
For this study, participants were recruited primarily through Concordia 
University‘s Psychology Department Participant Pool, and received one bonus course 
credit for participating (one credit = a bonus 1% of their final grade). Posters were also 
used to recruit participants from the Montreal community; these individuals were 
compensated $10. All methods of recruitment were approved by Concordia University‘s 
Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Participants were eligible for the study if they were between 18-65 years of age, 
could speak and read English fluently, and had not taken part in Study 1. 
Ninety-one participants completed the study. After testing, two participants 
reported that they were not fluent in English and were removed from the sample; another 
two participants were removed when data screening showed they were significant outliers 
(see Data Screening and Outlier Analyses). The final sample consisted of 87 individuals, 
of whom 11 received $10 compensation, and 76 received course credit for participation. 




24.45 (SD = 6.94). Ethnicity/race was primarily White (69%), followed by Middle 
Eastern (9%), Black (6%), Asian (5%), Multi-racial (4%), First Nations (3%), Other 
(3%), and Latino/a (1%). Ninety percent of the sample were students, with 62% of the 
students reporting that they were Psychology majors. Thirty-five percent of the students 
reported that they were in their first year of university; 42% were in their second or third 
year; 5% were in their fourth year; and 18% reported their year as Other. 
Materials  
The 64 matched stimuli created in Study 1 were used for Study 2. For this study, 
32 of the words were presented as stimuli: 8 positive words, 8 neutral words, 8 threat 
words, and 8 uncertain words. The remaining 32 words (8 of each type) were used as 
distractors during a subsequent recognition test of memory. Note that each set of threat 
words included an equal number of social and physical threat words. 
Procedure 
Presentation of stimulus words. Participants were tested in groups, in a 
classroom setting. Participants were informed that the study concerned the relationship 
between how people process words, and their responses to self-report questionnaires. 
Participants were given consent forms that described the study and conditions of 
informed consent (see Appendix K ). However, they were not informed in advance that 
their memory would be tested, as this might have led them to use memorization 
strategies, making incidental learning impossible. Participants were given a familiarity 
rating sheet (see Appendix L), on which there were 3-point Likert scales ranging from 1 
= not at all familiar to 3 = very familiar. Participants were told they would view a series 




familiar it was using the familiarity sheet. In order to prevent further exposure to the 
stimuli, the words only appeared on the screen, and not on the rating sheet. .Familiarity 
was defined as how often participants had seen or come into contact with the word; they 
were asked to rate familiarity even if they were unsure of a word's meaning. 
Word stimuli were projected on a screen at the front of the room with a timed 
PowerPoint® (Microsoft Corporation) slide show. The words appeared in lowercase 
black Arial font, size 96, centered on an off-white screen. Each word was presented for 8 
seconds, after which a tone sounded and a new word appeared. Participants were 
informed that the tone signaled the appearance of a new word, but they were asked to 
stay focussed on the screen as the presentations would occur quickly. The familiarity 
ratings were essentially a filler task whose purpose was to engage participants with the 
words and promote incidental learning. 
Distractor task. Following the presentation of the stimulus words, participants 
completed a three minute distractor task to minimize recency effects. They were given a 
lined sheet with a number (841) in the top right corner. They were asked to subtract three 
from this number, and then subtract three from the result, and then continue subtracting 
by threes. They were asked to work as quickly and accurately as possible, and to stop 
when a tone sounded at the end of three minutes. 
Free recall task. After the distractor task, participants were given a blank sheet of 
paper and asked to write down as many words as they could remember, in any order, 
from the presentation. Participants were given five minutes to recall words. 
Recognition task. Following the free recall task, participants were given a sheet 




order with 32 distractor words. For each word, participants were instructed to make a 
check mark under ―yes‖ if they thought the word had been presented earlier, and a check 
under ―no‖ if they did not think it had been presented. They were asked to follow their 
first guess if they were unsure (see Appendix M for Recognition Sheet). 
Completion of self-report questionnaires. Participants were then asked to 
complete a package of questionnaires, which were in pseudo-randomized order (4 orders 
were used). However, all packages presented the SUDS ratings on the first page, in order 
to obtain mood ratings immediately after the tasks described above. There was no time 
limit for completion of the questionnaires, but most participants took 20 - 30 minutes to 
complete the package.  
Debriefing. Following the completion of the questionnaires, participants were 
verbally debriefed, and then given a written Debriefing sheet (see Appendix N) 
concerning the purpose of the study. Because debriefing sheets could easily be left in 
public areas on campus, and it was critical that future participants remain unaware of the 
memory test, no specific mention of memory was made in the debriefing sheets. 
However, this aspect of the research was fully explained during verbal debriefing. Before 
leaving, participants were compensated for their participation ($10 or 1 bonus course 
credit). 
Measures 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; French version: Freeston et al., 1994; 
English translation: Buhr & Dugas, 2002) is a 27-item self-report measure of a 
dispositional characteristic associated with negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 




all characteristic of me, to 5 = entirely characteristic of me. The English translation of 
the IUS has excellent internal consistency, α = .94, and good test-retest reliability over 
five weeks, r = .074; it has also shown convergent and divergent validity with regards to 
measures of worry, anxiety, and depression, and criterion validity with regards to GAD 
status by questionnaire (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). A recent large-scale factor analysis 
suggests that the IUS can be understood in terms of two factors: 1) Uncertainty has 
negative behavioural and self-referent implications; 2) Uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything (Sexton & Dugas, 2009a). As expected, both factors have a similarly strong 
relationship with worry; however, a stronger correlation between Factor 1 and measures 
of depression, trait anxiety, and GAD analogue status provides support for the distinction 
between Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Sexton & Dugas, 2009a). While item loadings on the two 
factors vary somewhat across cultural groups, the IUS maintains excellent validity and 
reliability (Norton, 2005; Sexton & Dugas, 2007; see Appendix O). 
The Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; French version: Gosselin et al., 
2002; English translation: Sexton & Dugas, 2008) is a 25-item self-report measure of five 
different forms of cognitive avoidance: thought substitution; transformation of images 
into thoughts; distraction; avoidance of threatening stimuli; and thought suppression. 
These comprise five CAQ subscales, with five items each, rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = not at all typical, to 5 = completely typical. Factor analysis supports the 
five subscale structure of the CAQ (Sexton & Dugas, 2008). The CAQ has shown 
excellent internal consistency for both the total score, α = .95, as well as for the 




& Dugas, 2008). The CAQ shows convergent and divergent validity with regards to 
measures of worry, thought suppression, and coping styles (Sexton & Dugas, 2008). 
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman, 1980) is a questionnaire that 
measures a set of attitudes related to depression. The DAS has 40 items that describe 
different attitudes or beliefs. The items represent seven value systems including approval, 
autonomy, love, achievement, entitlement, perfectionism, and omnipotence. Respondents 
are asked whether each item is typical of your way of looking at things, rating each item 
on a 7-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 = totally agree to 7 = totally disagree. The 
DAS has high convergent validity with regards to measures of depression and 
depressogenic thinking. The DAS has excellent internal consistency, α = .82 - .94, as well 
as high test-retest reliability over eight weeks, r = .80 - .84 (Weissman, 1980). 
The Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Reynolds, 1982) is a measure of the tendency 
to self-report in a socially favourable manner, and is a short form of the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The SDS was included to assess 
the potential impact of social desirability on responses to study tasks. Thirteen scale items 
describe socially desirable behaviours and attitudes that have a low incidence of 
occurrence; participants respond that each item is either true or false for them. The SDS 
shows good internal consistency (Kuder-Richardson formula 20 reliability = .76), 
comparable to that of the full Marlowe Crowne scale (Reynolds, 1982). The SDS also 
demonstrates convergent validity with other measures of social desirability (Reynolds, 
1982).  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 




are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not at all typical to 5 = very typical. 
The PSWQ has excellent internal consistency,  = .86 to .95, and good test-retest 
reliability over 4 weeks, ranging from r = .74 to .93 (Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994). The PSWQ has shown evidence of convergent and divergent validity 
with regards to worry processes, anxiety, and depression (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 
1992; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). The PSWQ also shows sensitivity and specificity when 
used as a GAD screen (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003).  
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas et al., 2001) is an 11 item 
self-report questionnaire that assesses DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) diagnostic criteria for 
GAD, including a subscale measuring the severity of GAD somatic symptoms. The WAQ 
allows respondents to list up to six worry topics. They then rate the degree to which their 
worry is excessive (on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 0 = not at all excessive to 8 = 
totally excessive), difficult to control (from 0 = no difficulty to 8 = extreme difficulty), and 
interfering with their lives (from 0 = not at all to 8 = very severely). Respondents also 
rate the frequency of their worry over the past six months (from 0 = never to 8 = every 
day), and the severity of six GAD somatic symptoms on a 9-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 = not at all to 8 = very severely. The WAQ therefore provides a concise 
assessment of DSM-IV-TR symptom, severity, and interference criteria for GAD. The 
WAQ has demonstrated both sensitivity and specificity when used to screen for GAD, 
and has good test-retest reliability after 9 weeks (Dugas et al., 2001; see Appendix P).  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version, Form Y (STAI-T: 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977) is a well-known questionnaire 




anxiety. For this study, only trait anxiety was assessed. The STAI-T includes 20 items 
rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = almost never to 4 = almost always. The 
STAI-T has shown good internal consistency in clinical ( = .89; Bieling, Antony, & 
Swinson, 1998) and student samples ( = .81; Bernstein & Eveland, 1982). In a student 
sample, the STAI-T has shown good test-retest reliability, ranging from r = .71 to .75 
over 30 days, and r = .65 to .68 over 60 days (Spielberger et al., 1977). The STAI-T also 
demonstrates convergent validity with other measures of anxiety (Bieling et al., 1998; 
Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995). 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977) is a self-report measure of depressive symptoms experienced over the past week, 
designed for use in the general population. Twenty items are rated on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 = rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day) to 3 = most or all of 
the time (5-7 days). The CES-D has excellent internal consistency, and shows convergent 
and divergent validity with regards to measures of negative affect, interviewer ratings of 
depression, social functioning, and positive affect (Radloff, 1977). While four factors 
emerged from a factor analysis (depressed affect; positive affect; somatic and retarded 
activity; interpersonal), the high internal consistency led the author to recommend the use 
of the total score for research purposes. When re-administered at 3, 6, and 12 months, the 
CES-D demonstrated acceptable test-retest reliability, mostly ranging from r = .45 to .70, 
with higher correlations for shorter time periods (Radloff, 1977). 
A Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) was created in order to assess 
participants‘ self-reported mood state immediately after completing the computer tasks. 




Respondents rate their current level of each mood on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 
representing none, and 100 extreme, levels of the mood state (see Appendix Q). 
 A General Information Sheet was created to obtain demographic information 
about participants, including age, sex, education, student status/field of study, language, 
and race/ethnicity (see Appendix R). 
Results 
Data Screening and Outlier Analyses 
The data were double-entered, compared, and corrected to ensure accuracy. A z-
score was computed for all study variables, and any score greater than + 3.29 was 
considered an outlier (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). Results showed that four participants 
were univariate outliers on age, but as this is a participant characteristic, none of these 
were excluded. One participant was an outlier on their total recognition score, z = -4.01; 
as recognition scores are used to calculate two key outcomes for this study (recognition 
and sensitivity), this participant was removed from the sample. Another participant was 
an outlier on SUDS sadness ratings (z = 3.61), and was also removed. To screen for 
multivariate outliers, all study variables (except age, which was a univariate outlier) were 
then entered into a linear regression. Mahalanobis values showed that five participants 
were multivariate outliers, with scores greater than the Chi-square critical value, 2 (16) = 
26.30, p < .05. However, all of these outliers had Cook's distances less than one (for the 
whole sample, Cook‘s distances ranged from .00 to .26), indicating they would not 
significantly affect a regression analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001); these participants 




Z-scores for skewness were computed by dividing skewness by its standard error; 
values greater than 2.58 were considered significantly skewed (Field, 2005). According 
to this criterion, scores on the CAQ were significantly positively skewed (z = 4.91), as 
were scores on the DAS (z = 2.84). In addition, three of the Subjective Units of Distress 
(SUDS) scores were significantly skewed: SUDS sadness (z = 4.12) and irritability (z = 
5.19) were positively skewed, whereas SUDS well-being (z = -4.36) was negatively 
skewed. As this pattern on SUDS ratings, DAS and CAQ scores would be expected in a 
non-clinical sample, and because normality of predictors is not a necessary assumption 
for regression (Field, 2005, p. 170), none of these variables were transformed. Means and 
standard deviations for Study 2 measures are presented in Table 2, and Pearson 
correlations in Table 3. 
Calculation of Memory Outcomes  
For this study, two indices of memory were calculated, based on responses to the 
free recall and recognition memory tasks. Free recall scores were the total number of 
words of each type (neutral, uncertain, threat, and positive) correctly recalled by each 
participant. Sub-totals of the number of social and physical threat words recalled were 
also calculated, but these were primarily used in follow up analyses. Responses on the 
recognition test were then used to calculate sensitivity (or d′) scores. Sensitivity 
incorporates two types of information available from a recognition memory test: hits and 
false alarms. Hits occur when a word is correctly classified, as either a stimulus word 





Means and Standard Deviations for Study 2 Measures 
 
Measure n M SD  
 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 87 13.39 9.07 
 
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire 87 51.64 19.12 
CAQ Avoidance 87 10.08 5.13 
CAQ Distraction 87 11.33 4.62 
CAQ Substitution 87 8.86 4.12 
CAQ Suppression 87 12.17 4.51 
CAQ Transformation 87 9.22 4.94 
 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 87 120.13 32.61 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 86 53.69 16.88 
IUS Factor 1 87 27.13 9.72 
IUS Factor 2 86 26.52 8.69 
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire 87 45.51 13.82 
Social Desirability Scale 87 6.02 2.73 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version 87 40.24 10.38 
 
SUDS Anxiety 87 31.47 24.48 
SUDS Fatigue 87 43.13 27.68 
SUDS Irritability 87 20.10 24.10 
SUDS Sadness 87 18.31 20.56 
SUDS Well-being 86 67.98 21.83 
 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire 87 34.10 15.69 
 
Note. CAQ = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire: Avoidance = Avoidance of threatening stimuli 
subscale; Distraction = Distraction subscale; Substitution = Thought substitution subscale; 
Suppression = Thought suppression subscale; Transformation = Transformation of images into 






Correlations Between Study 2 Measures 
 
  CAQ CES DAS IUS PSW SDS STA SUa SUf SUi SUs SUw WAQ 
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SUw              -.28
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WAQ               
 
Note. n = 87, except : 
a 
n = 86; 
b 
n = 85. CAQ = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire; CES = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
scale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSW = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; SDS = Social 
Desirability Scale; STA = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version; SU = Subjective Units of Distress: a = anxiety, f = fatigue, i = 
irritability, s = sadness, w = well-being; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire. 
*






word is incorrectly classified as a stimulus word. Sensitivity accounts for both hits and 
false alarms, thereby providing a more exact index of recognition memory. For example, 
a participant may have a high recognition score, but if their false alarm rate is 
correspondingly high, their score may represent a tendency to over-endorse test items. 
Sensitivity essentially provides a measure of participants' ability to accurately distinguish 
stimuli from distractors on a recognition test. Statistically, sensitivity can be defined as 
the standardized difference between the distribution of hits and the distribution of false 
alarms, such that: d′ = z (false alarms) – z (hits; Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). In order to 
avoid computational problems due to extreme hit and false alarm scores, a transformation 
was first performed. The loglinear transformation recommended by Hautus (1995) was 
applied, in which 0.5 is added to all false alarm and hit scores, and 1 is added to the 
number of possible stimuli as well as the number of distractor items. A d' score was then 
calculated for each word type, including sub-categories of social and physical threat. 
Manipulation Checks 
Frequencies of hits on the recognition memory test showed that there were no 
stimulus words nor distractor words with floor or ceiling effects (i.e., there were no 
words with either 0% or 100% hits). On the recognition test, a paired samples t-test 
showed that the mean hit rate (M = 27.10, SE = .34) was significantly higher than the 
false alarm rate (M = 3.69, SE = .37, t(86) = 47.75, p < .000). This finding shows that 
participants were able to differentiate stimulus from distractor words at a rate 





Regressions With All Study Variables 
For all regressions, diagnostic indices were first calculated to ensure that the 
necessary regression assumptions were met (i.e., the impact of outliers and influential 
cases; generalizability of the model; see Field, 2005, pp. 162-175). Examination of these 
diagnostics showed that assumptions were adequately met for the regression analyses that 
follow. Before hypothesis-specific regressions were carried out, regressions with all study 
variables were conducted to determine which variables might be further investigated. To 
this end, four regressions were used to predict recall for each type of word (neutral, 
uncertain, threat, and positive), separately. Predictors were study variables except the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, because this would be investigated in the main 
analyses; predictors were entered in one step. 
Results of these analyses showed that for recall, both cognitive avoidance (β = 
0.47, p = 0.001) and worry (β = 0.38, p = 0.039) were significant predictors of recall for 
threat words. However, none of the other study variables were significant predictors of 
recall for neutral, uncertain, or positive words. 
The same procedure was then followed, but with recognition sensitivity for each 
word type as the outcome. Results indicated that SUDS anxiety ratings were a significant 
predictor of sensitivity for uncertain words (β = 0.52, p = 0.002), whereas SUDS 
irritability (β = -0.45, p = 0.005) and social desirability (β = -0.27, p = 0.046) were 
significant negative predictors. For positive words, results showed that female sex was a 
significant predictor (β = -0.28, p = 0.017), as were SUDS anxiety ratings (β = 0.53, p = 




0.048) were significant negative predictors of sensitivity for positive words. No other 
variables were significant predictors of sensitivity for neutral or threat words. 
Given these results, sex, social desirability, SUDS anxiety, and SUDS irritability 
were entered in the first steps of subsequent regressions. Findings concerning cognitive 
avoidance and worry were examined in separate follow up analyses. Findings concerning 
SUDS fatigue were not further explored in order to limit the number of analyses. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Recall 
 In order to address study hypotheses concerning intolerance of uncertainty and 
recall for different types of words, a series of hierarchical regressions were conducted. 
Recall for neutral, uncertain, threat, and positive words were examined in four separate 
analyses. As sex, social desirability, SUDS anxiety, and SUDS irritability were identified 
as variables of interest, these were entered as predictors in Step 1. Scores on the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) were then entered in Step 2, to determine whether 
intolerance of uncertainty would make a significant contribution to recall, above and 
beyond sex, social desirability, SUDS anxiety, and SUDS irritability. 
 Results showed that none of these variables were significant predictors of recall 
for neutral, uncertain, threat, or positive words (see Appendices S, T, U, V). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and Recognition Sensitivity (d′) 
Another four regressions were then carried out to assess the relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and sensitivity for the four types of words. As before, a 
separate regression was carried out for sensitivity for each word type; sex, social 





For uncertain words, results indicated that at all steps of the model, SUDS anxiety 
was a significant predictor of sensitivity, whereas SUDS irritability was a significant 
negative predictor. For threat words, SUDS anxiety was a significant predictor at all steps 
of the model. SUDS anxiety was also a significant predictor of sensitivity for positive 
words at all steps, and SUDS irritability was a significant negative predictor at all steps of 
the model. Female sex was a significant predictor of sensitivity for positive words at Step 
1, and social desirability was a significant negative predictor at Step 1. None of the 





Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Sensitivity for Neutral Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .03 
 Constant  2.40 .20  [2.00, 2.79] 
 Sex  .02 .20 .01 [-.37, .41] 
 SDS  -.04 .03 -.15 [-.09, .02] 
 SUDSanx  .00 .00 .11 [-.00, .01] 
 SUDSirr  .00 .00 -.03 [-.01, .01] 
 
Step 2 .01 
 Constant  2.19 .33  [1.54, 2.83] 
 Sex  .03 .20 .02 [-.37, .43] 
 SDS  -.03 .03 -.13 [-.09, .03] 
 SUDSanx  .00 .00 .10 [-.00, .01] 
 SUDSirr  -.00 .00 -.04 [-.01, .01] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .10 [-.01, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Sensitivity for Uncertain Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .11* 
 Constant  2.28 .20  [1.89, 2.68] 
 Sex  -.21 .20 -.11 [-.61, .19] 
 SDS  -.04 .03 -.17 [-.10, .01] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .37** [.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .00 -.36** [-.02, -.00] 
 
Step 2 .01 
 Constant  2.10 .33  [1.44, 2.75] 
 Sex  -.20 .20 -.11 [-.60, .20] 
 SDS  -.04 .03 -.15 [-.09, .02] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .36** [.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .00 -.37** [-.02, -.00] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .08 [-.01, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale. 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Sensitivity for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .08 
 Constant  2.37 .21  [1.96, 2.77] 
 Sex  -.11 .20 -.06 [-.52, .30] 
 SDS  -.05 .03 -.21 [-.11, .00] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .31* [.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .00 -.17 [-.01, .00] 
 
Step 2 .00 
 Constant  2.32 .34  [1.65, 2.99] 
 Sex  -.11 .21 -.06 [-.52, .30] 
 SDS  -.05 .03 -.21 [-.11, .01] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .31* [.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .00 -.17 [-.01, .00] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .02 [-.01, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale. 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Sensitivity for Positive Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .15* 
 Constant  2.21 .25  [1.71, 2.70] 
 Sex  -.51 .25 -.22* [-1.00, -.02] 
 SDS  -.08 .03 -.24 [-.14, -.01] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .39 [.01, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.35* [-.02, -.00] 
 
Step 2 .03 
 Constant  1.64 .40  [.85, 2.43] 
 Sex  -.48 .24 -.20 [-.96, .01] 
 SDS  -.06 .03 -.20 [-.13, .01] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .00 .37** [.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .00 -.36** [-.02, -.00] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .19 [.00, .02] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale. 





Follow-up Analyses: Cognitive Avoidance and Worry 
In earlier analyses with all study variables, cognitive avoidance and worry were 
significant predictors of recall for threat words; follow-up analyses were therefore carried 
out to explore these findings. A hierarchical regression was conducted with sex, social 
desirability, SUDS anxiety, and SUDS irritability as predictors in Step 1; worry as 
measured by the PSWQ in Step 2, and cognitive avoidance as measured by the CAQ total 
score in Step 3.  
Results showed that in Step 1, SUDS anxiety was a significant predictor of threat 
word recall (β = 0.28, p = 0.043); however, in the final model, cognitive avoidance was 
the only significant predictor of threat word recall (β = 0.32, p = 0.004). 
As explained in the Measures section, the CAQ can be interpreted both in terms 
of its total score, and in terms of its five subscales: thought substitution; transformation of 
images into thoughts; distraction; avoidance of threatening stimuli; and thought 
suppression. Further analyses were therefore conducted to determine whether recall for 
threat was related to the specific forms of cognitive avoidance measured by the CAQ 
subscales. Accordingly, five regressions were carried out, with sex, social desirability, 
SUDS anxiety, and SUDS irritability in Step 1, and one of the five CAQ subscales in 
Step 2. In order to prevent problems with collinearity, each of the CAQ subscales was 
examined separately. 
CAQ thought substitution was not a significant predictor of threat word recall; 
however, SUDS anxiety was a significant predictor at both steps of the model. CAQ 
transformation of images into thoughts was a significant predictor of threat word recall in 




also a significant predictor at Step 2 of the model, and SUDS anxiety at Step 1. CAQ 
avoidance of threatening stimuli was a significant predictor of threat word recall, as was 
SUDS anxiety in both steps of the model. CAQ thought suppression was also a 
significant predictor of threat word recall in Step 2; SUDS anxiety was again a significant 
predictor in both steps (see Tables 8 - 12). 
As outlined in Study 1, the set of threat words is comprised of both social and 
physical threat words. follow-up analyses were therefore performed to explore potential 
differences between social and physical threat words, with the four CAQ subscales that 
were significant predictors of threat word recall. To examine recall of social threat words, 
a regression was carried out with sex, social desirability, SUDS anxiety, and SUDS 
irritability in Step 1, and one of the CAQ subscales in Step 2; again, each subscale was 
analyzed separately. The same analyses were then performed, but with recall of physical 
threat words as the outcome.  
For recall of social threat words, in the analysis with CAQ transformation of 
images into thoughts, SUDS anxiety was the only significant predictor in the final step (β 
= 0.27, p = 0.048). For CAQ avoidance of threatening stimuli, SUDS anxiety was the 
only significant predictor of recall in Step 2 (β = 0.28, p = 0.043). Neither CAQ 
distraction nor CAQ thought suppression were significant predictors of recall for social 
threat words.  
For recall of physical threat words, results showed that CAQ distraction was a 
significant predictor (Step 2: β = 0.32, p = 0.004). CAQ avoidance of threatening stimuli 
was also a significant predictor of physical threat word recall (Step 2: β = 0.28, p = 




recall (Step 2: β = 0.31, p = 0.006). CAQ transformation of images into thoughts was not 





Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, Worry, and CAQ 
Thought Substitution Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.50 .36  [.78, 2.22] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .00 
 Constant  1.45 .44  [.57, 2.33] 
 Sex  -.19 .37 -.06 [-.92, .53] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.15 [-.02, .01] 
 CAQsub  .01 .03 .02 [-.06, .07] 
 
 
Note. n = 87. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 







Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, Worry, and CAQ 
Transformation of Images into Thoughts Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.50 .36  [.78, 2.22] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .06* 
 Constant  .89 .43  [.03, 1.76] 
 Sex  -.12 .35 -.04 [-.82, .58] 
 SDS  .00 .05 .00 [-.09, .10] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .30* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.23 [-.02, .00] 
 CAQtrans  .06 .03 .27* [.01, .12] 
 
 
Note. n = 87. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; CAQtrans = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, transformation of 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, Worry, and CAQ 
Distraction Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.50 .36  [.78, 2.22] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .10** 
 Constant  .60 .45  [-.29, 1.49] 
 Sex  -.12 .34 -.04 [-.80, .57] 
 SDS  -.00 .05 -.01 [-.10, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .23 [-.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.18 [-.02, .00] 
 CAQdis  .08 .03 .33** [.03, .14] 
 
 
Note. n = 87. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; CAQdis = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, distraction subscale. 





Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, Worry, and CAQ 
Avoidance of Threatening Stimuli Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.50 .36  [.78, 2.22] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .09** 
 Constant  .68 .45  [-.21, 1.57] 
 Sex  -.17 .35 -.05 [-.86, .52] 
 SDS  .01 .05 .01 [-.09, .10] 
 SUDSanx  .02 .01 .32* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.20 [-.02, .00] 
 CAQav  .07 .02 .31** [.02, .12] 
 
 
Note. n = 87. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; CAQav = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, avoidance of threatening 
stimuli subscale. 





Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, Worry, and CAQ 
Thought Suppression Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.50 .36  [.78, 2.22] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .28* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .10** 
 Constant  .30 .52  [-.75, 1.34] 
 Sex  -.13 .35 -.04 [-.81, .56] 
 SDS  .02 .05 .05 [-.07, .12] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .29* [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.21 [-.02, .00] 
 CAQsupp  .09 .03 .33** [.03, .14] 
 
 
Note. n = 87. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 
Subjective Units of Distress: anx = anxiety, irr = irritability; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; CAQsupp = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, thought suppression 
subscale. 





In this study, the relationship between IU and explicit memory bias for threat and 
uncertainty was explored. The stimuli piloted in Study 1 were used in an incidental 
learning task, and explicit memory (recall and recognition sensitivity) for the different 
types of words was measured. Regressions were then used to assess the contribution of 
IU to memory for the stimuli; the contribution of factors such as worry, cognitive 
avoidance, and depression were also assessed. 
Exploratory regressions with all study variables showed that worry and cognitive 
avoidance were predictors of recall, but only for threat words. SUDS anxiety was a 
significant predictor of sensitivity for uncertain and positive words, and SUDS irritability 
was a negative predictor for these word types. Social desirability emerged as a negative 
predictor of sensitivity for uncertain words. Lastly, female sex was a predictor, and 
SUDS fatigue a negative predictor, of positive word sensitivity.  
A series of regressions were then used to test the hypothesis that IU would predict 
recall and sensitivity for uncertain and threat words. Contrary to expectation, IU was not 
a predictor of sensitivity, or recall, for any type of word. However, SUDS anxiety was a 
predictor, and SUDS irritability a negative predictor, of sensitivity for uncertain words. 
SUDS anxiety was also a predictor of sensitivity for threat words. For positive words, 
SUDS anxiety and female sex were predictors, whereas social desirability and SUDS 
irritability were negative predictors.  
Based on the analyses with all study variables, follow-up regressions were 
conducted with worry and cognitive avoidance. In these regressions, SUDS anxiety and 




no longer significant. Analyses of specific CAQ subscales showed that transformation of 
images into thoughts, distraction, avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought 
suppression were all predictors of threat word recall; in all cases, SUDS anxiety was also 
a predictor. Separate analyses of social and physical threat words showed that distraction, 
avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought suppression were significant predictors of 
recall, but for only for physical threat words. For social threat words, SUDS anxiety was 
the only predictor of recall, in the analyses examining transformation of images into 
thoughts, and avoidance of threatening stimuli. 
The main outcome of Study 2 was the failure to find a relationship between IU 
and explicit memory for threatening or uncertain words. This contrasts with the study 
hypotheses, and with three previous studies that have found a relationship between IU 
and information processing biases. It is important to note, however, that only one study to 
date has found a relationship between IU and memory bias for uncertain words. In that 
study, high IU participants recalled a significantly higher proportion of uncertain as 
compared to neutral words, when contrasted with participants low in IU. However, only 
two types of words—uncertain and neutral—were presented in that study. In the current 
study, uncertain words were presented with three other types of words, two of which 
were emotionally valenced (threat and positive words). It may be that the presence of 
other valenced words interfered with focussed processing of words denoting uncertainty. 
In this sense, the use of four word types in this study may have been an overly stringent 
test of information processing bias. Another possibility is that uncertain words were not 
preferentially processed due to their lower concreteness and imageability, particularly 




factors that can enhance memory; as noted in Study 1, uncertain words were lower on 
these dimensions than the other types of words. 
Another key outcome was that worry was not a significant predictor of memory 
bias for uncertain words. While there was a significant relationship between worry and 
recall of threat words in the initial analyses, this relationship became non-significant 
when cognitive avoidance was included. This suggests that while worry (a symptom) 
makes a contribution to memory bias, cognitive avoidance (a cognitive process or 
disposition) may be a better predictor. This was true specifically for physical threat 
words, and for three particular forms of cognitive avoidance: distraction, avoidance of 
threatening stimuli, and thought suppression. While there were no specific hypotheses 
regarding cognitive avoidance, current theory suggests that it should be negatively related 
to memory bias. Specifically, the tendency to avoid upsetting mental material would be 
expected to interfere with the processing of that material, and lead to poorer memory. In 
fact, the opposite relationship was found: cognitive avoidance was positively related to 
memory for threat. One possible explanation for this is that while the Cognitive 
Avoidance Questionnaire measures the self-reported tendency to engage in cognitive 
avoidance strategies, it does not measure how successful these attempts are. For example, 
an individual may attempt to avoid upsetting thoughts, but paradoxically draw more 
processing resources to the very content they are trying to avoid. This would be 
consistent with findings from the thought suppression literature, which suggest that 
attempts to avoid thoughts can actually result in an increase in those thoughts (see 
Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001, for a review). In the current study, some support for 




cognitive avoidance related to enhanced memory for threat. However, as cognitive 
avoidance analyses were strictly exploratory, these outcomes should be interpreted with 
caution.  
Of further interest is that when social and physical threat words were examined 
separately, cognitive avoidance was related to recall for physical threat words alone. 
Study 1 analyses showed no significant differences between social and physical threat 
words on valence, indicating that they are equally negative or ―threatening‖. However, 
results also suggested that physical threat words were significantly more concrete and 
imageable than social threat words. Therefore, a memory bias may have emerged for 
physical threat words because they are higher in imageability and concreteness. 
Alternatively, these findings may reflect an actual bias toward the construct of physical 
threat: stimuli denoting physical threat may be preferentially processed and recalled. 
However, the possibility that results may be due to the higher concreteness and 
imageability of physical threat words cannot be entirely ruled out. 
In the initial exploratory regressions, some other study variables contributed to 
memory bias. For example, social desirability was negatively related to sensitivity for 
uncertain and positive words. This implies that individuals high on social desirability are 
less likely to accurately discriminate between certain types of old and new words on a 
recognition test. For instance, higher social desirability may lead an unsure participant to 
endorse more words as previously viewed, because they know their memory is being 
tested. Why this would only apply to uncertain and positive words, however, is unclear 
and would require further exploration. Another finding was the positive relationship 




research suggests that high state anxiety can interfere with performance, this may 
primarily be true for individuals who are high in trait anxiety (i.e., Eysenck, Payne, & 
Derakshan, 2005). The levels of trait anxiety in this study are relatively low compared to 
many studies in this area (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version: M = 40.24, SD = 
10.38; range 29.86 – 50.62). Furthermore, the levels of state anxiety in this study are 
fairly low (SUDS anxiety rating out of 100: M = 31.47, SD = 24.48; range 6.99 – 55.95). 
In a relatively low trait anxious sample, such small elevations in state anxiety may reflect 
slightly heightened arousal, and consequently improved performance on a recognition 
task. The finding of a negative relationship between irritability and memory performance 
may initially seem self-explanatory. However, it is more difficult to explain why 
irritability only negatively affected sensitivity for uncertain and positive words; as these 
are the result of exploratory analyses, however, they may simply be chance findings.  
A final point of interest is that contrasting results were found on the two explicit 
memory tests used in this study: recall and recognition. On the free recall test, 
relationships between worry, cognitive avoidance, and physical threat were found. In 
recognition, however, sensitivity for uncertain and positive words were related to 
measures of state anxiety, irritability, and social desirability. As already noted, free recall 
can be seen as a more difficult test of memory because it requires retrieval from memory 
without the aid of cues. Recognition, in contrast, is an easier test of memory, as the 
stimuli are provided, and must simply be distinguished from distractors. In this study, 
therefore, the tendency to worry and engage in cognitive avoidance appeared to 
contribute to the ability to effortfully retrieve words related to physical threat from 




enhanced memory for threat would be consistent with information processing theory. In 
contrast, the recognition sensitivity results suggest that mood state and social desirability 
either facilitated (state anxiety) or hampered (state irritability, social desirability) 
judgments about whether words were new or old. As high sensitivity scores indicate a 
better ability to discriminate stimuli from distractors, the results of this study suggest that 
mood state and social desirability have an impact on this discrimination. Mild levels of 
state anxiety may facilitate this type of judgment due to heightened arousal and 
attentiveness. Potentially, as already noted, social desirability may bias unsure 
participants toward responses that they believe are expected, thereby reducing their 
accuracy.  
While these points are interesting, the results of this study should be interpreted 
with some limitations in mind. One limitation concerns the sample, which was relatively 
small, and largely comprised of undergraduate Psychology students. Psychology students 
may have suspected that the study concerned memory, and have employed memorization 
strategies. As there was no post-study questioning about the experiment, this could not be 
assessed. A further concern is that beyond a self-report of English fluency, there was no 
independent measure of language to verify that participants were fluent English speakers; 
this may have affected participants‘ understanding of, and memory for, the stimulus 
words. 
In conclusion, hypotheses concerning intolerance of uncertainty and memory for 
uncertain and threat words were not supported in Study 2. While there was some 
evidence that worry was significantly related to memory for threat, this relationship 




addition, there was no significant relationship between worry and memory for uncertain 
words. However, measures of state anxiety did appear to be positively related to memory 
outcomes (sensitivity for uncertain, threat, and positive words). Conversely, state 
irritability and social desirability were negatively related to sensitivity for some stimuli 
(uncertain and positive words). Therefore, in this study, mood state and social desirability 
appeared to be better predictors of memory for stimulus words than intolerance of 
uncertainty.  
Follow up analyses indicated that three particular forms of cognitive avoidance—
distraction, avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought suppression—were related to 
recall, for physical threat words alone. This relationship between cognitive avoidance and 
memory for threat may be due to a paradoxical increase in the processing of material the 
individual is trying to avoid. While not the central focus of this study, this is an 
interesting outcome that will be further explored.  
It could be speculated that the lack of a relationship between worry, IU, and 
memory bias is consistent with the Williams et al (1997) prediction that anxiety is not 
characterized by an explicit memory bias for threat. It would be unreasonable to draw this 
conclusion on the basis of non-significant findings from a single study; however, this 






The goal of Study 3 is to investigate the role of IU in implicit memory for threat 
and uncertainty. More specifically, the Williams and colleagues (1997) prediction of an 
implicit, perceptual memory bias for threat will be tested. Using the stimuli generated in 
Study 1, memory for uncertain, threatening, neutral, and positive words will be assessed. 
Additional variables of interest such as worry, cognitive avoidance, mood, and social 
desirability will also be explored. In this study, participants will perform an incidental 
learning task that promotes perceptual processing of the stimulus words (letter counting). 
They will then complete a tachistoscopic word identification test to assess their implicit 
perceptual memory. In order to maintain transfer-appropriateness, the task and test will 
be procedurally identical; moreover, both task and test will require perceptual processing. 
Rapid presentation times and distractor tasks will be used to prevent accidental 
elaborative processing of stimuli. In light of the predictions made by Williams et al., and 
the findings of previous studies, IU is expected to be a significant predictor of an implicit 
perceptual memory bias for threat and uncertain words. In order to contrast this with any 
explicit memory that may occur, a free recall test will also be administered. As the task in 
this study requires implicit, perceptual processing, and because the Williams et al. model 
does not predict an explicit memory bias, no explicit memory bias is expected in Study 3. 
A new variable that may contribute to memory bias will be introduced in Study 3: 
that of stimulus relevance. Stimulus relevance refers to the degree to which stimulus 
words relate to topics that may be currently salient to a participant. For example, while a 




someone about to move to another continent. It is conceivable that highly relevant stimuli 
would be preferentially processed, and therefore better remembered. In some cases, 
personal stimulus relevance might be a better predictor of memory bias than the construct 
the word is intended to represent (i.e., neutral, uncertain, threat, positive). The 
contribution of stimulus relevance was addressed in a study by Coles et al. (2007; see 
Information Processing in GAD and Worry for detailed review). In this study, 
idiosyncratic stimulus words were selected based on participant ratings of personal 
relevance. However, the personal relevance of the stimulus words was inferred from 
participant ratings of valence (i.e., rate words on a scale ranging from extremely negative 
for me to extremely positive for me). While this provided a way to measure the relevance 
of positive and threat words, it could not as clearly establish the personal relevance of 
neutral or uncertain words—words that are neither negative nor positive, but may be 
highly salient. In order to address the influence of relevance on memory, therefore, a 
direct measure of stimulus relevance was added to Study 3. Specifically, at the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to rate all stimulus words on their relevance: ...rate 
how much each word corresponds to events or topics that are currently important to you. 
These ratings were then analyzed to assess their contribution to memory. A secondary 
hypothesis of this study was therefore that stimulus relevance would make a significant 
contribution to memory for all types of words. 
Further measures were added in Study 3 in order to address questions that arose 
from the results of Study 2. In Study 2, there was no measure of English language fluency 
beyond self-report; accordingly, a short vocabulary scale was added in Study 3. 




stimuli such as uncertain words. In addition, a scale measuring the ability to control 
attention was used, to assess the influence of this ability on the tachistoscopic 
identification task. A self-report manipulation check was also administered, to evaluate 
whether participants had discovered the true purpose of the study, and whether they had 
employed any memorization strategies. Finally, a semi-structured clinical interview (the 
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview) was administered to ensure that 
exclusionary criteria were not met. 
Given that most findings of implicit memory bias have emerged from studies 
using clinical samples of GAD patients, the original goal of Study 3 was to approximate 
these samples by recruiting extreme groups of high and low worriers. Despite our efforts, 
however, examination of the resulting sample showed normally distributed data, with a 
mean worry score characteristic of non-clinical student samples (Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire: M = 51.07, SD = 14.70). For this reason, and in order to prevent the loss 
of power inherent in creating groups from continuous data, worry and all other study 




Participants for this study were recruited through Concordia University‘s 
Psychology Department Participant Pool, and received bonus course credit for 
participation (a bonus 1% of their final grade per hour of participation). Participants were 
also recruited from the Montreal community using posters and advertisements on the 




recruitment were approved by Concordia University‘s Human Research Ethics 
Committee. In all, 423 people contacted our laboratory concerning the study, with 151 
dropping out after initial contact. A telephone screening (see Appendix W) was 
administered to the remaining 272 people to determine eligibility for the study. 
Participants were eligible for the study if: a) they were between 18-65 years of age; b) 
English was their first language; c) they had normal or corrected to normal vision and 
hearing; d) they had never been diagnosed with a reading disability or speech 
impediment; e) any psychotropic medication had been stable for at least four weeks; f) 
they did not meet criteria for bipolar disorder, major depression, schizophrenia, substance 
abuse, or pathological gambling; and g) they had not taken part in associated studies in 
our laboratory. Participants were also questioned about their levels of worry, in an 
attempt to acquire equal numbers of high and low worriers for the sample.  
Of the 272 screened participants, 128 did not meet study requirements and were 
excluded; 13 who were eligible dropped out after the screening. A total of 131 
participants completed the study. Of these, 5 were used to pilot test the procedure, and 6 
were removed due to procedural problems. In order to eliminate a floor effect on the 
tachistoscopic identification task (the study‘s main outcome), 22 participants who had 
extremely low scores (less than 8/64 correct responses) were removed from the sample. 
The final sample consisted of 98 individuals, of whom 58 received $25 
compensation, and 40 received course credit for their participation. The sample included 
76 women and 22 men ranging in age from 18 to 64, with a mean age of 26.23 (SD = 
10.37). Ethnicity/race was primarily White (68%), followed by Black (8%), Middle 




remainder did not report their ethnicity/race. Eighty-four percent of the sample were 
students, 70% of whom were full time; 50% of the students reported that they were 
majoring in Psychology. Participants‘ highest level of completed education was as 
follows: 44% had completed CEGEP, 34% had an undergraduate degree, 21% had 
completed high school, and 1% had completed primary school. Forty-four percent of the 
sample reported that they did not work, 40% reported working part-time, and 16% 
worked full-time. According to a cut score of 53 on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, 
49% of the sample were low worriers, and 51% were high worriers (based on data from 
Brown, Antony, and Barlow, 1992, a high worry cut score of 53 was established using 
the method suggested by Jacobson and Truax, 1991). However, despite attempts to 
recruit distinct high and low worry groups, the participants most resemble a normally 
distributed student sample (see Table 13 for Study 3 measure means). 
Materials 
 The stimulus words created in Study 1 were used in this study. Sixty-four of the 
stimuli were divided into two non-overlapping sets of 32 words—Set A and Set B. Sets A 
and B included eight of each word type (neutral, uncertain, threatening, and positive), 
with no word appearing in both sets. Set A and Set B threat words were each comprised 
of four social threat and four physical threat words. Sets A and B therefore contained the 
same number of words of each type (see Figure 3 for Set A & B words). Each of the non-
uncertain words was matched on length and part of speech with one corresponding 
uncertain word (see Table 1 for matching of words). As previously described, equivalent 
familiarity has already been shown across word categories. Each participant viewed 




did not appear in any other task. During Task 3, participants viewed the entire set of 64 
words (Set A + Set B). Thus, half of the participants were primed with Set A words 
during Task 1, and the other half were primed with Set B during Task 1. During the 
course of the study, incoming participants were randomly assigned to either Group A 
(priming with Set A words) or Group B (priming with Set B words) in order to control 
for potential word set effects. Forty-nine participants were randomized into Group A, and 
49 into Group B. 
Procedure 
Following the telephone screening described above, eligible participants were 
invited to our laboratory at Concordia University for individual testing. Participants read 
and signed a consent form before taking part in the study. The consent form stated that 
the study concerned the relationship between personality and how individuals process 
words; participants were informed that they would complete tasks related to attention, 
perception, and word comprehension. If participants had expected a test of memory, they 
would have been likely to use memorization strategies, making a test of implicit memory 
impossible. Participants were therefore not informed that their memory would be tested, 
but were fully debriefed about the true purpose of the research at the end of the study. In 
total, participants spent approximately ninety minutes in our laboratory. Thirty minutes 
each were required for the computer tasks, the pencil and paper tasks, and the clinical 





Stimulus Words used in Study 3, Divided into Set A and Set B 
 
 
Set A Words  Set B Words 
 
Word Type  Word Type 
ACTUAL Neutral  APPARENT Neutral 
CUSTOMARY Neutral  ENTIRE Neutral 
EVERY Neutral  INGREDIENT Neutral 
EXTERIOR Neutral  LITERAL Neutral 
GEOGRAPHICAL Neutral  METHODICAL Neutral 
MODERN Neutral  RECIPROCAL Neutral 
THEORETICAL Neutral  RURAL Neutral 
UNIVERSAL Neutral  UNLISTED Neutral 
AMBIGUOUS Uncertain  CHANCE Uncertain 
DEBATABLE Uncertain  DOUBTFUL Uncertain 
MAYBE Uncertain  HESITATION Uncertain 
MYSTERIOUS Uncertain  IMPRECISE Uncertain 
PUZZLING Uncertain  IRREGULAR Uncertain 
QUESTIONABLE Uncertain  UNCERTAIN Uncertain 
RANDOM Uncertain  VAGUE Uncertain 
TRICKY Uncertain  VARYING Uncertain 
CONTAMINATED Threat-p  DISAPPROVAL Threat-s 
INCOMPETENT Threat-s  EPIDEMIC Threat-p 
INFERIOR Threat-s  FEVERISH Threat-p 
LETHAL Threat-p  HATED Threat-s 
MOCKED Threat-s  IGNORED Threat-s 
MUTILATED Threat-p  RIDICULED Threat-s 
RUDE Threat-s  UNSANITARY Threat-p 
SICKNESS Threat-p  VIRUS Threat-p 
ADORED Positive  ADMIRED Positive 
CARING Positive  GENEROUS Positive 
CONFIDENT Positive  GREAT Positive 
DELIGHTFUL Positive  INTEGRITY Positive 
ENTHUSIASTIC Positive  OPTIMISTIC Positive 
GOOD Positive  UNSELFISH Positive 
PLEASANT Positive  WONDERFUL Positive 
TALENTED Positive  WORTHY Positive 
 
 
Note. Threat-p = physical threat words; Threat-s = social threat words. Social threat 





Computer tasks. For the computer tasks, participants were seated 50 cm away 
from an IBM-compatible computer with a 17-inch cathode ray tube (CRT) monitor. The 
monitor had a 16.67 ms screen refresh rate, and all presentation durations were 
programmed in accordance with this rate. All computer tasks were conducted using 
Eprime (version 1.2) software. Throughout the computer tasks, participants heard pre-
recorded instructions through speakers to the left and right of the computer screen, and 
were able to adjust the volume to their preference. Instructions were presented auditorily 
in order to prevent visual priming to the instructions. Participants initiated each new task 
by pressing the ―1‖ on the number keypad, and could replay instructions by pressing ―2‖. 
Once initiated, tasks could not be paused or stopped. Participants verbally responded to 
the computer tasks, and their responses were recorded with an audio tape cassette 
recorder. A research assistant introduced and started each of the computer tasks, and 
remained in the testing room during Task 2. However, participants carried out Task 1 and 
Task 3 alone in the testing room. A white noise machine was placed outside the testing 
room to minimize any distracting noise.  
Task 1: Letter counting. The purpose of this task was to ensure that participants 
focussed on the visual features of each stimulus word. For this task, eight words of each 
type (neutral, uncertain, threatening, and positive) appeared on the screen, one at a time. 
Participants therefore viewed a total of 32 words during Task 1, with half of the 
participants viewing Set A, and the other half viewing Set B. All stimuli were presented 
in uppercase white Arial font, bolded, size 22, centered on a black screen. Each stimulus 
word was preceded by a fixation cross (+) which appeared in the middle of the screen for 




durations are rounded up to the nearest whole number). Following the fixation cross, the 
stimulus word appeared on the screen for 900 ms. Pilot testing indicated that 900 ms was 
long enough to allow perception of the word, while being short enough to maintain the 
appearance that processing of words was being tested. While the stimulus word was still 
on the screen, participants heard a randomly selected letter through the computer 
speakers. Participants were asked to verbally state, as quickly as possible, how many 
times the letter appeared in the word they saw. The word was then replaced by a mask for 
1067 ms in order to eliminate any visual after-image; this mask was made up of 12 pound 
signs (############), as the longest stimulus word was 12 letters. For visual clarity, the 
mask was presented in white Courier New font, size 22. The mask was followed by a 
blank screen for 1050 ms. This sequence was repeated for each of the 32 words, with the 
words and letters randomly selected by the computer. A practice trial using 10 neutral 
words was used to train participants in this procedure, also with the aid of pre-recorded 
instructions. Once participants had completed the practice trial, they initiated Task 1 with 
a key press, which then proceeded without further instructions. The neutral words used in 
the practice trial did not appear in any other task or practice trial. 
 Task 2: Calibration. The purpose of this task was to calibrate—i.e., determine the 
optimal presentation speed for each participant—for Task 3, the tachistoscopic word 
identification. The goal was to select a duration most likely to result in the correct 
identification of between 30-50% of words. Tarsia et al. (2003) recommended a projected 
rate of 30-50% identification on a similar tachistoscopic identification task, in order to 




format as Task 1, with each word preceded by a fixation cross (1000 ms), followed by a 
mask (1067 ms), and then a blank screen (1050 ms). 
Participants first viewed a set of seven neutral words, one at a time, with each 
word remaining on the screen for 83 ms. They were asked to read each word out loud as 
it appeared, as quickly as possible. A research assistant remained in the room (giving the 
rationale that Task 2 was very short), and, unknown to the participant, checked their 
responses against a list of correct answers. A word had to be read exactly as presented in 
order to be marked as correct. Using this procedure, participants then viewed three more 
sets of 7 neutral words, with each set appearing at a shorter duration (67 ms, 
50 ms, and 33 ms, respectively). The pre-recorded instructions informed participants that 
each successive set would be presented more briefly. No word appeared more than once, 
either within or across sets. With the aid of a calibration sheet, the research assistant then 
calculated the presentation duration that would be used during Task 3. This calculation 
was based on the participant‘s worst performance (the duration at which they correctly 
identified the fewest words). If the participant‘s worst performance was 4/7 or more ( > 
57% correct), they were assigned one duration faster for Task 3. For example, a 
participant who correctly identified 4/7 words at 50 ms would be assigned to the 33 ms 
duration for Task 3. If the subject‘s worst performance was 2/7 or 3/7 ( 28%-42% 
correct), they were assigned to this same duration for Task 3. If the subject‘s worst 
performance was 1/7 or less ( < 14% correct) they were assigned to one duration slower 
for Task 3. Although participants were not tested at 100 ms or 17 ms, these durations 
were used for Task 3 if performance was less than 1/7 at 83 ms (100 ms used) or more 




appeared in the same order for all participants. There was no practice trial for Task 2, and 
the neutral words used did not appear in any other aspect of the research (see Appendix X 
for calibration sheet, which shows the neutral words used). 
Task 3: Tachistoscopic word identification. This procedure was adapted from 
Tarsia et al. (2003), and was used to test implicit memory for the words viewed in Task 1 
(primed words) and a matched set of novel words (unprimed distractor words). As in 
Task 2, participants were asked to read aloud words presented briefly on the screen. For 
Task 3, however, the research assistant initiated the computer program and left the room. 
Participants then completed the task alone, and their responses were recorded by audio 
tape cassette. As in previous tasks, each word was preceded by a fixation cross (1000 
ms), followed by a mask (1067 ms), and then a blank screen (1050 ms). In Task 3, 
however, the presentation duration for the words was the one selected during calibration 
(100 ms, 83 ms, 67 ms, 50 ms, 33 ms, or 17 ms). As already noted, half of the 
participants had viewed Set A words at Task 1, and the other half had viewed Set B. All 
participants viewed the combined set of 64 words during Task 3 (Set A + Set B). In this 
way, the word set viewed during Task 1 were the primed words, and the set not viewed 
provided a matched set of unprimed words (see Figure 3 for Task 3 stimuli). Each 
participant viewed the 64 words one at a time, in a different random order generated by 
the computer. Because the procedure resembled that of Task 2, and in order to avoid a 
practice effect, no practice trial was provided. However, participants were cautioned, in 
both pre-recorded and verbal instructions, that this task would be very challenging due to 
the short presentation durations; they were encouraged to make a response to every 




Pencil and paper tasks. Pencil and paper tasks were completed in the same 
testing room, at a separate desk. Instructions for these tasks were provided verbally by the 
research assistant, who then left the room to allow participants to complete each of the 
tasks alone. Note that participants who requested a break at this point in the experiment 
were asked to wait until the distractor and free recall tasks were complete. 
Distractor task. Immediately after the computer tasks, participants completed a 
distractor task to minimize rehearsal and recency effects. Participants were given a lined 
sheet with a number (841) in the top right corner. They were asked to subtract three from 
this number, and then subtract three from the result; they were instructed to continue 
subtracting by threes until the research assistant returned (after five minutes). They were 
asked to work as quickly and accurately as possible (see Appendix Y for distractor task). 
Free recall task. After the distractor task, participants were given a blank sheet of 
paper and asked to write down as many words as they could remember, in any order, 
from any of the computer tasks. The research assistant left the room for five minutes. 
Completion of self-report questionnaires. Participants were then asked to 
complete a package of questionnaires, which were in pseudo-randomized order (4 
different orders were used). However, all packages presented the SUDS ratings on the 
first page, in order to obtain mood ratings immediately after the tasks described above. In 
addition, the Manipulation Check and Stimulus Relevance questionnaires always 
appeared at the end of the package to avoid revealing the true purpose of the study, which 
might have influenced responses to other measures. Participants had unlimited time to 




spending too long on any one question. Most participants took 30 minutes to complete 
the questionnaires.  
Clinical interview. The final phase of the study was the administration of a semi-
structured clinical interview, the MINI-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (see 
Measures). This interview was used to provide corroboration of exclusionary criteria (i.e., 
no bipolar disorder, major depression, schizophrenia, substance abuse, or pathological 
gambling). Originally, this interview was also intended to explore the potential impact of 
other anxiety disorders on memory; however, the non-clinical nature of the sample 
rendered this impracticable. A trained research assistant and the first author conducted 
these interviews. Participants were offered a break prior to the interview, which lasted 
approximately 30 minutes.  
Debriefing. Following the interview, participants were fully debriefed about the 
true purpose of the study. They also received a written debriefing sheet (see Appendix Z) 
which summarized the goals of the research. Participants were then compensated for their 
participation ($25 or 2 bonus course credits). 
Measures 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), the Cognitive Avoidance 
Questionnaire (CAQ), the Social Desirability Scale (SDS), the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ), the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory–Trait version (STAI-T), the Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression Scale (CES-D), the Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS), and the 




The Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2001) is a self-report 
questionnaire measuring the ability to effortfully control one‘s attention. This measure 
was included in order to assess the impact of attentional control on the computer tasks in 
this study. The ACS includes sub factors measuring the ability to focus attention, shift 
attention between tasks, and flexibly control thought (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The 
ACS is comprised of 20 items, rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = almost 
never to 4 = almost always. The ACS demonstrates good internal consistency, α =.88, 
convergent validity with measures of positive emotionality, and divergent validity with 
regards to measures of negative emotionality (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
The Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI, English version 
5.0.0, for DSM-IV; Sheehan et al., 1998) is a brief structured clinical interview that 
assesses the major Axis I disorders according to DSM and ICD criteria. It is designed for 
use by psychiatrists and general practitioners, and takes approximately 20 minutes to 
administer. The MINI is structured in a yes/no response format, evaluating anxiety 
disorders, mood disorders, eating disorders, substance abuse, and psychotic disorders. 
The original version of the MINI has shown good validity when compared to other 
interviews such as the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (Sheehan et al, 1997), 
and the Composite International Diagnostic Interview for ICD-10 (Lecrubier et al, 1997). 
The version of the MINI used in this study (5.0) has been updated by the authors to 
correspond with criteria in the DSM-IV and the ICD-10. The MINI is widely employed 
in clinical research, and has been translated into several languages. (Note: given the 





 The Stimulus Relevance Questionnaire (SRQ) is a custom made self-report 
measure of the personal relevance of the stimulus words used in this study. This 
questionnaire was created in order to determine whether higher relevance would be 
related to better memory for the stimuli. The SRQ lists all 64 stimulus words in random 
order, and asks respondents to rate how personally relevant each word is; i.e., how much 
each word corresponds to important events or topics over the past month. Ratings are 
made on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 = not at all relevant to me to 4 = very 
relevant to me (see Appendix AA). 
A Manipulation Check (MC) form was created in order to assess participants‘ 
awareness of the true purpose of the study. On the MC, respondents were asked to choose 
the answer they feel best describes the purpose of the computer tasks (i.e., the implicit 
memory test). Six alternative answers are presented in multiple choice format, including 
five distractors (e.g., To assess the speed of your perceptual ability when working with 
words; Don’t know/none of the above); and only one correct response (To measure 
memory for different words). Respondents are then asked to briefly explain their choice in 
a space at the bottom of the questionnaire (see Appendix AB). 
The Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale Junior, Multiple 
Choice, Set A) is a companion form to Raven‘s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary 
Scales (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1977). Together, the Raven scales are designed to 
measure verbal knowledge and ability. The current study used only a self-report version 
of the vocabulary scale, the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale-Multiple Choice (MHVS- MC), 
to provide a brief measure of English language comprehension, and assess its impact on 




and respondents are asked to select the correct synonym from a list of six alternatives. 
While there are norms for the MHVS, these apply to the full version (i.e., not the multiple 
choice version used in this study, which is different in form and content). However, 
Mathews et al. (1995) and Mogg et al. (1987) also used the MHVS-MC as a measure of 
vocabulary. Due to copyright restrictions, this measure cannot be reproduced. The reader 
is referred to Pearson Assessments and Information (Psychcorp): 
http://www.pearsonassessments.com/pai/, where a search for Mill Hill Vocabulary will 
produce the full Raven's Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary Scales; the MHVS-MC is 
the fifth section of this measure. 
Results 
Data Screening and Outlier Analyses 
All data were double-entered, compared, and corrected to ensure accuracy. To 
screen the data for univariate outliers, a z-score was computed for all study variables, and 
any score greater than + 3.29 was considered an outlier (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). 
According to this criterion, several participants were univariate outliers on age; as this is 
a participant characteristic, it was not transformed. To screen for multivariate outliers, the 
variables were entered into a linear regression, with Mahalanobis and Cook‘s distances 
computed; because age was a univariate outlier, it was not included. Mahalanobis values 
showed that two participants had scores greater than the Chi-square critical value, 2 (16) 
= 26.30, p < .05, and were therefore multivariate outliers. However, neither of these 
outliers showed Cook's distances greater than 1, indicating they would not have a 





To evaluate skewness, z-scores were computed by dividing skewness by its 
standard error for all variables; any value greater than 2.58 was considered significantly 
skewed (Field, 2005). Using this criterion, several Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS) 
scores were significantly skewed: SUDS sadness (3.71) and irritability (3.02) were 
positively skewed, and SUDS well-being (-3.09) was negatively skewed. Scores on the 
IUS were also positively skewed (2.97). This pattern on both SUDS ratings and the IUS 
would be expected in a non-clinical sample. Furthermore, IUS and SUDS ratings were 
only involved in regression analyses, which do not require normality of predictors (Field, 
2005, p. 170); therefore, these variables were not transformed. Means and standard 
deviations for Study 3 measures are presented in Table 13, and correlations in Table 14.  
Manipulation Checks 
The Manipulation Check questionnaire (MC). Participants‘ awareness of the 
purpose of the computer tasks was assessed using the self-report MC; a total of 79 
participants completed this multiple-choice measure. There are six possible answers on 
the MC, but results showed that one item was not chosen by any participants (i.e., that the 
purpose of the computer tasks was ―To measure your verbal ability‖); this item was 
therefore removed from the analyses, leaving only five remaining items. It was expected 
that one-fifth of the participants would choose the correct answer by chance (i.e., that the 
purpose of the computer tasks was ―To measure memory for different words‖). The 
remaining four-fifths of the participants were expected to choose any one of the other 
distractor items. Fifty-seven participants chose one of the distractor items, compared to 
22 who chose the correct answer. A Chi-square test showed that the proportion of 




expected by chance, χ²(1, n = 79) = 3.04, p = .08. In addition, participants wrote a brief 
explanation of the response they selected; a review of these showed that even participants 





Means and Standard Deviations for Study 3 Measures 
 
 
Measure n M SD  
 
Attentional Control Scale 97 52.30 9.06 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 98 14.48 8.61 
 
Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire 98 59.40 18.88 
CAQ Avoidance 98 11.58 5.41 
CAQ Distraction 98 13.10 4.81 
CAQ Substitution 98 9.44 3.60 
CAQ Suppression 98 14.76 4.75 
CAQ Transformation 98 10.49 4.58 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 98 61.80 20.33 
IUS Factor 1 98 31.12 11.57 
IUS Factor 2 98 30.68 10.37 
 
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale 98 25.91 3.09 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire 98 51.07 14.70 
Social Desirability Scale 98 5.93 3.03 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version 97 42.73 11.66 
 
SUDS Anxiety 98 42.74 26.09 
SUDS Fatigue 98 43.81 25.43 
SUDS Irritability 98 27.74 25.12 
SUDS Sadness 98 19.56 20.58 
SUDS Well-being 98 70.54 18.22 
 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire 98 36.66 17.07 
 
Note. CAQ = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire: Avoidance = Avoidance of threatening stimuli 
subscale; Distraction = Distraction subscale; Substitution = Thought substitution subscale; 
Suppression = Thought suppression subscale; Transformation = Transformation of images into 







Correlations Between Study 3 Measures 
 
 
























































































SDS       -.24
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 -.19 -.05 .48
** 








SUi           .49
**
 -.13 -.05 .44
** 




SUw             -.14 -.58
** 
Voc              .13 
WAQ 
 
Note. n = 89. ACS = Attentional Control Scale; CAQ = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire; CES = Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression scale; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSW = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; SDS = Social Desirability Scale; STA = 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory–Trait version; SU = Subjective Units of Distress: a = anxiety, f = fatigue, i = irritability, s = sadness, w = well-
being; Voc = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire. 
*






Priming effect. As previously noted, participants were primed with one of two 
sets of words during Task 1: Set A or Set B. The combined Sets A + B provided a test of 
primed and unprimed words during Task 3, tachistoscopic word identification. Based on 
the words correctly identified during Task 3, a priming score was calculated. The priming 
score was the difference between correctly identified primed and unprimed words, such 
that: priming score = # correct primed words - # correct unprimed words. This 
difference was calculated in order to control for each individual‘s baseline level of word 
identification. In addition to a total score, priming scores were also calculated for each of 
the four word types; for example: priming on neutral words = # correct primed neutral 
words - # correct unprimed neutral words. Note that because half of the participants were 
primed with Set A, and the other half with Set B, the calculations differed for Group A 
and B: Group A priming = # correct primed words from Set A - # correct unprimed 
words from Set B; and Group B priming = # correct primed words from Set B - # correct 
unprimed words from Set A.  
In order to establish whether scores were higher overall for primed as compared 
to unprimed words (i.e., whether there was a priming effect), t-tests were performed 
separately for Group A and B. In Group A, the total score on primed (Set A) words (M = 
22.43, SE = .72) was significantly higher than the total score on unprimed (Set B) words 
(M = 17.53, SE = .94, ), t(96) = 4.13, p < .001). In Group B, the total score on primed (Set 
B) words (M = 18.37, SE = 1.11) was significantly higher than the total score on 
unprimed (Set A) words (M = 13.27, SE = .93, ), t(96) = -3.52, p < .001). Therefore, a 




Word set effect. Further analyses suggested that despite careful matching, Set A 
and Set B words were associated with different levels of priming. A t-test showed a 
significantly higher total priming score in Group A (M = 9.16, SE = .56) compared to 
Group B (M = .84, SE = .53), t(96) = 10.81, p < .001). Additional analyses were 
conducted to determine whether there was a significant priming effect when neutral, 
uncertain, threat, and positive words were examined separately. To this end, a series of 
paired-samples t-tests were conducted; again, Groups A and B were analyzed separately. 
For neutral, uncertain, threat, and positive words, results showed a significant priming 
effect in Group A (see Table 15). In Group B, there was a significant priming effect for 
threat and positive words. However, priming was non-significant for uncertain words in 
Group B. In addition, a reverse priming effect was found for neutral words in Group B, 
such that identification of unprimed neutral words was significantly higher than primed 
words (see Table 16). As this will affect analyses involving uncertain and neutral word 
priming, selected analyses were conducted using Group A alone, because Group A 
showed a significant priming effect across all word types (see Intolerance of Uncertainty, 
Stimulus Relevance, and Priming). 
Word frequencies. In order to determine whether any individual words showed a 
floor or ceiling effect, frequencies of correct identification on the word identification task 
were examined for each of the 64 words. Frequencies showed that there were no words 
with a floor effect (i.e., no words with zero correct identifications); there were also no 
words with a ceiling effect (i.e., no words that all participants correctly identified). 
Further examination showed that the two words with the lowest identification rate were 





Study 3: Paired Samples t-tests of Priming on Neutral, Uncertain, Threat and Positive 
Words in Group A 
 
 








Set A 6.04 .22 .25 13.04** 
Set B 2.78 .27   
 
Uncertain words 
Set A 6.00 .24 .23 11.43** 
Set B 3.33 .23   
 
Threat words 
Set A 4.08 .26 .20 9.43** 
Set B 2.20 .30   
 
Positive words 
Set A 6.31 .17 .24 5.66** 
Set B 4.96 .28   
 
 
Note. n = 49; df = 48 for all analyses. 
a
Mean number of correctly identified words on the word identification task. 
b
Standard error of the mean of paired differences.  
c
A significant t value indicates a significant priming effect: the number of correctly 
identified primed (Set A) words is higher than the number of correctly identified 






Study 3: Paired Samples t-tests of Priming on Neutral, Uncertain, Threat and Positive 
Words in Group B 
 
 








Set A 4.92 .26 .25 2.21* 
Set B 4.37 .32   
 
Uncertain words 
Set A 4.45 .28 .23 -.44 
Set B 4.55 .28   
 
Threat words 
Set A 3.02 .25 .22 -3.79** 
Set B 3.84 .35   
 
Positive words 
Set A 5.14 .28 .17 -2.80* 
Set B 5.61 .28   
 
 
Note. n = 49; df = 48 for all analyses. 
a
Mean number of correctly identified words on the word identification task. 
b
Standard error of the mean of paired differences.  
c
A significant negative t value indicates a significant priming effect: the number of 
correctly identified primed (Set B) words is higher than the number of correctly identified 
unprimed (Set A) words. A significant positive t value indicates a reverse priming effect, 
with unprimed (Set A) words significantly higher than primed (Set B) words. 




with the highest identification rate were ―confident‖ (94% correct) and ―wonderful‖ (95% 
correct). The words with the lowest identification rate were both from the subset of threat 
words, with ―contaminated‖ being part of Set A, and ―ridiculed‖ part of Set B. The words 
with the highest identification rate were both from the subset of positive words, with 
―confident‖ being part of word Set A, and ―wonderful‖ word Set B. Given that these 
words did not display absolute floor or ceiling effects, and because they were equally 
distributed between Set A and Set B, they were all retained for analysis.  
Regressions With All Study Variables 
As in the previous study, diagnostic indices were calculated (as per Field, 2005), 
and showed that the necessary assumptions for regression analyses were met. In order to 
explore the contribution of all the study variables to priming scores, four separate 
regressions were used to predict priming on each type of word (neutral, uncertain, threat, 
and positive). Scores on study measures except the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(IUS) and the Stimulus Relevance Questionnaire (SRQ) were entered in one step as 
predictors. Although previous analyses showed a non-significant priming effect in Group 
B for neutral and uncertain words, the regressions with all study variables were 
conducted with the whole sample, because using Group A alone would have reduced the 
sample size considerably (n = 49), problematic in analyses with 18 predictors. Moreover, 
when responses from Groups A and B are pooled, a significant overall priming effect is 
present. 
Results of these analyses showed that group was a significant negative predictor 
of priming for neutral words (β = -3.56, p < 0.001), uncertain words (β = -2.57, p < 




Essentially, being in Group A and being primed with Set A words, was a significant 
predictor of priming. Female sex was also a significant predictor of priming on neutral 
words (β = -0.21, p = 0.009), as was cognitive avoidance (β = 0.21, p = 0.048). 
Vocabulary was a significant predictor of priming on uncertain words (β = 0.31, p = 
0.004), and cognitive avoidance was a predictor of priming on threat words (β = 0.35, p = 
0.03). 
Another four regressions were then conducted to identify variables contributing to 
recall on each of the four word types; again, measures except the IUS and SRQ were 
entered in one step as predictors. Results showed that age was a significant negative 
predictor of neutral word recall (β = -0.26, p = 0.043). Cognitive avoidance was a 
negative predictor of recall for uncertain words (β = -0.39, p = 0.017). Duration of the 
word identification task was a significant predictor of recall for threat words (β = 0.27, p 
= 0.017), and SUDS fatigue ratings were negatively related to threat word recall (β = -
0.32, p = 0.008). For recall of positive words, trait anxiety was a significant predictor (β 
= 0.54, p = 0.036), and depression was a negative predictor (β = -0.48, p = 0.031). 
Given these results, age, sex, and vocabulary were entered in the first steps of 
subsequent regressions. The significant relationship between group and priming reflects 
the previous finding that Group A had significantly higher priming scores than Group B. 
This group effect has already been noted, and appears to be due to differences between 
the two word sets (see Word set effect). However, this group effect is not related to the 
central study hypotheses, which concern the relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty, stimulus relevance, and memory. Therefore, to avoid replicating already 




the study hypotheses, group was not included as a predictor in further regressions. 
Findings concerning cognitive avoidance, threat word priming, and uncertain word recall 
were examined in follow up analyses. While other reported findings are potentially 
interesting, they were not explored because they were less directly related to the study 
hypotheses. Moreover, given the study‘s small sample size, it was a priority to limit both 
the number of analyses, and the number of predictors within each analysis.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty, Stimulus Relevance, and Priming 
Regressions were then used to address hypotheses concerning the role of 
intolerance of uncertainty and stimulus relevance in implicit memory (priming). To this 
end, four separate hierarchical regressions were conducted, with priming on each of the 
four word types (neutral, uncertain, threat, and positive) as the outcome. Because age, 
sex, and vocabulary were significant predictors in previous regressions, these were 
entered in Step 1. Scores on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) were entered in 
Step 2, to determine whether IU made a significant contribution to priming beyond these 
variables. Stimulus Relevance (SRQ) scores were totaled separately for each word type, 
and were entered in Step 3 to determine whether stimulus relevance added to the 
prediction of priming scores, beyond age, sex, vocabulary, and intolerance of uncertainty. 
Results showed that for neutral words, female sex was a significant predictor of 
priming in all steps of the model, but no other variables were significant (see Table 17). 
Given that priming was non-significant for neutral words in Group B (see Word set 
effect), this regression was re-run using Group A alone. Results showed that in Group A, 
only age was a significant negative predictor of neutral word priming, in Step 1 (β = -





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming on Neutral Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .09*     
 Constant  -.61 2.21  [-4.99, 3.78] 
 Age  -.05 .03 -.20 [-.10, .00] 
 Sex  -1.43 .63 -.23* [-2.69, -.17] 
 Vocab  .14 .09 .17 [-.04, .31] 
 
Step 2 .01     
 Constant  -1.09 2.24  [-5.54, 3.36] 
 Age  -.05 .03 -.20 [-.10, .00] 
 Sex  -1.32 .64 -.21* [-2.59, -.05] 
 Vocab  .12 .09 .14 [-.06, .30] 
 IUS  .02 .01 .12 [-.01, .04] 
 
Step 3 .00     
 Constant  -1.16 2.33  [-5.78, 3.47] 
 Age  -.05 .03 -.20 [-.10, .00] 
 Sex  -1.33 .65 -.22* [-2.62, -.04] 
 Vocab  .12 .09 .14 [-.06, .30] 
 IUS  .02 .01 .12 [-.01, .04] 
 SRn  .00 .02 .01 [-.04, .05] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; SRn = stimulus relevance for neutral words. 




For uncertain words, female sex and vocabulary were significant predictors of 
priming in Step 1; when the IUS was entered in Step 2, only vocabulary was a significant 
predictor. In Step 3, sex, vocabulary, and the stimulus relevance of uncertain words were 
all significant predictors of uncertain word priming (see Table 18). As priming was non-
significant for uncertain words in Group B , this regression was re-run with Group A 
alone. Results showed that in Group A, vocabulary was the only significant predictor of 
uncertain word priming, in all steps of the regression (Step 3: β = 0.46, p = 0.007).  
For threat and positive words, neither age, sex, vocabulary, intolerance of 
uncertainty, nor stimulus relevance were significant predictors of priming (see Tables 19 
& 20). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty, Stimulus Relevance, and Recall 
A parallel set of regressions were then carried out to examine the contribution of 
intolerance of uncertainty and stimulus relevance to recall for the stimuli. Again, four 
separate hierarchical regressions were conducted, with recall for neutral, uncertain, threat, 
and positive words as separate outcomes. Age, sex, and vocabulary were entered in Step 
1; intolerance of uncertainty in Step 2; and stimulus relevance for each type of word in 
Step 3. 
Results showed that neither age, sex, vocabulary, intolerance of uncertainty, nor 
stimulus relevance predicted recall for any type of word, in any step of the regressions 






Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming on Uncertain Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .09*     
 Constant  -3.29 1.76  [-6.79, .21] 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.06 [-.05, .03] 
 Sex  -1.01 .51 -.20* [-2.01, -.00] 
 Vocab  .20 .07 .30* [.06, .34] 
 
Step 2 .00     
 Constant  -3.27 1.80  [-6.85, .31] 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.06 [-.05, .03] 
 Sex  -1.01 .51 -.21 [-2.03, .01] 
 Vocab  .20 .07 .30* [.06, .35] 
 IUS  .00 .01 -.01 [-.02, .02] 
 
Step 3 .06*     
 Constant  -4.32 1.79  [-7.88, -.76] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.04, .04] 
 Sex  -1.23 .51 -.25* [-2.23, -.22] 
 Vocab  .21 .07 .32* [.07, .35] 
 IUS  -.02 .01 -.16 [-.04, .01] 
 SRun  .05 .02 .30* [.01, .09] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 






Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming on Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .00     
 Constant  -.63 1.39  [-3.39, 2.14] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .40 -.04 [-.93, .65] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .14 [-.04, .18] 
 IUS  .00 .01 .01 [-.02, .02] 
 
Step 3 .01     
 Constant  -.69 1.40  [-3.47, 2.08] 
 Age  .01 .02 .03 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.10 .40 -.03 [-.89, .69] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .14 [-.04, .18] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .07 [-.01, .02] 
 SRt  -.02 .02 -.11 [-.05, .02] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming on Positive Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .01     
 Constant  1.46 1.33  [-1.19, 4.12] 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.09 [-.04, .02] 
 Sex  .30 .38 .08 [-.46, 1.06] 
 Vocab  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.12, .10] 
 
Step 2 .00     
 Constant  1.44 1.36  [-1.27, 4.14] 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.09 [-.04, .02] 
 Sex  .30 .39 .08 [-.47, 1.07] 
 Vocab  -.01 .06 -.02 [-.12, .10] 
 IUS  .00 .01 .01 [-.02, .02] 
 
Step 3 .00     
 Constant  2.04 1.68  [-1.30, 5.38] 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.08 [-.04, .02] 
 Sex  .31 .39 .09 [-.46, 1.09] 
 Vocab  -.02 .06 -.04 [-.13, .09] 
 IUS  .00 .01 -.01 [-.02, .02] 
 SRpos  -.01 .01 -.07 [-.04, .02] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 




Follow up Analyses: Cognitive Avoidance 
 Given that cognitive avoidance emerged as a significant predictor of threat word 
priming, and a significant negative predictor of uncertain word recall, a series of follow 
up analyses were used to explore these results. 
Cognitive avoidance and threat word priming. With threat word priming 
scores as the outcome, a hierarchical regression was conducted with age, sex, and 
vocabulary in Step 1; cognitive avoidance in Step 2; and stimulus relevance for threat 
words in Step 3. Results showed that the only significant predictor of threat word priming 
was cognitive avoidance, in Steps 2 and 3 (Step 3: β = 0.30, p = 0.009). 
As previously outlined, the Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ) can also 
be analyzed in terms of its five subscales: thought substitution; transformation of images 
into thoughts; distraction; avoidance of threatening stimuli; and thought suppression. 
Given the significant findings with the CAQ total score, another set of regressions was 
carried out, each using a different CAQ subscale as a predictor. Specifically, age, sex, 
and vocabulary were entered in Step 1; one of the CAQ subscales in Step 2; and stimulus 
relevance for threat words in Step 3. Separate regressions were conducted for each of the 
CAQ subscales in order to avoid problems with collinearity.  
Results showed that CAQ thought substitution was a significant predictor of 
threat word priming, in Steps 2 and 3 of the regression. CAQ avoidance of threatening 
stimuli was also a significant predictor in Steps 2 and 3; in addition, stimulus relevance 
was a negative predictor in Step 3. CAQ thought suppression was also a significant 
predictor of threat word priming, in Steps 2 and 3. There were no significant findings for 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Cognitive Avoidance 




Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .06*     
 Constant  -1.43 1.38  [-4.17, 1.30] 
 Age  .01 .02 .06 [-.02, .04] 
 Sex  -.19 .38 -.05 [-.95, .57] 
 Vocab  .06 .05 .13 [-.04, .17] 
 CAQsub  .10 .04 .24* [.02, .19] 
 
Step 3 .03     
 Constant  -1.51 1.37  [-4.22, 1.21] 
 Age  .01 .02 .08 [-.02, .04] 
 Sex  -.19 .38 -.05 [-.94, .56] 
 Vocab  .07 .05 .13 [-.04, .17] 
 CAQsub  .13 .05 .30* [.04, .22] 
 SRt  -.02 .02 -.17 [-.05, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; 
CAQsub = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, Thought substitution subscale; SRt = 






Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Cognitive Avoidance 
(Transformation of Images into Thoughts Subscale), and Stimulus Relevance Predicting 
Priming on Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .01     
 Constant  -.94 1.41  [-3.75, 1.86] 
 Age  .00 .02 .03 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.09 .40 -.03 [-.87, .70] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .14 [-.04, .18] 
 CAQtra  .03 .04 .10 [-.04, .10] 
 
Step 3 .01     
 Constant  -1.02 1.41  [-3.82, 1.79] 
 Age  .01 .02 .04 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.06 .40 -.02 [-.84, .73] 
 Vocab  .08 .06 .15 [-.03, .18] 
 CAQtra  .05 .04 .14 [-.03, .12] 
 SRt  -.02 .02 -.13 [-.05, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; 
CAQtra = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, Transformation of images into thoughts 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Cognitive Avoidance 
(Distraction Subscale), and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming on Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .00     
 Constant  -.89 1.48  [-3.83, 2.04] 
 Age  .00 .02 .03 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.17 .40 -.05 [-.96, .62 ] 
 Vocab  .08 .06 .15 [-.03, .18] 
 CAQdis  .02 .03 .06 [-.05, .08] 
 
Step 3 .01     
 Constant  -1.04 1.48  [-3.99, 1.91] 
 Age  .01 .02 .04 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.19 .40 -.05 [-.97, .60] 
 Vocab  .08 .06 .16 [-.03, .19] 
 CAQdis  .03 .04 .10 [-.04, .10] 
 SRt  -.02 .02 -.11 [-.05, .02] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; 
CAQdis = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, Distraction subscale; SRt = stimulus 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Cognitive Avoidance 
(Avoidance of Threatening Stimuli Subscale), and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Priming 
on Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .05*     
 Constant  -1.50 1.39  [-4.26, 1.27] 
 Age  .00 .02 .00 [-.03, .03] 
 Sex  -.10 .38 -.03 [-.86, .66] 
 Vocab  .08 .05 .16 [-.03, .19] 
 CAQav  .07 .03 .23* [.01, .12] 
 
Step 3 .04*     
 Constant  -1.78 1.37  [-4.51, .95] 
 Age  .00 .02 .01 [-.03, .03] 
 Sex  -.07 .38 -.02 [-.82, .68] 
 Vocab  .09 .05 .19 [-.01, .20] 
 CAQav  .10 .03 .34* [.03, .16] 
 SRt  -.03 .02 -.24* [-.06, -.00] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; 
CAQav = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, Avoidance of threatening stimuli 






Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Cognitive Avoidance 




Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  -.60 1.36  [-3.31, 2.11] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.14 .39 -.04 [-.92, .64] 
 Vocab  .07 .06 .15 [-.04, .18] 
 
Step 2 .05*     
 Constant  -1.75 1.42  [-4.58, 1.07] 
 Age  .00 .02 .02 [-.03, .03] 
 Sex  -.14 .38 -.04 [-.90, .62] 
 Vocab  .08 .05 .15 [-.03, .18] 
 CAQsupp  .08 .03 .23* [.01, .14] 
 
Step 3 .02     
 Constant  -1.89 1.42  [-4.70, .93] 
 Age  .00 .02 .03 [-.03, .04] 
 Sex  -.13 .38 -.04 [-.89, .62] 
 Vocab  .08 .05 .16 [-.03, .19] 
 CAQsupp  .09 .03 .28* [.02, .16] 
 SRt  -.02 .02 -.16 [-.05, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; 
CAQsupp = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire, Thought suppression subscale; SRt = 
stimulus relevance for threat words. 




Follow-up analyses were then conducted to explore differences between social 
threat words and physical threat words, with regards to the three CAQ subscales that 
were significant predictors of threat word priming. Specifically, to examine priming on 
social threat words, a regression was conducted with age, sex, and vocabulary entered in 
Step 1; one of the three CAQ subscales in Step 2; and stimulus relevance for social threat 
words in Step 3. A parallel procedure was then followed for priming of physical threat 
words, but with stimulus relevance for physical threat words in Step 3.  
For social threat words, results indicated that none of these variables were 
significant predictors of priming. For priming of physical threat words, CAQ thought 
substitution was a significant predictor at Steps 2 and 3 of the model (Step 3: β = 0.29, p 
= 0.004); vocabulary was also a predictor at Step 1 (β = 0.22, p = 0.048). CAQ avoidance 
of threatening stimuli was a significant predictor of physical threat word priming at Steps 
2 and 3 (Step 3: β = 0.36, p = 0.001); vocabulary was significant at all steps (Step 3: β = 
0.24, p = 0.022); and stimulus relevance for physical threat words was a negative 
predictor at Step 3 (β = -0.25, p = 0.015). CAQ thought suppression was a significant 
predictor of physical threat word priming at Step 3 (β = 0.22, p = 0.036), and vocabulary 
was a significant predictor at all steps (Step 3: β = 0.22, p = 0.043). 
Cognitive avoidance and uncertain word recall. Finally, to explore the 
relationship between cognitive avoidance and uncertain word recall, a hierarchical 
regression was conducted with age, sex, and vocabulary in Step 1; the total CAQ score in 
Step 2; and stimulus relevance for uncertain words in Step 3. The results showed that 
stimulus relevance for uncertain words was the only significant predictor of uncertain 





This final study explored the contribution of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and 
stimulus relevance to implicit memory for different types of words. Participants 
performed an incidental learning task, and then completed measures of implicit and 
explicit memory. As the task was designed to promote implicit memory, no explicit 
biases were predicted. However, IU was expected to be significantly related to implicit 
memory for threatening and uncertain words; stimulus relevance was also expected to 
contribute. The impact of factors such as vocabulary, attentional control, worry, cognitive 
avoidance, and depression were also explored. 
Manipulation checks showed that the computer tasks produced a significant 
overall priming effect. However, there was a word set effect, such that priming was 
higher among Group A participants, who were exposed to Set A words during the first 
task. Analyses were carried out as planned, but follow up analyses using Group A—who 
showed significant priming for all word types—were also conducted. Responses to the 
Manipulation Check questionnaire indicated that participants were unaware of the true 
purpose of the computer tasks. 
Exploratory regressions with all study variables showed that some participant-
related variables (i.e., age, sex, vocabulary) were related to both priming and recall for 
stimulus words. However, these analyses also showed that worry was not significantly 
related to priming or recall for the stimulus words; similarly, no other symptom measures 
were significant predictors. Conversely, factors such as stimulus relevance, and processes 




The first study hypothesis, that intolerance of uncertainty would predict implicit 
memory (i.e., priming scores) for uncertain and threat words, was not supported. The 
secondary hypothesis, that stimulus relevance would make a contribution to implicit 
memory, was supported, but for uncertain words only. Other variables that contributed to 
priming included female sex (for neutral and uncertain words) and vocabulary (for 
uncertain words only).  
A parallel set of analyses showed no relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty and recall for any type of word; worry, stimulus relevance and other variables 
were similarly unrelated. As the goal of the procedure was to produce implicit memory, 
the lack of relationship between study variables and explicit memory is unsurprising. In 
terms of IU, these findings are similar to those of Study 2, in which IU was not 
significantly related to explicit memory bias. Conversely, in preliminary Study 2 
analyses, worry was significantly related to explicit memory for threat, which was not the 
case in Study 3. It bears repeating, however, that the encoding task in Study 3 was not 
intended to create explicit memory.  
While there were no specific hypotheses concerning cognitive avoidance, follow 
up analyses suggested that it was a significant predictor of implicit memory for threat 
words. Further exploration suggested that specific forms of cognitive avoidance— 
thought substitution, avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought suppression—were 
related to physical threat word priming. Vocabulary was also a significant predictor of 
physical threat word priming. Stimulus relevance, in contrast, was a negative predictor of 
threat priming, but only in conjunction with avoidance of threatening stimuli. The results 




avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought suppression were significant predictors of 
recall for physical threat words. In both studies, significant relationships between 
cognitive avoidance and memory only emerged for physical threat words. Furthermore, 
avoidance of threatening stimuli and thought suppression were significant predictors in 
both Study 2 and 3 (thought substitution was only significant in Study 3). This recurrence 
suggests that the relationship between these types of cognitive avoidance and memory for 
physical threat may not be a chance finding. As noted in Study 2, memory may be 
specific to physical rather than social threat because of the high concreteness and 
imageability of physical threat words, or because the construct of physical threat is more 
salient, or differently encoded. What is notably different between the two studies, 
however, is the type of memory in question: in Study 2, this effect was found for free 
recall; in Study 3, for perceptual priming. This seeming discrepancy may simply reflect 
the different types of encoding required by the tasks in each study. For example, in Study 
2, words were projected on a screen and rated on familiarity; encoding was explicit, as 
was the free recall test. In Study 3, encoding was intentionally perceptual, as was the 
tachistoscopic test of implicit memory. While the results of Studies 2 and 3 concern 
different forms of memory (conceptual and perceptual), therefore, they may in fact reflect 
a similar process that is occurring with regards to the encoding of physical threat.  
Although stimulus relevance was expected to contribute to memory for all types 
of words, it only reliably emerged as a negative predictor of threat word priming (in the 
CAQ avoidance of threatening stimuli analyses). This might indicate that some form of 
avoidance, or directing of processing away from threat, occurs when threat is personally 




this case it appeared that the attempt to avoid thinking about threat was successful. In 
addition, this relationship appeared to be specific to physical threat. Although one 
analysis suggested that stimulus relevance was a significant predictor of priming on 
uncertain words, this relationship no longer held when analyses were repeated with the 
group demonstrating a priming effect on uncertain words (Group A). Alternatively, it 
may be that the scant findings with regards to stimulus relevance are due to flaws in the 
method of measurement. For example, certain types of words may be more difficult to 
rate in terms of their self-relevance. Uncertain words, for example, may as a group be 
difficult to relate to personal concerns, leading participants to spend more time rating 
them, and potentially inflating their ratings. Conversely, there may be a reluctance to 
relate threatening words to current personal concerns, and this may lead to artificially 
lowered stimulus relevance ratings. 
There are naturally limitations to this study, the most evident being the use of a 
non-clinical student sample to examine questions of memory bias. As previously noted, 
we attempted to recruit a sample with high worriers, in order to approximate GAD 
research; however, this was not possible. It may be that the lack of findings concerning 
IU are due to the non-clinical, moderate levels of worry present in this study's sample. 
Another consideration is the properties of the stimulus words used in the study. 
Specifically, results indicate that vocabulary was related to uncertain word priming. This 
suggests that despite their statistically similar ratings of familiarity (as found in Study 1), 
uncertain words may have been more complex, and better vocabulary may have allowed 
for better priming. However, vocabulary was also related to priming of physical threat 




greater ease of priming in general. Another limitation was the finding of a word set 
effect, which showed that despite the piloting and matching process, the word sets were 
not equivalent. This suggests that a larger sample could have been used to test the 
properties of the words, in order to ensure better matching. On a broader level, however, 
randomized assignment of participants to different word sets, and subsequent 
comparisons of word set effects, might be used in future research to ensure equivalency. 
To summarize, hypotheses concerning intolerance of uncertainty and implicit 
memory for uncertain and threat words were not supported in this study. Stimulus 
relevance did contribute to implicit memory, but negatively, and only for threat words. 
The most interesting finding from this study was that cognitive avoidance was a 
significant predictor of priming for threat. Specifically, thought substitution, avoidance of 
threatening stimuli, and thought suppression were related to implicit memory for physical 
threat words. As these findings echo those from Study 2, the potential relationship 






 The central goal of the current study was to explore the relationship between IU 
and memory biases for threat and uncertainty. This relationship was examined by 
analyzing the contribution of IU as a predictor of memory, and by using stimulus words 
denoting uncertainty. A related interest was to assess the predictions of Williams et al. 
(1997), that anxiety is characterized by an implicit but not an explicit memory bias for 
threat. Cognitive avoidance, stimulus relevance, and a range of other factors were 
explored. Results of the current studies did not support any of the hypotheses concerning 
IU. Limited support was found for stimulus relevance, which was negatively related to 
memory for physical threat. However, two forms of cognitive avoidance—avoidance of 
threatening stimuli and thought suppression—were related to memory for physical threat, 
across two studies.  
 In light of previous research, the non-significant findings concerning IU are 
unexpected. The IU outcomes from this group of studies can be interpreted in several 
ways. The first possibility is that IU does not play a role in information processing, and 
more specifically, in memory for threat and uncertainty. Previous research does suggest 
that attention, and particularly interpretation, are influenced by IU. However, few studies 
to date have explored these questions, making predictions about the role of IU in 
information processing, and particularly memory, difficult. In contrast to expectations, 
therefore, it may be that IU is actually unrelated to memory bias for threat and 
uncertainty. As will later be debated, other variables such as cognitive avoidance may be 
more prominently involved in memory for threat and uncertainty. Another possibility is 




revealed by the current research. Although transfer appropriateness and cutting-edge 
information processing tasks could be considered strengths of this research, it is 
nevertheless the first exploration of memory bias and IU. There may well be other means 
of addressing this question that would establish the role of IU in information-processing; 
one goal of this discussion will be to suggest some possibilities. 
 Non-significant findings concerning IU may be due in part to limitations in the 
word stimuli that were used. Despite careful analysis and selection, the higher 
concreteness and imageability of physical threat words may have made them more 
memorable than uncertain words; this could have masked any processing biases toward 
uncertainty. There may also have been limitations with the method used to establish the 
construct validity of uncertain stimuli. Specifically, asking participants to rate stimulus 
words on how much they referred to uncertainty may have failed to fully capture the 
uncertainty construct. However, uncertain words were significantly higher on the 
uncertainty dimension compared to other words; moreover, different patterns of 
responses to uncertain words suggest that they were conceptually distinct from other 
word types. Nevertheless, a differently worded question, or a different way of rating the 
words, may have better established the construct validity of the uncertain stimuli. 
Alternately, the use of words may have been in and of itself a limitation. As previously 
noted, words were used in the current research due to their effectiveness in attention and 
interpretation studies, and their adaptability to information processing tasks. However, 
some researchers have posited that more ecologically valid approaches should be used to 
study information processing biases (i.e., McNally, 1995). The lack of significant 




information processing biases. While finding other means to explore the processing of 
uncertainty will be challenging, some alternatives will later be proposed. 
 The current research provided some evidence that stimulus relevance influences 
memory; however, this influence was negative, and was limited to threat words. This 
outcome might be due to limitations with the method used to measure stimulus relevance. 
Another possibility, however, is that the Study 3 findings do reveal a differential effect of 
stimulus relevance, which depends on the type of stimuli. For example, stimulus 
relevance may impair memory for threatening stimuli, but enhance memory for non-
threatening stimuli. This might reflect some type of cognitive avoidance, such that the 
more personally relevant the threat word, the less it is elaborated and remembered. This is 
interesting to consider in light of other study findings concerning cognitive avoidance. In 
any event, the fact that stimulus relevance was a better predictor of memory than 
vocabulary, or even IU, suggests that it is an important factor to consider in future 
research. 
 A parallel goal of the current studies was to test the Williams et al. (1997) 
prediction, that anxious individuals should show an implicit perceptual memory bias for 
threat, but not an explicit memory bias. At the broadest level, the results of these studies 
do not support the Williams et al. model, because there was no evidence of a relationship 
between anxiety (i.e., trait anxiety, state anxiety, or worry) and implicit perceptual 
memory for threat. The second and related prediction made by the model is the absence 
of a relationship between anxiety and explicit memory for threat. In Study 3, there was 
certainly no relationship between any form of anxiety, and explicit memory for threat; 




Therefore, little can be inferred about the Williams et al. model from Study 3. There was 
similarly no support for the predictions of this model in Study 2; in fact, some of the 
findings contradict their predictions about the absence of explicit memory bias for threat. 
For example, worry was significantly related to explicit memory for threat (although not 
when cognitive avoidance was taken into account); moreover, state anxiety was related to 
explicit memory for threat. While Study 2 does not support the Williams et al. 
predictions, it should be noted that the better test of the Williams model is in fact Study 3, 
as it tests both implicit and explicit memory following a single encoding task. In addition, 
Study 3 follows the procedure recommended by Williams et al.—a perceptual encoding 
task, and an implicit perceptual memory test. Together, however, the results of Study 2 
and Study 3 do not provide any conclusive evidence in support of the Williams et al. 
model. 
On a related note, it was surprising that trait anxiety was not related to explicit 
memory for threat in the current studies. While there were no specific hypotheses 
concerning trait anxiety, previous research suggests a relationship between trait anxiety 
and memory bias for threat. As a review of the literature shows, however, findings have 
been mixed (see Information Processing in High Trait Anxiety). Nevertheless, some 
studies have found a bias for threat in high trait anxiety; moreover, this pattern is 
conceptually consistent with the Williams et al. (1997) model, and with information 
processing theories of anxiety. In this light, the current findings concerning trait anxiety 
merit some consideration. As already noted, levels of trait anxiety in Study 2 were 
somewhat low (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory—Trait version: M = 40.24, SD = 10.38; 




biases related to high trait anxiety in Study 2. In Study 3, levels of trait anxiety were 
somewhat higher and closer to the range found in previous studies (State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory–Trait version: M = 42.73, SD = 11.66; range 31.07 – 54.39). However, trait 
anxiety was only related to recall for positive words in Study 3. The lack of an explicit 
memory bias for threat may have been due in part to the task used in Study 3, which was 
specifically geared toward implicit rather than explicit memory. As previously discussed, 
many studies of trait anxiety have focussed on explicit memory for threat; however, of 
those that explored implicit memory, the majority did not find a memory bias. 
Interestingly, two previous studies that did find an ―implicit‖ bias (e.g., Eysenck & 
Byrne, 1994; Richards & French, 1991) used a word-stem completion task to measure 
implicit memory, which, as already noted, can be influenced by explicit memory 
(Perruchet & Baveux, 1989). Therefore, the literature provides little indication that an 
implicit memory bias for threat should be expected among high trait anxious individuals. 
In this sense, the findings of Study 3 are consistent with the literature. For Study 2, a 
slightly low range of trait anxiety scores may have precluded detection of a memory bias 
for threat that might have been found in a highly trait anxious sample. 
 There may be another explanation for the lack of trait anxiety findings in these 
studies, however. Some research suggests that high trait anxious individuals have an 
attentional bias toward threat, but only under conditions of stress. In one study, for 
example, high and low trait-anxious students responded similarly to the emotional Stroop 
under normal circumstances; however, when exams approached, the high trait-anxious 
students became slower at naming threat words, indicating a bias toward threat (MacLeod 




that follow threatening stimuli; once again, however, these biases were only reliably 
found when high trait anxious individuals were under stress (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 
2000; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell 1994). Taken together, this research suggests that high 
trait anxiety may be related to information processing biases primarily under conditions 
of stress (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). While these studies concerned attention and not 
memory, it is possible that memory for threat may only be biased when anxious 
individuals also experience high levels of state anxiety. In Study 2, levels of state anxiety 
were quite low overall (SUDS anxiety rating out of 100: M = 31.47, SD = 24.48; range 
6.99 – 55.95); as noted above, trait anxiety scores were also fairly low. This combination 
of low levels of state and trait anxiety may have made it difficult to elicit biases toward 
threat in Study 2. An anxiety induction procedure (such as telling participants they will 
later give a speech) might have activated processing biases toward threat; this type of 
induction could be added to future studies. In Study 3, it is interesting to observe that the 
levels of state anxiety were somewhat higher (SUDS anxiety rating out of 100: M = 
42.74, SD = 26.09; range 16.65 – 68.83). This may reflect the more challenging nature of 
the tachistoscopic identification task, which may itself have served as a state anxiety 
induction. As summarized above, levels of trait anxiety were also higher in Study 3. 
However, there were no significant relationships between implicit memory for threat, 
state anxiety, and trait anxiety. As noted above, however, existing research does not 
clearly predict implicit memory biases in high trait anxiety; evidently, further research on 
this question is needed. 
 An intriguing series of outcomes in this research was the relationship between 




included in these studies because research suggests a link between cognitive avoidance, 
worry, and IU. In addition, some researchers have posited that cognitive avoidance might 
interfere with processing of threat among anxious individuals (i.e., Friedman et al., 2000). 
In the current studies, cognitive avoidance appeared to be a stronger predictor of memory 
for threat than either worry or IU. Moreover, cognitive avoidance was positively related to 
memory for threat, contrasting with the expectation that cognitive avoidance would result 
in poorer memory for threat. More specifically, in Study 2, cognitive avoidance was a 
significant predictor of recall for threat words, in conjunction with state anxiety. Detailed 
analyses revealed that three specific forms of cognitive avoidance were related to recall 
for physical threat: distraction, avoidance of threatening stimuli, and thought suppression. 
A similar pattern of results emerged in Study 3, but for priming rather than recall. In 
Study 3, follow up analyses indicated that thought substitution, avoidance of threatening 
stimuli, and thought suppression were significantly related to priming for physical threat 
words; vocabulary was also a contributor. As previously noted, the procedures in Study 2 
and 3 were designed to create explicit and implicit memory biases, respectively. This is 
essentially the pattern that emerged for cognitive avoidance in the two studies. The 
commonality between the studies is, firstly, that cognitive avoidance was a significant 
predictor of memory for physical threat words. Secondly, in both studies, avoidance of 
threatening stimuli and thought suppression were significant predictors of memory for 
threat. The fact that avoidance of threatening stimuli and thought suppression were 
significant in both studies raises the possibility that these two types of cognitive 




 One interesting possibility is that cognitive avoidance was related to recall of 
threat because attempts to avoid thinking about threat were ineffective. The cognitive 
avoidance questionnaire measures the self-reported tendency to engage in cognitive 
avoidance, rather than the degree of success in these attempts. Current study findings may 
even suggest that attempts to avoid thinking about threat paradoxically increase 
processing, and result in enhanced memory. In both Study 2 and Study 3, processing 
resources may have involuntarily been allocated toward threat by individuals who, when 
given the opportunity, would avoid thinking about threat. High scores on a measure such 
as the Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire may represent an information processing style 
characterized by the tendency to effortfully avoid thinking about threat. These cognitively 
avoidant individuals may initially succeed in suppressing threat-related information, but 
subsequently experience an increase of those very thoughts; this is analogous to the 
rebound effects of thought suppression (Wegner, 1994). Across these two studies, 
therefore, there may be a cognitively avoidant information processing style that 
paradoxically enhances memory for threatening material. 
 The proposal that cognitive avoidance can paradoxically lead to enhanced 
processing of threat is broadly consistent with the literature on thought suppression. In 
their classic study, Wegner and colleagues found that suppressing thoughts of a white 
bear resulted in an increase of those thoughts (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 
1987). To explain this and similar findings, Wegner proposed that two processes occur 
during thought suppression. The first, the operating process, is thought to be an effortful 
and conscious attempt to find distracting stimuli to replace the unwanted thought. The 




unwanted thought, and monitor the success of the suppression attempt. While the goal of 
these processes is to eliminate unwanted thoughts, they actually serve to associate an 
increasing number of cues with the unwanted thought, paradoxically making it more 
accessible (Wegner, 1994). Numerous studies have demonstrated the paradoxical effects 
of thought suppression in non-clinical samples (see Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; 
Rassin, Merckelbach, and Muris, 2000, for reviews). A review of this research shows that 
two consequences of thought suppression have been reported in the literature: 
enhancement (increases in the thought during attempts to suppress it) and rebound 
(increases in the thought subsequent to suppression). A recent meta-analysis of thought 
suppression studies shows that while enhancement effects do exist, individuals are fairly 
successful in their short-term attempts to suppress. In contrast, rebound effects appear to 
be larger and more robust across studies. Together, these findings suggest that the 
rebound effects of thought suppression are most evident after, rather than during, 
suppression attempts (Abramowitz et al., 2001).  
 In terms of the current research, therefore, it is conceivable that cognitively 
avoidant individuals attempted to suppress processing of threat words, and later 
experienced a rebound effect for those words. This rebound effect might have made threat 
words more accessible later, during the memory tests that were administered at the end of 
Studies 2 and 3. Some support for this proposal can be drawn from a recent study 
showing that thought suppression was associated with an explicit memory bias for threat 
as compared to neutral words (Kircanski, Craske, & Bjork, 2008). Kircanski et al., 




association between thought suppression and implicit memory, which contrasts with the 
current Study 3 findings. 
 To expand on this line of reasoning, the results of Studies 2 and 3 may suggest 
that cognitive avoidance is not only a predictor of memory bias, but a better predictor of 
memory bias than anxiety. The lack of consistent findings in the field of memory and 
anxiety may have emerged because a separate process, such as cognitive avoidance, must 
interact with anxiety in order to produce a memory bias. For example, a highly anxious 
individual may show enhanced attention for threat, but only show a memory bias if they 
also have a cognitively avoidant style that leads them to engage in thought suppression. In 
this case, all anxious individuals would show an attentional bias for threat, but only those 
who are also cognitively avoidant would show a memory bias. Interestingly, these ideas 
broadly parallel the framework of Williams et al. (1997), in the sense that biases in 
attention may not necessarily imply the type of processing that would result in biased 
memory. In the scenario proposed above, memory might only result from the enhanced 
accessibility and elaboration of stimuli that occurs due to the rebound effects of thought 
suppression. It is noteworthy that many models of GAD currently include cognitive 
avoidance as an important contributor to worry and anxiety (e.g., Borkovec et al., 1998; 
Dugas, Marchand, et al., 2005 ). The results of the current studies suggest the possibility 
that cognitive avoidance is not only be related to anxiety and worry, but to an avoidant 
information processing style that predicts the development of memory bias for threat. 





Suggestions for Future Research 
 While the research hypotheses received limited support, some suggestions for 
future research can nevertheless be derived from the current studies. The first set of 
recommendations concern some of the methodological issues raised in the literature 
review. In particular, the outcomes of the current research highlight the need for careful 
selection of word stimuli in information processing research. Study 1, for example, 
showed successful word matching in accord with standard information processing 
procedures, as well as good construct validity. However, differences in the imageability 
and concreteness of uncertain and physical threat words were found. Because of this, 
research conclusions about findings concerning IU, and cognitive avoidance of physical 
threat, can only be tentatively made. Given that most studies in this area have not made 
detailed analyses of word stimuli, these types of characteristics have remained largely 
uncontrolled and may have influenced research outcomes. Given enough time and 
resources, the preferred procedure would be to pilot test stimuli in advance of the 
research, using the population of interest (i.e., students, high trait anxious individuals, 
patients seeking treatment, etc.). A less time-consuming alternative, however, may be to 
obtain participant ratings of stimuli following testing, and use these ratings when 
interpreting results. This is an approach used to good effect in some previous studies (i.e., 
Becker et al., 1999). In order to reduce the burden on participants, the of ratings could be 
limited to valence and imageability. While previous research shows that imageability and 
concreteness can be differentiated, some researchers suggest that concrete words are more 
memorable because of their higher imageability (Altarriba et al., 1999; Paivio et al., 




the facilitated processing of both highly concrete and imageable words. In addition, if 
stimuli related to a specific symptom or disorder are of interest, pre-selection of these 
stimuli by experts would be recommended, with more detailed pilot testing using a small 
target population. However it is approached, adding some form of stimulus rating to 
future studies would clarify whether uncontrolled characteristics of stimuli are 
influencing study outcomes. 
 A further area for investigation concerns the role of stimulus relevance in 
information processing. As outlined in the literature review, only one other study to date 
has specifically examined this question (Coles et al., 2007). In the current research, 
participants were simply asked to rate each stimulus word on its personal relevance. 
While the question used to assess stimulus relevance in this study appeared to have good 
face validity, different means of wording such a question, and less time-consuming 
ratings via computer presentation, could improve measurement. It might also be useful to 
pilot test different stimulus relevance questions to determine how participants interpret 
them; this may be particularly useful when asking participants to rate words, such as 
uncertain words, that may be less clearly applicable to personal concerns. Furthermore, 
different means of analysis could be considered. In Study 3, for example, stimulus 
relevance was averaged across each word type, and this average was then used as a 
predictor. Future studies might involve analysis of individual stimulus words that are high 
on relevance, rather than an averaging across words. However this question is 





 Findings from the current research suggest that cognitive avoidance, and more 
specifically, avoidance of threatening stimuli and thought suppression, may be associated 
with memory for threat. Future studies could be carried out to explore this association. 
For example, incidental learning of different types of words could be administered to 
participants high and low in trait anxiety; levels of cognitive avoidance could be used as a 
predictor of memory outcomes. Such a design might reveal whether cognitive avoidance 
and anxiety interact to produce a memory bias for threat, or whether cognitive avoidance 
alone is related to a memory bias (i.e., if high cognitive avoidance predicts memory for 
threat, regardless of levels of trait anxiety). A further extension would be to explore the 
effect of different types of cognitive avoidance on memory in high and low trait anxious 
individuals; as in the current study, thought suppression and avoidance of threatening 
stimuli may emerge as a key forms of avoidance related to memory. 
 Finally, suggestions can be made concerning future investigations of IU, worry, 
and memory. If the current group of studies were replicated, some improvements might 
render them more effective. For example, pilot testing a large pool of uncertain words in a 
sample of high worriers may produce stimuli more representative of the uncertainty 
construct. In the same vein, the current studies could be carried out in high worry groups, 
and clinical samples of GAD patients. While research suggests that worry exists on a 
continuum (Olatunji et al., 2010; Ruscio et al., 2001), there are nevertheless qualitative 
differences between clinical and non-clinical worriers (i.e., Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004), 
which may affect information processing. More generally, including measures of both 
attention and memory would enhance future research. Because the goal of the current 




However, a focus on one aspect of processing is necessarily limited; in the current 
studies, for example, attentional factors are likely to have influenced memory outcomes. 
Measurement of several aspects of processing within the same study would therefore 
provide a more complete picture. An adaptation of the Study 3 procedure might include a 
Stroop task for encoding, with measurement of colour naming latency as a measure of 
attention toward threat. This could then be followed by an implicit test of memory 
(tachistoscopic identification of Stroop and distractor words). A similar approach has 
been used in several previous studies, some of which have assessed both attention and 
memory (i.e., MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; Mathews et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1989). 
To date, this has resulted in mixed findings, possibly due to some of the procedural issues 
already discussed; nevertheless, these studies provide a model for the type of procedure 
that would be beneficial for this area of research. This approach would have the further 
advantage of providing a more complete test of the Williams et al. (1997) model, which, 
although not specifically supported by the current study, provides a comprehensive 
account of much of the research in this area. 
 Another avenue for future research might be to move away from the use of words 
altogether. As previously noted, some researchers advocate more ecologically valid 
means of evaluating information processing biases (i.e., McNally, 1995). The results of 
the current studies certainly highlight the many factors that can influence participant 
responses to word stimuli. One alternative to word stimuli might be to ask participants to 
complete a task which induces uncertainty. For example, participants might view a series 
of simple shapes on a computer screen. They could be asked to make some type of 




(for example, keys marked negative; positive; incomplete; complete). Participants could 
be told that their task is to decide how to respond, without further instructions as to how 
they should proceed. Individuals high in IU would be expected to experience more 
anxiety, and less tolerance for uncertainty, during this task; their responses are likely to be 
slowed compared to those low in IU. If, moreover, the stimuli varied in their clarity 
(either visual sharpness or identifiability as specific objects), individuals high in IU might 
be expected to show longer response latencies as stimuli became less clear. A subsequent 
memory test might show that high IU individuals, when engaged in an uncertain task, 
have a memory bias for uncertain stimuli. If needed, levels of threat might be manipulated 
through instructions that either imply there is no right way to respond (low threat), or that 
there is only one right way to respond (high threat). While this approach would eliminate 
some of the problems associated with word stimuli, it is limited in the sense that creating 
stimuli that represent other categories of information (neutral, threatening, positive, etc.) 
would be difficult. Potentially, using images that depict differently valenced scenes might 
be used. This is an approach applied by Koerner and Dugas (2007), who used images 
derived from the International Affective Picture System classified as neutral, positive, 
threatening, or ambiguous, to explore the role of IU in interpretation. Some of their 
findings suggested that individuals high in IU made more negative interpretations of 
negative and ambiguous scenes, compared to individuals low in IU. The type of images 
used in their study could be adapted to the type of uncertainty manipulation described 
above. While interesting, this proposal still suffers from a potentially limited relationship 
to real life topics of concern for participants. The study conducted by Coles and 




determine current worry themes for each participant; some representation of these themes 
could then be used as testing material. Rather than yoking worriers with controls, 
however, moderate worriers could be yoked to high worriers; in this way, high and 
moderate worriers could be matched on worry themes, and identical stimuli administered 
to each yoked pair of participants. With this design, it might be possible to detect 
differences in attention and memory among worriers lower and higher in IU.  
 In conclusion, while the results of these studies did not establish the role of IU in 
memory for threat and uncertainty, they did generate several observations and potential 
directions for future research. Findings concerning cognitive avoidance in particular may 
suggest new avenues for exploring memory bias in anxiety. While designing meaningful 
studies of information processing and IU will remain a challenge, the endeavor is a 
valuable one. This type of research will serve to clarify the cognitive processes that 
underlie worry, and inform theoretical models of anxiety disorders such as GAD. 
Although there is empirical support for models such as that proposed by Dugas and 
colleagues (Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998), the specific mechanisms underlying processes 
such as IU remain to be elucidated. Information processing frameworks, whether 
traditional or innovative in their application, have the potential to answer fundamental 
questions about how processes such as IU operate. Further studies concerning the 
processes underlying memory are urgently needed; this is underscored by the lack of 
clarity in existing research, and the debate concerning which conceptual models should be 
used to guide future research. Hopefully, studies such as this one will serve to enhance 
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Study 1: Set 1 Pilot Words Used in the Concreteness, Familiarity, Imageability, 
Uncertainty, and Valence Questionnaires 
 
1 2 3 4 
unforeseen unsafe interval disaster 
platform sketch inspiration underaged 
despised chance combination mortified 
inhabit answer theoretical unload 
integrity epidemic casualty inferior 
unsanitary joyful uncertain unlisted 
additional alley accepted feverish 
symmetrical possibility mutilated actual 
unsure nausea intelligence unselfish 
emergency generous unloved lethal 
literal unafraid injury interior 
rude substitute destroy many 
surprising methodical search pleasant 
compliment collision install caring 
lonely undecided rural unpeel 
ignorant measure information great 
unanticipated undo massacre unlock 
infection early imprecise unsettled 
perhaps universal unhealthy unique 
vague sandy dangerous attractive 
unpin understanding unclear incompetent 
import pitiful inadequate under 
heroic maimed probability ingredient 
ambiguous immature idiot annual 
guess virus untalented isolated 
questionable happy inanimate ridiculed 
intern neutral adored every 
origin unspecified unsweetened admired 
popular ineffective hated assault 
unexpected inconclusive pathetic because 
past disapproval uneducated  
 
Note. Words are in the randomized order used in the pilot testing questionnaires listed 
above; this order reads from top to bottom, beginning with column 1. Set 1 includes 20 
positive, 20 social threat, 20 physical threat, 20 uncertain, and 43 neutral words, for a 





Study 1: Set 2 Pilot Words Used in the Concreteness, Familiarity, Imageability, 
Uncertainty, and Valence Questionnaires 
 
1 2 3 4 
unwell criticized unresolved convulsion 
customary positive vertical unpredictable 
comprehensive  illness unknown inventory 
puzzling unearth horizontal changeable 
loser hesitation death  contaminated 
underwater unplanned pain faithful 
applause toxic selection insensitive 
charming random unrecorded brutality 
poisonous stupid insecure foolish 
unflavoured quantity beautiful sickness 
mangled failure approval friendly 
unashamed similar fluctuating debatable 
worthy unkind instruction unattractive 
unroll irregular humiliated mathematical 
indefinite violence disease ignored 
introverted supply peaceful fatal 
unit torture inept confident 
mysterious unpack indistinct doubtful 
geographical entire praise blink 
tentative good apparent about 
inside kill fracture alphabet 
unfold unglued delightful inexact 
untreatable love unpaved embarrassed 
enthusiastic tricky disgrace outside 
modern unilingual untie injection 
offended indicate reciprocal exterior 
unstick square optimistic recent 
likeable verse unsold mocked 
varying coward unsophisticated talented 
accident presence wonderful height 
ashamed maybe nation  
 
Note. Words are in the randomized order used in the pilot testing questionnaires listed 
above; this order reads from top to bottom, beginning with column 1. Set 2 includes 20 
positive, 20 social threat, 20 physical threat, 20 uncertain, and 43 neutral words, for a 















Words differ in the extent to which they refer to concrete objects, persons, places or things that can be
seen, heard, felt, smelled, or tasted, as contrasted with abstract concepts that cannot be experienced 
by our senses. In this questionnaire you will be asked to rate a list of words with respect to their 
"concreteness" in terms of sensory experience. 
Any word that refers to objects, materials, or persons, should be given a high concreteness 
rating (at the upper end of the numerical scale). Any word that refers to an abstract concept 
be rated as low concrete (or abstract). Words can make you think of other words by association, but it
is important that you only rate the concreteness of each specific word.
that cannot be experienced by the senses should be given a low concreteness rating (at the
lower end of the numerical scale). 
For example, think of the word "Carpet", which can be experienced by our senses and therefore should
be rated as high concrete; the word "Option" cannot be experienced by the senses and therefore should 
 
 
Note. In order to conserve space and limit the length of the Appendices, only a sample of 
the first page of this questionnaire is provided. The remaining pages are identically 
formatted (with the exception of the instructions), and include the remaining study 





Study 1 Familiarity Questionnaire 
 
in speech either: 






Simply rate each one regardless of its meaning.
FAM
This is a questionnaire to find out how often you have come in contact with certain words. Below is a list
of words. Please rate each one on the number of times you have experienced it by circling a number  
under one of the five adjectives provided. The five possible adjectives are NEVER, RARELY, SOMETIMES, 
OFTEN.................  You have often seen or heard or used the word, but not very often
OFTEN, and VERY OFTEN. This means you have seen or heard or used the particular word in writing or
NEVER................. You have never seen or heard or used the word in your life
RARELY..............  You have seen or heard or used the word at least once before, but only rarely
SOMETIMES......  You have sometimes seen or heard or used the word, but not often
VERY OFTEN.....  You have seen or heard or used the word nearly every day of your life
Do not be concerned if you are unable to give a definition of some of the words. 
 
 
Note. In order to conserve space, only a sample of the first page of this questionnaire is 
provided. The remaining pages are identically formatted (with the exception of the 
instructions), and include the remaining study stimuli, in the order presented in 





Study 1 Imageability Questionnaire 
 
Any word that in your opinion arouses a mental image (i.e., a mental picture, or 
sound, or other sensory experience) very quickly and easily should be given a 
high imagery rating (at the upper end of the numerical scale). Any word that 
imagery rating  (at the lower end of the numerical scale).
Difficult to Easy to 
Form a form a 
mental image mental image
1. Unforeseen …….….…1….….…..……..……2…..……..……..……3…..……..…… ..…4……..…..………..…5…..……..…… 6……..…..…..…7…..……..
2. Platform …….….…1….….…..……..……2…..……..……..……3…..……..…… ..…4……..…..………..…5…..……..…… 6……..…..…..…7…..……..
3. Despised …….….…1….….…..……..……2…..……..……..……3…..……..…… ..…4……..…..………..…5…..……..…… 6……..…..…..…7…..……..
4. Inhabit …….….…1….….…..……..……2…..……..……..……3…..……..…… ..…4……..…..………..…5…..……..…… 6……..…..…..…7…..……..
5. Integrity …….….…1….….…..……..……2…..……..……..……3…..……..…… ..…4……..…..………..…5…..……..…… 6……..…..…..…7…..……..
easily  and would be rated as high imagery; "Relevant" would probably do so with difficulty and be
 rated as low imagery. Words can make you think of other words by association, but it is important
 that you only rate how easy it is to form a mental image of each specific word.
asked to rate a list of words on the ease or difficulty with which they arouse mental images.   
 
arouses a mental image with difficulty or not at all should be given a low 
IMG
Words differ in their capacity to arouse mental images of things or events. Some words arouse a 
sensory experience, such as a mental picture or sound, very quickly and easily, whereas other words 
may do so only with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or not at all. In this questionnaire you will be 
For example, think of the word "Buffalo". "Buffalo" would probably arouse an image relatively 
 
 
Note. In order to conserve space, only a sample of the first page of this questionnaire is 
provided. The remaining pages are identically formatted (with the exception of the 
instructions), and include the remaining study stimuli, in the order presented in 





Study 1 Uncertainty Questionnaire 
 
Refers
Does not refer Refers a little  moderately Refers a lot Refers perfectly
 to uncertainty to uncertainty to uncertainty to uncertainty to uncertainty
1. Unforeseen ………..……1………..….……… ...…2…...……….…..…………3……..…….…… ..……4……..…….……..………5……..…….
2. Platform ………..……1………..….……… ...…2…...……….…..…………3……..…….…… ..……4……..…….……..………5……..…….
3. Despised ………..……1………..….……… ...…2…...……….…..…………3……..…….…… ..……4……..…….……..………5……..…….
4. Inhabit ………..……1………..….……… ...…2…...……….…..…………3……..…….…… ..……4……..…….……..………5……..…….
5. Integrity ………..……1………..….……… ...…2…...……….…..…………3……..…….…… ..……4……..…….……..………5……..…….




Note. In order to conserve space, only a sample of the first page of this questionnaire is 
provided. The remaining pages are identically formatted (with the exception of the 
instructions), and include the remaining study stimuli, in the order presented in 





Study 1 Valence Questionnaire 
 
Neutral
Very A little (Neither positive A little Very 
negative  negative nor negative) positive positive
1. Unforeseen ………..…1………..…..……. …2…….……... .…3………….…... …4……..……... …5………..…..
2. Platform ………..…1………..…..……. …2…….……... .…3………….…... …4……..……... …5………..…..
3. Despised ………..…1………..…..……. …2…….……... .…3………….…... …4……..……... …5………..…..
4. Inhabit ………..…1………..…..……. …2…….……... .…3………….…... …4……..……... …5………..…..
5. Integrity ………..…1………..…..……. …2…….……... .…3………….…... …4……..……... …5………..…..
VAL
How much of a negative or positive connotation do the following words have?
 
 
Note. In order to conserve space, only a sample of the first page of this questionnaire is 
provided. The remaining pages are identically formatted (with the exception of the 
instructions), and include the remaining study stimuli, in the order presented in 





Study 1 General Information Questionnaire 
 
Sex:     Male _____ Female _____
Education:
University year :      1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ other ___________
Field of study :       Psychology ______  
           Other (Please specify) _____________________________
Status : full-time ______ part-time ______
First Language:         English ______   
French______
Other (please specify) ______
If English is not your first language, do you consider yourself fluent in English?
Yes No
Race / Ethnicity: (check one)
African-American / Black / Caribbean Origin ______
Asian-American / Asian Origin / Pacific Islander ______
Latino-a / Hispanic ______
American Indian / Alaska Native / Aboriginal Canadian ______
European Origin / White  ______
Bi-racial / Multi-racial ______
Middle Eastern  ______ 
Other (Please Specify)________________________________
General Information






Study 1 Consent form 
 
Consent form to Participate in Research 
 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research conducted by Kylie Francis 
from the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory under the supervision of Dr. Michel Dugas, both of whom 
may be reached at 848-2424 ext. 2229. 
 
PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to obtain ratings of the concreteness, 
imageability, familiarity, uncertainty, and positive/negative characteristics of a series of words. 
 
PROCEDURE 
I have been informed that the study involves the following procedures: I will be asked to sign a 
consent form, and fill out a general information sheet. Then, I will be asked to complete a 
questionnaire package in which I will rate a set of words on their concreteness, imageability, 
familiarity, uncertainty, and positive/negative characteristics. The questionnaire should take 30 - 45 
minutes to complete. My name will only appear on the consent form, and code numbers alone 
will be used to identify the questionnaires. The signed consent form will be stored separately 
from my responses to the questionnaires; all these documents will be kept under lock and key. I 
understand that my participation in the experiment, and the information I provide, are strictly 
confidential. As compensation for either participating in or observing this study, I will receive 
one course credit as outlined on the Psychology Department‘s Participant Pool website:  
http://www-psychology.concordia.ca/Participants/index.html. 
 
CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:  
 I understand that I am free to decline to participate in the experiment without negative 
consequences. 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any 
time without negative consequences.  
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researcher will know, 
but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
 
 
I HAVE CURRENTLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print)   
SIGNATURE   
WITNESS SIGNATURE   
DATE   
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Adela Reid, 










Title of Study: An investigation of information-processing biases related to worry: Pilot testing of 
stimulus word sets. 
 
 
Principal Investigator: Kylie Francis, M. A, Doctoral candidate 
Supervisor: Michel J. Dugas, Ph. D, Associate Professor of Psychology 
 
 
Summary of the research: Recent research suggests that individual differences in how people 
process information (information processing biases) may underlie the tendency to worry 
excessively. A study that will soon be carried out in the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory concerns 
information processing biases toward different types of words. In order to carry out this research, 
however, specific sets of words need to be selected for the research. The words that will be used 
need to be very similar (matched) on several characteristics: concreteness, imageability, 
familiarity, degree of uncertainty, and positive/negative valence. Matching is important because 
differences in these characteristics may make some words stand out more than others. For example, 
if a word is very unfamiliar, it may be more noticeable. Therefore, if these characteristics are not 
matched, and a participant processes one word differently than another, it would be impossible to 
know whether this was because of the word type, or because of differences in characteristics such as 
familiarity. The goal of this study was therefore to obtain participant ratings of a large set of words 
on the 5 characteristics. These ratings will be analyzed so that each word will have an average 
rating for concreteness, imageability, familiarity, uncertainty, and positive/negative valence. This 




If you have any questions or concerns about this research, feel free to contact the Anxiety 
Disorders Laboratory, (514) 848-2424 ext, 2229. Email: anxiety@alcor.concordia.ca. 
 
You may also contact the Chair of the Psychology Department Ethics Committee, Adam S. 
Radomsky, Ph.D., at ADAM.RADOMSKY@concordia.ca . 
 
Or you may consult Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, 




Suggestions for further reading: 
 
 MacLeod, C. & Rutherford, E. (2004). Information-processing approaches: Assessing the 
selective functioning of attention, interpretation, and retrieval. In Cynthia L. Turk & Richard G. 
Heimberg (Eds), Generalized anxiety disorder: Advances in research and practice (pp.109-142). 





Study 2 Consent form 
 
Consent form to Participate in Research 
 
This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research conducted by Kylie Francis 
from the Anxiety Disorders Laboratory under the supervision of Dr. Michel Dugas, both of whom 
may be reached at 848-2424 ext. 2229. 
 
PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between 




I have been informed that the study involves the following procedures: I will be asked to sign a consent 
form. Next, I will be asked to view a series of words and carry out information-processing tasks. Finally, I 
will be asked to fill out a general information sheet and questionnaires that assess how people react in 
different types of situations. Participation should take approximately one hour. My name will only appear 
on the consent form, and code numbers alone will be used to identify the questionnaires. The signed 
consent form will not be kept with my responses to the questionnaires, and all these documents will be kept 
under lock and key. I understand that my participation in the experiment, and the information I provide, are 
strictly confidential. As compensation for either participating in or observing this study, I will receive one 
course credit as outlined on the Psychology Department‘s Participant Pool website:  
http://www-psychology.concordia.ca/Participants/index.html. 
 
CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:  
 I understand that I am free to decline to participate in the experiment without negative 
consequences. 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any 
time without negative consequences.  
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researcher will know, 
but will not disclose my identity). 
 I understand that the data from this study may be published. 
 
 
I HAVE CURRENTLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print)   
SIGNATURE   
WITNESS SIGNATURE   
DATE   
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 514-848-2424, x. 





Study 2 Familiarity Rating Sheet 
 
 
Not at all Moderately Very 


















Note. In order to conserve space, only a sample of the first page of this questionnaire is 





Study 2 Recognition Sheet 
 
For each word, please make a check under ―NO‖ or ―YES‖. 
If you are not sure, follow your first guess. 
Was this word  
presented earlier? 
 NO YES 
random   
great   
mocked   
varying   
tricky   
customary   
vague   
mutilated   
imprecise   
mysterious   
integrity   
sickness   
generous   
enthusiastic   
unsanitary   
doubtful   
puzzling   
unlisted   
inferior   
actual   
chance   
confident   
entire   
ingredient   
adored   
delightful   
rude   
maybe   
hesitation   
rural   





For each word, please make a check under ―NO‖ or ―YES‖. 
If you are not sure, follow your first guess. 
Was this word  
presented earlier? 
 NO YES 
literal   
talented   
disapproval   
ambiguous   
worthy   
uncertain   
virus   
universal   
pleasant   
lethal   
modern   
debatable   
incompetent   
questionable   
caring   
exterior   
feverish   
ignored   
every   
hated   
irregular   
unselfish   
ridiculed   
epidemic   
good   
admired   
optimistic   
geographical   
methodical   
wonderful   
contaminated   
theoretical   
apparent   
 









Title of Study: Working with words: An investigation of information-processing biases 
related to worry.  
 
Principal Investigator: Kylie Francis, M. A, Doctoral candidate 
Supervisor: Michel J. Dugas, Ph. D, Associate Professor of Psychology 
 
 
Summary of the research: Recent research suggests that individual differences in how 
people process information (information processing biases) may underlie the tendency to 
worry excessively. The goal of this study is to test information processing biases toward 
different types of information (in this study, words will be used). Participants are first 
asked to view words of different types and carry out information-processing tasks. After 
viewing the words, participants are asked to fill out a set of questionnaires. Based on their 
responses to the questionnaires, participants will be divided into two groups. These 
groups will be compared on how they processed different types of words. This research 
will help to clarify previous research in the area, which has been inconsistent. 
Furthermore, this research may suggest that certain types of words are useful for 
examining information-processing biases related to worry. Finally, the findings may have 
implications for the treatment of excessive worry. Specifically, researchers may 
investigate whether changing information processing biases during psychotherapy is an 
effective way to reduce chronic worry. 
 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, feel free to contact the Anxiety 
Disorders Laboratory, (514) 848-2424 ext, 2229. Email: anxiety@alcor.concordia.ca. 
 
You may also contact Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., member of the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee, at ADAM.RADOMSKY@concordia.ca . 
 
Or you may consult Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 
University, at 514-848-2424, x. 7481, or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca . 
 
 
Suggestions for further reading: 
 
 MacLeod, C. & Rutherford, E. (2004). Information-processing approaches: 
Assessing the selective functioning of attention, interpretation, and retrieval. In Cynthia 
L. Turk & Richard G. Heimberg (Eds), Generalized anxiety disorder: Advances in 





Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) 
 
Not at all Somewhat Entirely
characteristic characteristic characteristic
of me of me of me
1. Uncertainty stops me from 
having a firm opinion.   ........................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
2. Being uncertain means that a 
person is disorganized.    .....................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
3. Uncertainty makes life 
intolerable.    .........................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
4. It's unfair not having any 
guarantees in life.   ..................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
5. My mind can't be relaxed if I
don't know what will happen 
tomorrow.    .....................................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, 
anxious, or stressed.    .............................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
7. Unforeseen events upset me 
greatly.    .....................................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
8. It frustrates me not having all 
the information I need.    ...................................1 ..................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
9. Uncertainty keeps me from 
living a full life.    ............................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
10. One should always look ahead
so as to avoid surprises.    .............................1 ......................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
11. A small unforeseen event can 
spoil everything, even with the 
best of planning.    ..........................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
12. When it's time to act, 
uncertainty paralyses me.    ..........................1 .......................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
13. Being uncertain means that I am 
not first rate.    .......................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
IUS
You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the uncertainties 
of life. Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is characteristic of you. Please 





14. When I am uncertain, I can't go
forward.    ..............................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
15. When I am uncertain I can't 
function very well.    ....................................1 .......................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
16. Unlike me, others always seem 
to know where they are going 
with their lives.    ................................. .1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
17. Uncertainty makes me 
vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.    .............................1 ..............2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
18. I always want to know what the
future has in store for me.    ......................1 ..........................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
19. I can't stand being taken by 
surprise.    ......................................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
20. The smallest doubt can stop me
from acting.    ........................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
21. I should be able to organize 
everything in advance.    ...........................1 ..........................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
22. Being uncertain means that I 
lack confidence.    ..................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
23. I think it's unfair that other 
people seem sure about their 
future.    .................................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
24. Uncertainty keeps me from 
sleeping soundly.    ..........................................1............................2............................3.............................4...........................5...................
Behavior Research and Therapy, 40 , 931-945.
Origianl French Version:  Freeston, M.H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M.J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994):  Why do people worry?  
Personality and Individual  Differences, 17 (6), 791-802.
English Version: Buhr, K., Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainty scale: psychometric properties of the English version.
 
Note. The font and spacing of this questionnaire have been reduced to conserve space. In the 




 Appendix P 
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ) 
 
1. What subjects do you worry about most often?
a) ______________________________ d) _______________________________
b) ______________________________ e) _______________________________
c) ______________________________ f) _______________________________
2. Do your worries seem excessive or exaggerated?
Not at all Moderately Totally
excessive excessive excessive
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
3. Over the past six months, how many days have you been bothered by excessive worry?
1 day 
Never out of 2 Every day
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
4. Do you have difficulty controlling your worries? For example, when you start worrying about something, 












a) Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge.
Very 
Not at all Moderately Severely
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
b) Being easily fatigued.
Very 
Not at all Moderately Severely
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
c) Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank.
Very 








Not at all Moderately Severely
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
f) Sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep).
Very 
Not at all Moderately Severely
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
6. To what extent does worry or anxiety interfere with your life? For example, your work, social 
activities, family life, etc.?
Very 
Not at all Moderately Severely
……..…….0……….….1……….….2……….….3……….….4……….….5……….….6……….….7……….….8……….
you were worried or anxious? Rate each sensation by circling a number (0 to 8).
Over the past six months, to what extent have you been disturbed by the following sensations when 
Questionnaire: Validation in nonclinical and clinical samples]. Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 17, 31-
Questionnaire sur l'inquiétude et l'anxiété: Validation dans les échantillions non cliniques et cliniques [The Worry and Anxiety 
French Version: Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., Provencher, M. D., Lachance, S., Ladouceur, R., & Gosselin, P. (2001). Le 
 
 











1. On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no anxiety and 100 represents 
extreme anxiety, what is your current level of anxiety?  
 




2. On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no sadness and 100 represents 
extreme sadness, what is your current level of sadness? 
 




3. On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no irritability and 100 represents 
extreme irritability, what is your current level of irritability? 
 




4. On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents an absence of well-being and 100 
represents an extreme level of well-being, what is your current level of well-
being? 
 




5. On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no fatigue and 100 represents 
extreme fatigue, what is your current level of fatigue? 
 










Study 2 General Information Sheet 
 
General Information
Sex:     Male _____ Female _____
Education:
Highest Level Completed
Primary school _____ CEGEP_____ Bachelor's degree _____
Secondary school _____ Certificate _____ Master's/Doctorate _____
Field of study :       Psychology ______  Other (Please specify) _________________________
Currently a student? No ____ Yes _____
IF currently a student:  full-time ______ part-time ______
Work:
Status : full-time ______ part-time ______ not working ______
First Language:        
 English ______   French______ Other (please specify) _________________________
Race / Ethnicity: (check one)
African-American / Black / Caribbean Origin ______
Asian-American / Asian Origin / Pacific Islander ______
Latino-a / Hispanic ______
American Indian / Alaska Native / Aboriginal Canadian ______
European Origin / White  ______
Bi-racial / Multi-racial ______
Middle Eastern  ______ 
Other (Please Specify)________________________________






Age:   _____





Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Recall for Neutral Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .06 
 Constant  1.22 .37  [.48, 1.96] 
 Sex  -.26 .37 -.08 [-1.00, .48] 
 SDS  .03 .05 .07 [-.07, .13] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .24 [-.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.10 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .04 
 Constant  .39 .60  [-.80, 1.59] 
 Sex  -.22 .37 -.07 [-.95, .51] 
 SDS  .05 .05 .12 [-.05, .16] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .22 [-.00, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.12 [-.02, .01] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .20 [-.00, .03] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Recall for Uncertain Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .03 
 Constant  2.11 .41  [1.30, 2.92] 
 Sex  -.18 .41 -.05 [-.99, .63] 
 SDS  -.05 .06 -.10 [-.16, .07] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .10 [-.01, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.22 [-.03, .00] 
 
Step 2 .01 
 Constant  2.53 .67  [1.20, 3.86] 
 Sex  -.20 .41 -.06 [-1.01, .61] 
 SDS  -.06 .06 -.12 [-.17, .06] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .11 [-.01, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.21 [-.03, .00] 
 IUS  -.01 .01 -.09 [-.03, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Recall for Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  1.49 .37  [.77, 2.20] 
 Sex  -.20 .36 -.06 [-.92, .52] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.01 [-.11, .09] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .27 [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 
Step 2 .00 
 Constant  1.56 .60  [.37, 2.75] 
 Sex  -.20 .37 -.06 [-.93, .53] 
 SDS  -.01 .05 -.02 [-.11, .10] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .27 [.00, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.14 [-.02, .01] 
 IUS  -.00 .01 -.02 [-.02, .02] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 






Study 2: Hierarchical Regression with Sex, Social Desirability, Mood, and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Predicting Recall for Positive Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .05 
 Constant  2.63 .41  [1.81, 3.45] 
 Sex  -.64 .41 -.17 [-1.45, .18] 
 SDS  -.06 .06 -.12 [-.17, .05] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .18 [-.01, .03] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.18 [-.03, .01] 
 
Step 2 .02 
 Constant  1.89 .67  [.56, 3.21] 
 Sex  -.60 .41 -.16 [-1.41, .22] 
 SDS  -.04 .06 -.08 [-.16, .07] 
 SUDSanx  .01 .01 .17 [-.01, .02] 
 SUDSirr  -.01 .01 -.20 [-.03, .00] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .16 [-.01, .03] 
 
 
Note. n = 86. CI = confidence interval for B. SDS = Social Desirability Scale; SUDS = 





 Appendix W 
Study 3 Telephone Screening 
 
PHONE INTERVIEW - Study 3 
“As I mentioned, the first step in this study is a 20-minute phone screening. That’s because we’re looking for 
people who meet specific criteria for our research. So, I’ll be asking you some questions, and filling out your 
answers on a form as we talk. Everything that you tell me is completely confidential, and the form will be 
stored in a locked cabinet. If you meet the requirements, you’ll be invited to come to the lab for the study. 
However, based on your answers, it may be that you are not eligible for the study. In that case I won’t be 
able to invite you to take part in the experiment. Are you still willing to continue with the phone screening?”  
Interviewer name:            
 
Participant name:         Date:    
 
Age:     (must be 18-65) 
 
First Language  ENGLISH     OTHER    (EXCLUDE) 
Defined as the language they spoke at home on a daily basis before the age of 5 
Normal or corrected to normal vision? YES _____ NO_____ (EXCLUDE)  
 Glasses or contacts are fine as long as their vision is normal while wearing them 
 
Normal or corrected to normal hearing? YES ____NO_____ (EXCLUDE)  
 
Are you currently taking any medication? If YES, What medication? How long have you been 
taking it at that dose? Establish exact dose per day, and duration. If they take anxiety medications 
as needed (PRN) , establish frequency & stability. To be included in the study, medication & dose 
should have been stable for 4 weeks (though a reduction is less problematic than an increase). 
             
MEDICATION STABLE (or none) YES    NO   * If NO, but 
medication would meet criteria for stability in near future, ask whether participant is willing to 
wait, maintaining a stable dose, in order to participate. Also inform them that a requirement 
for the study is not to take any drugs, or drink alcohol, or take any NEW medications 
(including cold medication) the night before or the day of the study. Verify that this is ok with 
them. 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed as having a reading disability or speech impediment?  
 YES ____ (EXCLUDE) NO _____ 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or any other mental 
illness? YES ____ (EXCLUDE) NO _____ 
If YES: Specify:            
 
Can you can tell me what motivated you to call about the study? 






1a. In general, what are some of the things you tend to worry about? 
a)              
b)              
c)              
d)              
1b. Do your worries seem excessive or exaggerated to you? 
   YES _____ NO _____ 
IF you are unsure of participant‟s report: Why do you think they [are/are not] exaggerated? 
             
1c. Do you have trouble controlling your worries? For example, once you start to worry, do 
you have difficulty stopping? If unclear, ask whether worries persist even when he/she does 
not want to worry; if they do, check YES. 
   YES _____ NO _____ 
**If NO to 1b and 1c skip to DEPRESSION section. If YES to 1b or 1c continue to question 2.  
 
2. Recently, have you been bothered by worries more days than not? i.e., in the last few 
months. If participant is unsure, ask whether he/she is worried most of the time, half the time, or 
less than half the time. If most or more than half of the time, check YES. 
   YES _____ NO _____ 
3. On a typical day during the past month, how much time did you spend worrying? 
 Can be reported in mins, hrs, or %, as preferred; specify which when recording response 
             
4. During the past six months, have you been bothered by: 
 a) Feeling agitated, over-excited or “on-edge  YES _____ NO _____ 
 b) Fatigue      YES _____ NO _____ 
 c) Difficulties concentrating, mind going blank;  YES _____ NO _____ 
 d) Irritability      YES _____ NO _____ 
 e) Muscle tension     YES _____ NO _____ 
 f) Sleep problems      YES _____ NO _____ 
 




5. Do your worries or anxiety interfere with your life (your work, social activities, family, 
etc)? If unclear, ask whether worry and anxiety lead to avoidance of activities; problems with 
friends or family, difficulties at work, inability to relax or enjoy things, emotional distress, etc.  
  YES _____ NO _____  If YES, the person meets interference criteria. 
 
6. For how long have worries or anxiety been a problem for you? [Would you say you’ve 
always been a worrier? When did you start to notice that?] i.e., number of months or years since 
worries became a problem. Can ask in terms of development (childhood, teens, 20s, etc.), life 
events (CEGEP, University, jobs, birth of children), or particular age when worries first became a 
problem. 
      YEARS  ____  MONTHS 
GAD :  NOT PROBABLE      PROBABLE    
OTHER ANXIETY DISORDER:  NOT PROBABLE     PROBABLE   
If other anxiety disorder probable, specify:       
 
DEPRESSION 
1a. Recently, have you been feeling depressed, sad, or empty? i.e., in the past 2 weeks. 
   Depressed:  YES _____ NO _____ 
Lately, have you lost interest or pleasure in almost all of your usual activities? 
   Loss of interest  YES _____ NO _____ 
 
1b. Recently, have other people commented that you seem sad or down? 
   Depressed:  YES _____ NO _____ 
Has anyone recently said you seem less interested in things you usually enjoy? 
   Loss of interest  YES _____ NO _____ 
 
**If NO to 1a and 1b skip to question 5a. If YES to either 1a or 1b continue to question 2. 
 
2. Have you been feeling [depressed/lacking interest] nearly every day over the past two 
weeks? 
   Depressed:  YES _____ NO _____ 
   Loss of interest  YES _____ NO _____ 
 
3. Over the past 2 weeks, have you: 
Read symptoms below; if YES ask whether present most days (if so, check „Most days‟). 
   Most days? 
3a. Lost or gained a significant amount of weight? e.g. 5% of 
body weight within a month. Had a major decrease or 
increase in appetite? 
YES NO 
 




3c. Felt so agitated you couldn’t sit still, or so slowed down it 
was hard to move or carry on a conversation? 
YES NO 
 
3d. Been fatigued, tired, or lacking energy? YES NO  
3e. Have you felt extremely guilty, worthless, or blamed 
yourself for things? worthlessness or excessive, 
inappropriate guilt..  
YES NO 
 
3f. Felt your thinking was slowed down, or you had trouble 
concentrating? Had trouble making decisions?  
YES NO 
 
3g.* Had thoughts about death or hurting yourself? Have you 






3h. If symptoms seem severe: How have these symptoms of depression interfered with your 
life (e.g. daily routine, job, social activities)? How much do they bother you? 
            
             
DEPRESSION: NOT PROBABLE     PROBABLE    (EXCLUDE) 
 
**EVEN IF EXCLUDED:  
 IF PERSON RESPONDED YES TO 3g, CONTINUE TO QUESTION 4. 
If person responded NO to 3g, check “LEVEL 0” in SUICIDALITY section, and continue with 
question 5. Offer participant referral/number for help with depression if suicidality is not 
present. 
 
4. IF person responded YES to 3g: What kind of thoughts of death or suicide have you had? 
Assess: Concreteness of ideas; presence of specific plan; access to method for carrying out plan; 
specific timeline for plan; ability to state reasons for living. Note the difference between actual 
suicidal ideation and self-harm obsessions. In Self-harm obsessions, thoughts about death or 
harming oneself are intrusive in that the person does not want to have them (egodystonic). The 
person may fear that because they are having these thoughts, they might commit suicide without 
actually wanting to. 
 
            
             
 
5a. ASK ONLY IF NOT CURRENTLY DEPRESSED: It sounds like your mood is fairly good right 
now; have you had any thoughts about death or harming yourself? Check level below 
 
SUICIDALITY Based on the person‟s description p. 4-6, check one of the 4 LEVELS below: 
  LEVEL 0: No current suicidal ideation 
  LEVEL 1: Vague thoughts about suicide, but no plan 
  LEVEL 2: Fuzzy plan (i.e. would take pills, but don‟t know specifically what pills, or how 
many are needed, or where to get these pills etc…) 
  LEVEL 3: Clear plan, but no intention or timeline of when it will take place 
  LEVEL 4: Clear plan and clear intention of when it will take place 
 
5b. Have you ever acted on thoughts about suicide, or attempted suicide in the past?  
 If YES, How long ago? 
  ATTEMPT 0: Never attempted suicide 
  ATTEMPT 1: Suicide attempted more than 2 years ago 
  ATTEMPT 2: Suicide attempt made within the past 2 years 
 
Based on the responses above, check one of the categories below: 
 
ATTEMPT 0 
+ LEVEL 0   OK 
+ LEVEL 1   OK 
+ LEVEL 2   EXCLUDE  
+ LEVEL 3   EXCLUDE  
+ LEVEL 4   EXCLUDE  
 
ATTEMPT 1 
+ LEVEL 0   OK 
+ LEVEL 1   EXCLUDE 
+ LEVEL 2   EXCLUDE 
+ LEVEL 3   EXCLUDE 
+ LEVEL 4   EXCLUDE 
 





ATTEMPT 2  
+ ANY LEVEL = EXCLUDE  
 
IF EXCLUDED AT LEVEL 3 or LEVEL 4: Put participant on hold; ask Kylie to take the call. 
Any other level of exclusion: Confirm absence of immediate intention; give referral/number for 




1. Currently, do you gamble? 
   YES _____ NO _____ 
If YES, Has gambling caused you financial problems? Has it caused problems with your friends 
or family, school or work? Have you tried to stop gambling but have been unable to? 
             
PROBLEM GAMBLING: NOT PROBABLE     PROBABLE  
 (EXCLUDE)  If participant is excluded, offer referral/number for helpline.  
 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
1. Currently, how much alcohol do you drink? Specify number, type, and amount of alcoholic 
beverage used and indicate time period; e.g., "three 12 oz. beers per week.") 
             
If alcohol use seems excessive: Has your drinking created problems at school or work? With your 
friends or family? Have you tried to stop drinking but have been unable to 
             
2. Besides alcohol, do you currently use other substances such as marijuana, cocaine, or 
other recreational drugs? 
   YES _____ NO _____ 
 If YES, What do you use? Typically, how much and how often?  
             
If use seems excessive: Has it caused problems at school or work? With your friends or family? 
Have you tried to stop but have been unable to? 
             
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
 NOT PROBABLE     PROBABLE   (EXCLUDE) 





AT END OF INTERVIEW 
Thank participant; Inform them whether they are eligible for the study, based on their 
answers. If eligible, schedule them for testing, reminding them that they should not 
take any substances the day of, or the night before, testing. *Schedule on Gmail 
calendar. 
OPTIONAL SECTION – ADMINISTER ONLY IF NEEDED / UNSURE 
NON-ORGANIC PSYCHOSIS 
Has there ever been a time when you had strange or unusual experiences such as: 
a) Hearing or seeing things that other people didn't notice?  YES _____ NO _____ 
b) Hearing voices or conversations when no one was around? YES _____ NO _____ 
c) Having visions that no one else saw?   YES _____ NO _____ 
d) Having the feeling that something odd was going on around you, that people were doing 
things to test you or antagonize or hurt you so that you felt you had to be on guard 
constantly?        YES _____ NO _____ 
If YES to any of the above, specify:         
             
PSYCHOSIS: NOT PROBABLE     PROBABLE   (EXCLUDE) 









Study 3 Calibration Sheet 
 
   CALIBRATION   
        
 83 ms Correct?   67 ms Correct?  
1 UNDO    1 RECENT    
2 VERSE    2 ORIGIN    
3 MEASURE    3 ALPHABET    
4 NEUTRAL    4 UNLOCK    
5 QUANTITY    5 INTERVAL    
6 INFORMATION    6 EARLY    
7 UNFOLD    7 INSTRUCTION    
  TOTAL =     TOTAL =   
        
 50 ms Correct?   33 ms Correct?  
1 MANY     1 UNIT    
2 PAST    2 SANDY    
3 ANSWER    3 IMPORT    
4 UNDERAGED    4 INSTALL    
5 INSIDE    5 SUBSTITUTE    
6 MATHEMATICAL    6 PRESENCE    
7 SIMILAR    7 UNSWEETENED    
  TOTAL =     TOTAL =   
        
Circle duration that is participant's WORST performance (fewest correct) 
   If two or more are equal, select the LOWER number (i.e., faster duration). 
 If 7, 6, 5, or 4 correct…….…….. use one duration FASTER   
 If 3 or 2 correct…………………… use SAME duration   
 If 1 or 0 correct…………………… use one duration SLOWER   
        
  100 ms    
  83 ms Select duration   
  67 ms  for Wd ID task   
  50 ms  (circle one)   
  33 ms    
  17 ms    
 Math start time:      Recall start time:     






Study 3 Distractor Task 
 
         
 
841             
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              










Title of Study: An investigation of information-processing biases related to worry.  
 
Principal Investigator: Kylie Francis, M. A, Doctoral candidate 
Supervisor: Michel J. Dugas, Ph. D, Associate Professor of Psychology 
 
 
Summary of the research: Attempts to understand how people attend to, interpret, and 
remember information have led to a growing body of what is called ‗information 
processing‘ research. Recently, researchers have proposed that specific information-
processing biases may underlie the tendency to worry excessively. The goal of this study 
is to test information processing biases toward different types of information (in this 
study, words are used). Participants are first asked to view words of different types and 
carry out information-processing tasks. After viewing the words, participants are asked to 
fill out a set of questionnaires and take part in a brief interview. Based on their responses 
to the questionnaires and interview, participants will be divided into high and low worry 
groups. These groups will be compared on how they processed different types of words. 
This research will help to clarify previous research in the area, which has been 
inconsistent. Furthermore, this research may suggest that certain types of words can be 
effectively used to examine information-processing biases related to worry. Finally, the 
findings may have implications for the treatment of excessive worry. Specifically, 
researchers may investigate whether changing information processing biases during 
psychotherapy is an effective way to reduce chronic worry. 
 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, feel free to contact the Anxiety 
Disorders Laboratory, (514) 848-2424 ext, 2229. Email: anxiety@alcor.concordia.ca. 
 
You may also contact Virginia Penhune, Ph.D., chair of the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee, at penhune@alcor.concordia.ca. 
 
Or you may consult Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 
University, at 514-848-2424, x. 7481, or by email at Adela.Reid@Concordia.ca . 
 
Suggestions for further reading: 
 
 MacLeod, C. & Rutherford, E. (2004). Information-processing approaches: 
Assessing the selective functioning of attention, interpretation, and retrieval. In Cynthia 
L. Turk & Richard G. Heimberg (Eds), Generalized anxiety disorder: Advances in 





The Stimulus Relevance Questionnaire (SRQ) 
 
Please carefully read the words below and rate each word on how relevant it is to you; 
In other words, rate how much each word corresponds to events or topics that are 
currently important to you (i.e. within the past month). Rate each word by circling the
appropriate number, where:
Please make a rating for every word, even though the relevance of some words may 
not be readily apparent.













































34. UNSANITARY…….… …...….0…...……….… .1………….….2………….….3………….…..…..4…...…
35. EPIDEMIC………………….0………….….1………….….2………….….3………….….. ….4…...…




40. EVERY…………….… …...….0…...……….… .1………….….2………….….3………….…..…..4…...…
41. IGNORED………………….0………….….1………….….2………….….3………….….. ….4…...…








50. RURAL…………….… …...….0…...……….… .1………….….2………….….3………….…..…..4…...…
51. WORTHY………….………….0………….….1………….….2………….….3………….….. ….4…...…












64. LITERAL…………..…...….0…...……….… .1………….….2………….….3………….…..…..4…...… 
 
Note. The font and spacing of this questionnaire have been reduced to conserve space. In the 









Please make a response by checking ONLY ONE of the boxes below. Even if you think 
more than one answer may be correct, please choose only one answer, the answer that 
seems most correct to you.  
 
What do you think the purpose of the computer tasks was? (i.e., NOT the written 
questions) 
 
 To assess the speed of your perceptual ability when working with words 
 To measure your verbal ability 
 To measure how quickly you can co-ordinate auditory instructions, visual material, and 
verbal responses 
 To measure memory for different words 
 To assess how your vocabulary affects your perceptual speed when working with words 
  Don‘t know / none of the above 
 
 
Please briefly explain why you chose this answer (unless you checked ―Don‘t know‖): 
 
        
        
        
        





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Recall of Neutral Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .04     
 Constant  .59 .73  [-.86, 2.03 ] 
 Age  -.02 .01 -.21 [-.03, .00] 
 Sex  -.12 .21 -.06 [-.53, .30] 
 Vocab  .02 .03 .08 [-.04, .08] 
 
Step 2 .01     
 Constant  .46 .74  [-1.02, 1.93] 
 Age  -.02 .01 -.20 [-.03, .00] 
 Sex  -.09 .21 -.04 [-.51, .33] 
 Vocab  .02 .03 .06 [-.04, .08] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .10 [-.00, .01] 
 
Step 3 .00     
 Constant  .51 .77  [-1.02, 2.04] 
 Age  -.02 .01 -.20 [-.03, .00] 
 Sex  -.08 .21 -.04 [-.51, .35] 
 Vocab  .02 .03 .06 [-.04, .08] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .10 [-.00, .01] 
 SRn  -.00 .01 -.03 [-.02, .01] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Recall of Uncertain Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .02     
 Constant  .96 1.01  [-1.04, 2.96] 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.07 [-.03.02] 
 Sex  -.27 .29 -.10 [-.85, .30] 
 Vocab  .02 .04 .05 [-.06, .10] 
 
Step 2 .02     
 Constant  .70 1.02  [-1.32, 2.72] 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.07 [-.03, .02] 
 Sex  -.21 .29 -.08 [-.79, .36] 
 Vocab  .01 .04 .02 [-.07, .09] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .14 [-.00, .02] 
 
Step 3 .02     
 Constant  .36 1.04  [-1.70, 2.43] 
 Age  -.00 .01 -.02 [-.03, .02] 
 Sex  -.28 .29 -.11 [-.87, .30] 
 Vocab  .01 .04 .03 [-.07, .09] 
 IUS  .00 .01 .05 [-.01, .02] 
 SRun  .02 .01 .18 [-.01, .04] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Recall of Threat Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .04     
 Constant  -.15 .70  [-1.54, 1.25] 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.06 [-.02, .01] 
 Sex  -.33 .20 -.17 [-.73, .07] 
 Vocab  .04 .03 .14 [-.02, .09] 
 
Step 2 .01     
 Constant  -.24 .72  [-1.66, 1.18] 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.06 [-.02, .01] 
 Sex  -.31 .20 -.16 [-.71, .10] 
 Vocab  .03 .03 .12 [-.03, .09] 
 IUS  .00 .00 .07 [-.01, .01] 
 
Step 3 .01     
 Constant  -.21 .72  [-1.63, 1.22] 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.07 [-.02., 01] 
 Sex  -.33 .21 -.17 [-.74, .08] 
 Vocab  .03 .03 .13 [-.02, .09] 
 IUS  .00 .01 .01 [-.01, .01] 
 SRt  .01 .01 .12 [-.01, .03] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 





Study 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Demographics, Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, and Stimulus Relevance Predicting Recall of Positive Words 
 
 
Predictor  ∆R2 B SE B β 95% CI  
 
Step 1 .00     
 Constant  1.42 1.07  [-.71, 3.54] 
 Age  .00 .01 .02 [-.02, .03] 
 Sex  .08 .31 .03 [-.53, .69] 
 Vocab  -.01 .04 -.03 [-.10, .08] 
 
Step 2 .02     
 Constant  1.13 1.08  [-1.02, 3.27] 
 Age  .00 .01 .02 [-.02, .03] 
 Sex  .14 .31 .05 [-.47, .76] 
 Vocab  -.02 .04 -.06 [-.11, .06] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .16 [-.00, .02] 
 
Step 3 .00     
 Constant  .95 1.34  [-1.70, 3.61] 
 Age  .00 .01 .02 [-.02, .03] 
 Sex  .14 .31 .05 [-.48, .76] 
 Vocab  -.02 .05 -.05 [-.11, .07] 
 IUS  .01 .01 .16 [-.00, .02] 
 SRpos  .00 .01 .03 [-.02, .03] 
 
 
Note. n = 98. CI = confidence interval for B. Vocab = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; IUS = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; SRpos = stimulus relevance for positive words. 
 
 
 
 
